Harden v. Ritter

• Decision Date: 22 August 1997
• Citation: 710 So. 2d 1254
• Parties: Christine HARDEN v. Mary RITTER. 1 2960932.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

Page 1254

710 So.2d 1254

Christine HARDEN v.Mary RITTER. ¹

2960932.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

Aug. 22, 1997.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 26, 1997.

Certiorari Denied Feb. 20, 1998

Alabama Supreme Court 1970073.

Curtis Simpson, Sheffield, for appellant.

A. Mark Ritter, Florence, for appellee.

ROBERTSON, Presiding Judge.

Christine Harden appeals from a judgment entered by the Lauderdale County Circuit Court on the pleadings filed in her civil action against Mary Ritter.We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Harden filed a complaint in the trial court alleging that Harden and Ritter had entered into a contract for the construction of a residential dwelling, but that Ritter had breached the contract by providing defective materials and poor workmanship in the construction of the dwelling.While Count I of Harden's complaint sought damages based upon a general breach of contract theory, Count II claimed that Ritter's conduct violated Ala.Code 1975, § 7-2-314, a portion of the Uniform Commercial Code as codified in this state.Ritter answered the complaint, asserting various affirmative defenses and denying that she had entered into a contract for the construction of a dwelling; however, she contended that the parties had instead entered into an agreement whereby Harden would have an option to purchase certain real property from Ritter.

Subsequently, Ritter moved for a judgment on the pleadings, attaching her affidavit in which she averred that she had entered into an option contract with Harden.She also attached a copy of a document labeled "Option to Purchase Real Property."Ritter's motion contended that this option to purchase was the only contract between the parties and that "[a] clear reading of the document shows that [Ritter] breached none of the terms of the Option agreement and this Count is due to be dismissed."With respect to Count II, Ritter contended that Ala.Code 1975, § 7-2-314 does not apply to the sale of a residence because a house is not within the definition of "goods" under the Uniform Commercial Code.

After this motion was filed, the trial court entered a judgment on the pleadings in favor of Ritter.In its judgment, the trial court noted that Ritter had moved to strike her affidavit after filing the motion for judgment on the pleadings; it ruled that "[a]fter excluding the affidavit and upon hearing and reviewing said Motion, the Court is of the opinion that [Ritter's] motion is due to be GRANTED and said case is hereby DISMISSED."

With respect to the standard of review, Ritter's introduction of material outside the pleadings in support of her motion for judgment on the pleadings raises the question whether the judgment entered by the trial court is truly a judgment on the pleadings or is actually a summary judgment.Rule 12(c), Ala.R.Civ.P., provides as follows:

"After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56."

(Emphasis added.)

This provision sets forth a procedure analogous to the conversion of motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) to summary judgment motions.See5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 1371, at 541-43 (2d ed.1990).With respect to both motions to dismiss and motions for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court is vested with discretion to choose whether to consider materials outside the pleadings submitted in support of those motions.Id.§ 1366, at 491("The court has complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.");§ 1371, at 543("It is within the court's discretion whether to accept extra-pleading matter on a motion for judgment on the pleadings and treat it as one for summary judgment.");see alsoHomart Dev. Co. v. Sigman, 868 F.2d 1556, 1561(11th Cir.1989)("Merely because the judge peruses the material tendered does not automatically convert a Rule 12(c) motion into a Rule 56 motion.").In this instance, although the affidavit attached to Ritter's motion was necessarily presented to the trial court, it was excluded by the court, and the motion was therefore not converted to a summary judgment motion.

We thus apply the standard of review applicable to a judgment entered on the pleadings pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 12(c), Ala.R.Civ.P."A Rule 12(c)motion for judgment on the pleadings disposes of a case when the material facts are not in dispute."McCullough v. Alabama By-Prods. Corp., 343 So.2d 508, 510(Ala.1977)."When such a motion is made, the trial court reviews the pleadings filed in the case and, if the pleadings show that no genuine issue of material fact is presented, the trial court will enter a judgment for the party entitled to a judgment according to the law."B.K.W. Enterprises, Inc. v. Tractor & Equip. Co., 603 So.2d 989, 991(Ala.1992).Moreover, a judgment on the pleadings is subject to de novo review, and the facts in the complaint are to be accepted as true and are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.SeeOrtega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1524-25(11th Cir.1996).

We note that Count I of Harden's complaint alleges that the contract between Ritter and Harden was for the construction of a residential dwelling, with Ritter to receive $45,000 in consideration for construction of a dwelling for Harden.Harden further avers that Ritter breached this contract by providing defective materials and poor quality workmanship, including a defective or improperly installed heating system, carpet, bathroom tile and window, and interior doors and plumbing, as well as an uncompleted front porch and walls.These allegations state a cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability with respect to new homes that both this court and the Alabama Supreme Court have recognized as a matter of Alabama common law.SeeCochran v. Keeton, 47 Ala.App. 194, 199-200, 252 So.2d 307, 312(Civ.App.1970), aff'd, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So.2d 313(1971).While Ritter's answer denies these matters, and states that the parties' contract was in the nature of an option to purchase real property, her answer cannot alone operate to negate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning the nature of the parties' contract and whether...