Hardin v. Berghuis

Decision Date15 August 2011
Docket NumberCASE NO. 5:10-CV-11601
PartiesMARIO HARDIN, #251826, Petitioner, v. MARY BERGHUIS, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

HONORABLE JOHN CORBETT O'MEARA

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS, DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND
DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL
I. Introduction

This is a habeas case brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Michigan prisoner Mario Hardin ("Petitioner") was convicted of armed robbery, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.529, following a jury trial in the Oakland County Circuit Court. He was sentenced as a second habitual offender, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.10, to 10 to 40 years imprisonment, to be served consecutively to an unexpired term on a prior armed robbery conviction. In his pleadings, Petitioner raises claims concerning the sufficiency of the evidence and the effectiveness of trial counsel. For the reasons set forth, the Court denies the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court also denies a certificate of appealability and denies leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

II. Facts and Procedural History

Petitioner's conviction arises from his robbery at a party store in Oakland County, Michigan in 2007. The Michigan Court of Appeals set for the relevant facts, which are presumed correct on habeas review, see Monroe v. Smith, 197 F. Supp. 2d 753, 758 (E.D. Mich. 2001), aff'd. 41 F. App'x730 (6th Cir. 2002), as follows:

Defendant's conviction arises from a robbery at a party store in Waterford, Michigan, on July 8, 2007. Daniel Walters testified that when he was in the store's parking lot preparing to enter his car after purchasing a pack of cigarettes, he noticed defendant standing immediately behind him. Defendant had followed Walters out of the store. Walters testified that as he turned around "something was stuck to my side and I was asked to give my things [to defendant]." Specifically, Walters testified that defendant stated something to the effect of "you're going to give me all of your things." Walters complied and handed defendant his wallet and cigarettes; defendant then took the items and fled the scene. Walters testified that he did not see what defendant actually placed in his side, nor did he see any weapon or item that appeared to be a weapon in defendant's possession. However, he believed the item pressing against his side was a "foreign object, a gun" because the object "didn't feel like fingers ... it felt a little bigger, a lot more pressure to my side." The owner of the store also witnessed part of the confrontation, but he did not notice any weapon or item in defendant's left hand and was not in a position to observe what was in defendant's right hand. Defendant did not threaten to shoot, stab, or kill Walters, nor did he orally assert that he was in possession of a weapon. However, defendant admitted at trial that he planned to rob a store customer that day. Defendant defended the armed robbery charge by denying that he possessed a weapon or fashioned an article as a weapon. Specifically, he claimed that he was holding a bag of potato chips in his right hand and took Walters' property with his left hand. Yet, during a police interview, when defendant was asked why Walters informed police that a weapon was stuck in his side, defendant asserted that he physically touched Walters, who may have mistakenly thought defendant had a weapon.

People v. Hardin, No. 281382, 2009 WL 2168890, *1 (Mich. Ct. App. July 21, 2009) (unpublished).

Following his conviction and sentencing, Petitioner filed an appeal of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals asserting that: (1) the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to prove that he was "armed" to support his armed robbery conviction, and (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on the lesser offense of larceny. The court denied relief on those claims and affirmed Petitioner's conviction. Id at *1-4. Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied in a standard order. People v. Hardin, 485 Mich. 979, 774 N.W.2d 870 (2009).

Petitioner thereafter instituted this federal habeas action raising the same claims presentedto the state courts on direct appeal of his conviction. Respondent has filed an answer to the petition contending that it should be denied for lack of merit.

III. Standard of Review

The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), codified 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., govern this case because Petitioner filed this petition after the AEDPA's effective date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA provides:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. §2254(d) (1996).

"A state court's decision is 'contrary to' . . . clearly established law if it 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]' or if it 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent.'" Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). "[T]he 'unreasonable application' prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to 'grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of petitioner's case." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413); see also Bell, 535U.S. at 694. However, "[i]n order for a federal court find a state court's application of [Supreme Court] precedent 'unreasonable,' the state court's decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court's application must have been 'objectively unreasonable.'" Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (citations omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, _ U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333, n. 7; Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).

The Supreme Court recently held that "a state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). Pursuant to § 2254(d), "a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision" of the Supreme Court. Id. Thus, in order to obtain habeas relief in federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's rejection of his claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id.

Section 2254(d)(1) limits a federal habeas court's review to a determination of whether the state court's decision comports with clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; see alsoKnowles v.Mirzayance, _ U.S. _, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court "has held on numerous occasions that it is not 'an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law' for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court") (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2008) (per curiam)); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). Section 2254(d) "does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been 'adjudicated on the merits.'" Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 785. Furthermore, it "does not require citation of [Supreme Court] cases-indeed, it does not even require awareness of [Supreme Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002); see also Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 16. While the requirements of "clearly established law" are to be determined solely by Supreme Court precedent, the decisions of lower federal courts may be useful in assessing the reasonableness of the state court's resolution of an issue. See Stewart v. Erwin, 503 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 2003)); Dickens v. Jones, 203 F. Supp. 354, 359 (E.D. Mich. 2002).

A state court's factual determinations are presumed correct on federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A habeas petitioner may rebut this presumption only with clear and convincing evidence. See Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998)....

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