Hardigree v. Lofton

• Decision Date: 06 April 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-13352,19-13352
• Citation: 992 F.3d 1216
• Parties: Anthony Wayne HARDIGREE, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Marc LOFTON, Statham Police Officer, individually, Defendant - Appellant, City of Statham, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

992 F.3d 1216

Anthony Wayne HARDIGREE, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.Marc LOFTON, Statham Police Officer, individually, Defendant - Appellant,City of Statham, et al., Defendants.

No. 19-13352

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

April 6, 2021

William J. Atkins, Edmond Lindsay & Hoffler, LLP, ATLANTA, GA, Zack Greenamyre, Mitchell & Shapiro, LLP, ATLANTA, GA, for Plaintiff - Appellee.

Matthew Herbert Bennett, Bennett Law Office, LLC, GRIFFIN, GA, for Defendant - Appellant.

Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

WILSON, Circuit Judge:

Officer Marc Lofton appeals a district court order granting summary judgment to Anthony Wayne Hardigree on one claim and denying Lofton summary judgment on the same and other claims. Hardigree filed suit against Lofton under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia state laws in 2017.¹ He brought claims for unlawful entry, false arrest, excessive force, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, assault, and battery. His claims arose from an August 4, 2016, interaction with Lofton and other officers at his mobile home in Statham, Georgia. Both parties moved for summary judgment.

The facts of this case are disputed, and because there are dueling summary judgment motions, in some instances we must look at the facts in the light most favorable to Hardigree and in other instances in the light most favorable to Lofton. What is undisputed—and relevant to the challenge here—is that Lofton entered Hardigree's home without a warrant and without consent on August 4, 2016. Lofton deployed his taser on Hardigree and Hardigree was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct, obstruction, and simple battery. All charges were eventually dismissed. Hardigree then filed this suit.

The district court granted Hardigree's motion for summary judgment on the unlawful entry claim and denied it on all other claims. As to Lofton's motion for summary judgment, the court granted it for the federal malicious prosecution claim and denied it for all other claims. Lofton appealed. He argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because he did not violate Hardigree's constitutional rights, or alternatively, he is entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims.

After discussing the disputed facts, we first consider whether the district court erred by granting summary judgment to Hardigree on the unlawful entry claim. Next, we consider whether the district court's denial of summary judgment to Lofton on that claim was proper. Finally, we review the denial of summary judgment to Lofton on the false arrest, excessive force, and state law claims.

The facts of this case are heavily disputed and there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Lofton lawfully entered Hardigree's home. Therefore, summary judgment is improper. We reverse the grant of summary judgment to Hardigree on the unlawful entry claim. The disputed facts also color the remaining claims. Because genuine issues of material fact prevent finding for Lofton as a matter of law, we affirm the district court's denial of summary judgment, qualified immunity, and official immunity on all other claims.

I. Background

The following facts are undisputed: On August 4, 2016, Anthony Rodgers was the subject of a criminal drug investigation.² The police were surveilling a known drug house and observed Rodgers leave the house in a red Ford Explorer. An officer began to follow Rodgers but subsequently lost him. The officer radioed for assistance, and another officer soon spotted the red Explorer parked near a mobile home. The mobile home was Hardigree's residence.

As the officer pulled up, she observed Rodgers leaving Hardigree's home carrying a black bag. Once Rodgers got back into the Explorer, the officer approached the vehicle. While asking Rodgers for his license, the officer smelled marijuana. She subsequently searched the car. In the car, the officer discovered 29 grams of methamphetamines, some marijuana, and other drug paraphernalia.³ The officer arrested Rodgers and a female passenger.

Lofton had since arrived at the scene. He was informed that Rodgers had been seen walking from Hardigree's home. Roughly twenty minutes later, Lofton and other officers approached the mobile home to conduct a knock-and-talk. Torrey Craig, Hardigree's wife, answered the door. When asked if she knew Rodgers, she said no but that her husband had spoken to him; she then went to get Hardigree.

The conversation was audio-recorded. The officers asked about Rodgers, and Hardigree told them he did not know Rodgers but that Rodgers came to the house looking for work and asked for a bottle of water. The officers expressed skepticism at the story—noting that Rodgers was a known drug dealer so they did not think he would be looking for a job. The officers asked to search the house and Hardigree declined, saying it was not his house but his sister's house. An officer asked Hardigree to call his sister. Hardigree sought to close the door and end the conversation but Lofton told Hardigree he was not free to leave and was being detained. Lofton told him to stay where he was (in the house). The other officer told him to come outside.

At this point the stories diverge. Hardigree says that he announced he was "going to go and get the phone" to call his sister and get permission for a search. He turned and walked away from the door. Lofton then barged through the door into Hardigree's home.

Lofton says that Hardigree "abruptly and without warning turned and rushed further into the home." Lofton entered and reached out to grab Hardigree to stop him because he feared for his safety and believed Hardigree may be running to destroy evidence.

Per Hardigree, Lofton "immediately and without any warning deployed his taser." Hardigree "offered no resistance whatsoever to Lofton or the other officers." He fell face first on the ground screaming and begging Lofton to stop tasering him, but Lofton did not stop. One of the prongs of the taser went into Hardigree's penis. Lofton deployed the taser again through the prongs even though Hardigree was not resisting. Then, with Hardigree prone on the ground, Lofton detached the prongs and tasered him in drive stun mode. Lofton pushed the taser between Hardigree's legs up into his inner, upper thigh—close to his genitals. Lofton then arrested Hardigree.

According to Lofton, a brief struggle ensued once Lofton entered the home. After being shoved by Hardigree, Lofton unholstered his taser and deployed it while Hardigree was standing up and facing him. Lofton issued several commands to Hardigree to get on the ground and show his hands. After being tasered, Hardigree fell to the ground but his hands were underneath him. He failed to comply with continued commands to produce his hands and another officer struggled to place him in handcuffs. With Hardigree's hands near his waistband, Lofton used the taser in drive stun mode for compliance. Once Hardigree was handcuffed, no additional force was used and Hardigree regained full bodily function.

II. Standard of Review

We review a district court's grant or denial of summary judgment, including those based on qualified immunity, de novo. See Fils v. City of Aventura , 647 F.3d 1272, 1287 (11th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). All evidence and factual inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable doubts about the facts are resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Skop v. City of Atlanta , 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007) ; see also Fils , 647 F.3d at 1288 ("At summary judgment, we cannot simply accept the officer's subjective version of events, but rather must reconstruct the event in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and determine whether the officer's [actions were unlawful] under those circumstances.").

III. Qualified Immunity Standard

Qualified immunity protects government officials who are sued under § 1983 for money damages in their individual capacities. Immunity is appropriate so long as "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The doctrine balances "the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).

To avail oneself of qualified immunity, one must establish "that he or she acted within the scope of discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred." Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County , 972 F.2d 1230, 1236 (11th Cir. 1992). If so, courts then must determine whether the facts, viewed "in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury," show that "the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right" that was clearly established at that time. Saucier v. Katz , 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). To determine if a right is clearly established, we ask whether the state of the law on the date of the alleged misconduct placed defendants on "fair warning that their alleged treatment of [the plaintiff] was unconstitutional." Hope v. Pelzer , 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002).

IV. Unlawful Entry Claim

Hardigree claims that Lofton unlawfully entered his home in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The "very core" of the Fourth Amendment is "the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be...