Hardigree v. Lofton
| Decision Date | 30 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:17-CV-236-RWS |
| Parties | ANTHONY WAYNE HARDIGREE, Plaintiff, v. MARC LOFTON, CITY OF STATHAM, GARRETT SMITH, and CHAD NORRIS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
This case is before the Court on Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment [Doc. Nos. 55, 57, 59, and 60] and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 63].
This is a civil action related to the allegedly unlawful arrest of Plaintiff Anthony Wayne Hardigree on August 4, 2016, at a mobile home in Statham, Georgia.
Anthony Rodgers, known in the Statham community as "Antman" and/or "Ant," was the subject of a criminal drug investigation [Doc. No. 60-2, ¶ 1, admitted]. Based upon information from a confidential informant, law enforcement officers were conducting surveillance of a known drug house on Wall Road in Statham, Georgia, on August 4, 2016 [Doc. No. 57-2, ¶ 1, admitted]. Defendant Chad Norris, a Barrow County Sheriff's Deputy, and Defendant Marc Lofton, a City of Statham police officer, were involved in the surveillance operation [Doc. No. 60-2, ¶ 1, admitted]. Law enforcement observed Antman leaving the Wall Road residence in a red Ford Explorer [Doc. No. 57-2, ¶ 2, admitted]. After losing Antman, Defendant Norris made a call out on the radio to stop the Explorer [Id., ¶ 3, admitted; Doc. No. 60-2, ¶ 2, admitted].
Nicole Geiman, another Barrow County Sheriff's Deputy, followed up on the radio traffic connected to Antman and joined the search for his Explorer [Doc. No. 60-2, ¶ 3, admitted]. After a few minutes, Deputy Geiman spotted the Explorer near a mobile home located on McCarty Road in a mobile home park [Doc. No. 57-2, ¶¶ 5-6, admitted]. This mobile home was Plaintiff's residence [Id., ¶ 5, admitted]. As she pulled up, Deputy Geiman observed Antman leaving Plaintiff's residence carrying a bag or backpack over his shoulder and getting back into his Explorer [Doc. No. 60-2, ¶ 5, admitted]. Deputy Geiman approached the vehicle, and Defendant Lofton arrived shortly thereafter [Doc. No. 63-2, ¶¶ 13-14, admitted]. DefendantSmith, a Georgia State Patrol Trooper, was also asked to assist with the traffic stop [Doc. No. 55-1, ¶ 1, admitted].
Trooper Smith saw Deputy Geiman speaking with Antman through the driver's side door of the Ford Explorer [Id., ¶ 7, admitted]. Trooper Smith asked Antman for his driver's license and immediately noticed an odor of marijuana [Id., ¶ 8, admitted]. Deputy Geiman and Officer Lofton then arrested Antman and a female occupant of the Explorer [Doc. No. 63-2, ¶ 15, admitted]. Deputy Geiman, Trooper Smith, and Officer Lofton then searched the Explorer [Id., ¶ 16, admitted]. Inside the vehicle, they found approximately 29 grams of methamphetamine, some marijuana, and other drug paraphernalia [Doc. No. 55-1, ¶ 13, admitted]; Doc. No. 57-2, ¶ 12, admitted]. During the search and while waiting for Deputy Norris to arrive at the scene, Deputy Geiman informed Officer Lofton and Trooper Smith that she had seen Antman walking from Plaintiff's residence [Doc. No. 57-2, ¶ 13, admitted]. Deputy Norris arrived about twenty-five minutes after Deputy Geiman initiated the stop of the Explorer [Id., ¶ 15, admitted].
