Harden v. Fields
| Decision Date | 15 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | 9:18-CV-162 (MAD/CFH) |
| Parties | ANTHONY HARDEN, Petitioner, v. LEROY FIELDS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
| APPEARANCES: |
| OF COUNSEL: |
| ANTHONY C. HARDEN |
| Petitioner pro se |
| OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK |
| STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL |
| 28 Liberty Street |
| New York, New York 10005 |
| Attorney for Respondent |
| PRISCILLA I. STEWARD, AAG. |
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
On February 8, 2018, Petitioner pro se Anthony Harden ("Petitioner") filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which he challenges a 2013 judgment of conviction in Albany County, upon a jury verdict, of two counts of second degree assault. Dkt. No. 1; see also People v. Harden, 134 A.D.3d 1160, 1160 (3d Dep't 2015). Petitioner raises the following grounds for habeas relief: (1) the New York State Supreme Court, Albany County, violated his due process rights by improperly charging the jury on the defense of justification and by failing to instruct the jury that if it found Petitioner justified with respect to the first-degree assault counts, it could not consider lesser included counts of second-degree assault; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely object to the trial court's justification instruction; and (3) appellate counsel was ineffective because he: (a) misunderstood the trial record and erroneously argued that the jury rejected the justification defense; (b) briefed claims that were unpreserved for appeal; and (c) failed to argue that the imposition of consecutive sentences was illegal. Dkt. No. 1 at 5-12. In a Report-Recommendation and Order, Magistrate Judge Hummel recommended denial and dismissal of the petition in its entirety. See Dkt. No. 22 at 3. Petitioner has not objected to the Report-Recommendation and Order. For the reasons that follow, the petition is denied and dismissed.
In June 2013, following a jury trial in New York State Supreme Court, Albany County, Petitioner was convicted of two counts of assault in the second degree in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 120.05(2). See Dkt. No. 1 at 1; Harden, 134 A.D.3d at 1160. Petitioner was adjudicated to be a second felony offender and sentenced to determinate prison terms of seven years, plus five years of post-release, and five years, plus five years of post-release supervision, with the sentences to run consecutively. See Dkt. No. 1 at 1; Harden, 134 A.D.3d at 1160; Dkt. No. 11-2 at 437, 448.
Petitioner's appellate counsel filed a brief in the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, arguing that: (1) Petitioner's convictions for second degree assault were not supported by the weight of the evidence; (2) the jury's rejection of the defense of justification was not supported by the weight of the evidence; (3) the court's jury chargeconcerning the defense of justification was "confusing and an incorrect statement of law"; and (4) the imposition of consecutive sentences was "harsh and excessive." See Dkt. No. 11-1 at 160, 162 (capitalization omitted); see id. at 155-64. Petitioner also filed a pro se supplemental brief, arguing that: (1) the trial court's "jury instruction improperly removed an issue of fact, failing to allow the jury a fair consideration of defendant's justification defense, depriving him of a fair trial"; (2) the trial court "failed to instruct the jury that a finding of not guilty by reason of justification[] precluded consideration of the lesser included offenses"; (3) trial counsel was ineffective because she "failed to make a timely objection to the [t]rial [c]ourt's improper jury instruction"; and (4) the trial court erred in polling the jury only as to the counts on which he was convicted, but not as to the counts on which he was acquitted. Dkt. No. 11-2 at 460-74.
In a decision and order dated December 3, 2015, the Appellate Division denied Petitioner's direct appeal and affirmed the trial court's July 23, 2013 judgment of conviction. See Harden, 134 A.D.3d at 1165. Petitioner, represented by counsel, moved for leave to appeal from the December 3, 2015 decision and order of the Appellate Division at the New York State Court of Appeals, arguing that: (1) the Supreme Court's justification charge was incorrect; (2) defense counsel timely objected to the court's justification charge; and (3) the jury should have been polled on all counts. See Dkt. No. 11-3 at 2-5.
By order dated June 7, 2016, the New York State Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's motion for leave to appeal. See id. at 6; People v. Harden, 27 N.Y.3d 1133 (2016).
On April 12, 2016, Petitioner filed a pro se motion to vacate the judgment of conviction pursuant to N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law section 440. See Dkt. No. 11-3 at 8. Petitioner argued, as relevant here, that: (1) the Supreme Court's justification instruction was erroneous; (2) trialcounsel was ineffective for (a) failing to timely object to the court's justification charge; (b) acquiescing in the court's polling of only the charges upon which Petitioner was convicted, but not those of which he was acquitted; (c) failing to preserve arguments that the justification instruction was erroneous and that the jury polling was defective; and (d) failing to object to the imposition of consecutive sentences; and (3) Supreme Court's imposition of consecutive sentences was illegal. See id. at 8-24. The People did not file a response in opposition. See Dkt. No. 10-1 at 9.
In a May 19, 2016 decision and order, the New York State Supreme Court, Albany County, denied Petitioner's motion in its entirety. See Dkt. No. 11-3 at 177. The court held that all issues raised by Petitioner in his CPL 440 motion were "or could have been, raised on the appeal which was decided and therefore this motion must be denied." Id. at 175 (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(3)(a), (c)).
On June 16, 2016, Petitioner sought leave to appeal the Supreme Court's May 19, 2016 decision and order denying his CPL 440 motion. See Dkt. No. 11-3 at 179-85. On August 9, 2016, the Appellate Division denied Petitioner's application. See id. at 186.
On May 22, 2017,1 Petitioner filed a motion for writ of error coram nobis in the Appellate Division seeking to vacate that court's December 2015 decision and order. See Dkt. No. 11-3 at 187, 189. Petitioner argued, as relevant here, that "[a]ppellate [c]ounsel was ineffective for failing to raise a winning argument of the ineffectiveness of trial counsel, and instead raised issues that were unpreserved for appellate review[,]" including that appellate counsel "changed the dynamics of the argument[] by stating the jury rejected the defense of justification which[]cannot be inferred from a silent record[]." Dkt. No. 11-4 at 12. The People did not file a response to the petition. See Dkt. No. 10-1 at 9. On August 25, 2017, the Appellate Division, Third Department, denied Petitioner's motion for writ of error coram nobis. See Dkt. No. 11-4 at 83. Petitioner then sought leave to appeal the Appellate Division's denial of his motion for writ of coram nobis to the New York State Court of Appeals. See id. at 84. In an order dated November 10, 2017, the New York State Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's application for leave to appeal. See id. at 88. In February 2018, Petitioner filed the present petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Dkt. No. 1.
On April 16, 2021, Magistrate Judge Hummel issued a Report-Recommendation and Order recommending that the Court deny and dismiss the petition. See Dkt. No. 22. Specifically, Magistrate Judge Hummel found that Petitioner failed to exhaust his claims prior to bringing this suit, and that Petitioner's claims otherwise lacked merit. See Dkt. No. 22 at 36, 38, 40. Magistrate Judge Hummel also found that the Appellate Division's application of the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) regarding ineffective assistance of counsel claims was not unreasonable, and therefore recommended that Petitioner's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely object to the trial court's jury charge regarding the defense of justification be dismissed.
Neither party filed objections to Magistrate Judge Hummel's Report-Recommendation and Order.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") allows a federal court to grant habeas relief to a state prisoner only if a state court's adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409-10 (2000). A decision "involves an unreasonable application" of federal law where it "correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case." Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08. A petitioner must therefore demonstrate that the state court's decision was "so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). This is a "'highly deferential standard,'" requiring that state courts "'be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quotations omitted). However, "[i]t preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with Court's precedents." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102.
Where a state court denies a claim on the merits...
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