Harden v. Conwell
| Decision Date | 28 October 1920 |
| Docket Number | 7 Div. 98 |
| Citation | 205 Ala. 191,87 So. 673 |
| Parties | HARDEN v. CONWELL. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Jan. 13, 1921
Appeal from Circuit Court, Etowah County; W.J. Martin, Judge.
Trespass and trover by T.A. Conwell against J.H. Harden. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Transferred from Court of Appeals under Acts 1911, p. 449, § 6. Affirmed.
Goodhue & Brindley, of Gadsden, for appellant.
James D. Giles and Thomas H. Stevens, both of Gadsden, for appellee.
The main question to be determined upon this appeal is whether or not the rental contract had been forfeited by the tenant, the appellee, before the appellant drew the staple and took possession of the house in question. If there had been a forfeiture by the tenant, under the terms of the contract the owner or agent was authorized to re-enter and take possession of the building without notice, etc. The appellant contends that the contract had been forfeited by the appellee, for the reason that the store was to be occupied as a meat market and he had ceased to so use or occupy it several weeks before the re-entry by the appellant. The undisputed evidence shows that the appellee had not abandoned or vacated the store entirely, as he left it locked, retained the key, and also left stored therein several articles of personal property but that he did cease to conduct a meat market therein and had removed therefrom all butcher's tools, instruments or appliances used in or connected with the market business, and had, in fact, ceased to use the building as a market. The rental contract says, "for occupation as a market and not otherwise," and the appellant's insistence is that this provision required the maintenance of a market at all times, and that when the appellee discontinued his market and ceased to use the building as such he breached the above-quoted provision of the contract, and that under another clause the owner had the right to enter and retake possession. We are not able to agree with appellant's counsel as to this contention, and think that the provision above quoted merely restricted the use of the building as a market, and did not contemplate or require that the appellee must conduct a market continuously during the entire period of the lease. In other words, it did not require him to conduct a market, but merely forbade the use of the house for any other business, trade, or calling. We,...
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Pantz v. Nelson
... ... Bigelow v. Heintz, 53 N.J. L. 69, 21 A. 109; ... Woolley v. Carter, 7 N.J. L. 85; Whittler v ... Sharp (Utah), 135 P. 112; Harden v. Conwell, ... 205 Ala. 191, 87 So. 673; Bitterman v. Hern (Tex. Civ ... App.), 32 S.W. 341; American Surety Co. v. Hill ... County, 254 ... ...
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Pantz v. Nelson
...440; Bigelow v. Heintz, 53 N.J.L. 69, 21 Atl. 109; Woolley v. Carter, 7 N.J.L. 85; Whittler v. Sharp (Utah), 135 Pac. 112; Harden v. Conwell, 205 Ala. 191, 87 So. 673; Bitterman v. Hern (Tex. Civ. App.), 32 S.W. 341; American Surety Co. v. Hill County, 254 S.W. 241, 267 S.W. 265; Delano v. ......
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Roan v. McCaleb, 1 Div. 630
...to return the Ford, though not accepted by plaintiff, could be considered by the jury in mitigation of punitive damages. Harden v. Conwell, 205 Ala. 191, 87 So. 673; 89 C.J.S., Trover and Conversion, § 199, p. 661, note 14, also §§ 180-187, pages There are only two rulings of the court whic......