Trooper Smith then approached the mobile home to conduct a knock-and-talk with the residents [Doc. No. 55-1, ¶ 15, admitted]. One of the female residents, Torry Craig, answered the door [Id., ¶ 16, admitted]. Ms. Craig told Trooper Smiththat she did not know Antman but that her husband, Plaintiff Hardigree, had spoken with him [Id., ¶ 17, admitted]. Ms. Craig then left the doorway of the mobile home to get Plaintiff Hardigree [Id., ¶ 18, admitted]. Officer Lofton also approached the door to speak with Plaintiff [Doc. No. 57-2, ¶ 21, admitted]. Plaintiff stated that he did not know Antman well and that he was at the house to ask about a job at Plaintiff's brother's welding shop [Id., ¶ 19, admitted; Doc. No. 63-2, ¶ 25, admitted]. Officer Lofton interjected that Plaintiff was "in the game, too" [Doc. No. 57-2, ¶ 23, admitted]. Deputy Norris then approached the mobile home [Id., ¶ 25, admitted]. Trooper Smith then stepped away, returning to his patrol car for a short period of time and then standing near the door of the mobile home [Id.].
Deputy Norris asked for permission to come inside the residence to search it, but Plaintiff refused to give his consent [Id., ¶ 26, admitted]. He stated that the residence belonged to his sister [Id., ¶ 27, admitted]. Plaintiff argued with Officer Lofton and Deputy Norris about closing his door and terminating the police encounter; they told Plaintiff that he needed to exit the residence [Id., ¶ 29, admitted]. Instead, Plaintiff turned around to go farther inside the residence; he states that he did so to call his sister [Doc. No. 60-2, ¶¶ 19-20, admitted]. Deputy Norris then shouted "10-10," the code for a fight in progress. [Doc. No. 55-1, ¶ 26, admitted].
Officer Lofton entered the residence, followed by Deputy Norris, and tried to stop Plaintiff from continuing farther into the residence [Doc. No. 57-2, ¶ 38, admitted]. Officer Lofton then unholstered his taser and deployed it while Plaintiff was standing up and facing him [Id., ¶ 40, admitted]. Trooper Smith and Deputy Geiman rushed into the mobile home to assist [Id., ¶ 42, admitted]. Plaintiff was on the ground, and Officer Lofton ordered him to show his hands [Id., ¶ 43, admitted]. Plaintiff did not do so, and Officer Lofton used his taser in a "drive stun" [Id., ¶ 47, admitted]. Upon entering, Trooper Smith saw Plaintiff face-down on the ground while Officer Lofton deployed the taser prongs and Deputy Geiman attempted to place handcuffs on Plaintiff [Doc. No. 55-1, ¶ 28, admitted]. Plaintiff was then placed under arrest and charged with simple assault and battery (under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23), disorderly conduct (under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39), and obstructing law enforcement officers (under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24) [Doc. No. 55-1, ¶ 36, admitted].
Trooper Smith then conducted a protective sweep of the mobile home [Doc. No. 55-1, ¶ 32, admitted]. Trooper Smith's only interaction with Plaintiff during or after the use of force was after he had been placed under arrest and taken outside of the mobile home [Id., ¶ 37, admitted]. Trooper Smith did not use any hands-on force against Plaintiff [Id., ¶ 39, admitted].
This case was filed on November 13, 2017 [Doc. No. 1]. Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on March 16, 2018 [Doc. No. 27]. In Counts One, Two, and Four, Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the individual Defendants for unlawful entry, false arrest, and excessive force [Id.]. In Count Three, Plaintiff asserts a § 1983 claim against Defendant Lofton for malicious prosecution [Id.]. In Count Five, Plaintiff asserts state law claims against Defendants Lofton and City of Statham for false imprisonment, assault, battery, and malicious prosecution [Id.]. All parties have now moved for summary judgment [Doc. Nos. 55, 57, 59, 60 and 63].
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires that summary judgment be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). "The moving party bears 'the initial responsibility of informing the . . . court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.'" Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotingCelotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotations omitted)). Where the moving party makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the non-movant, who must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact does exist. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). The applicable substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. at 248. A fact is not material if a dispute over that fact will not affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 249-50.
In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Patton v. Triad Guar. Ins. Corp., 277 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2002). But, the court is bound only to draw those inferences that are reasonable. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 ().
The Court will discuss the qualified immunity doctrine generally and then address each party's arguments in turn.
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects governmental officials who are sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for money damages in their personal, or individual capacities, but only so long as "their conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v....
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