Hardin v. Crate

• Decision Date: 30 September 1875
• Parties: SETH W. HARDINv.JAMES V. S. CRATE.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

78 Ill. 533

1875 WL 8529 (Ill.)

SETH W. HARDIN

v.JAMES

v. S. CRATE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1875.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOHN G. ROGERS, Judge, presiding.

This was an action of ejectment, brought by Seth W. Hardin against James V. S. Crate, for the recovery of the west half of the north-east quarter of section 13, township 33 north, range 9 east, in Will county. The defendant recovered and the plaintiff appealed.

Mr. EDMUND S. HOLBROOK, for the appellant.

Messrs. GOUDY & CHANDLER, for the appellee.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the Court:

The facts in this case fully appear in the opinion delivered when the case was before us on a former appeal, 60 Ill. 215. The judgment was affirmed on the ground it was thought the evidence showed a complete bar to the title claimed by plaintiff, under the 9th section of the Conveyance Act of 1845. A new trial was taken under the statute, which resulted, as before, in a verdict for defendant, and from the judgment rendered thereon, plaintiff prosecutes this, his second, appeal.

On the evidence, and under the law as stated by the court, three distinct issues of fact were submitted to the consideration of the jury:

1st. Whether the deed from Bailey and Reynolds to Brower and Wynkoop was delivered on May 1st, 1841, the day it bore date, or not until it was acknowledged, in September, 1842. 2d. Whether the color of title obtained under the deed from the sheriff to Stuart was acquired in good faith.

3d. Whether defendant had actual possession of the lands for seven years before the commencement of this suit, under claim and color of title made in good faith; and whether, during that period, he paid all taxes legally assessed upon the lands.

If the jury found either of these propositions for defendant, it would defeat any recovery by plaintiff. A finding for defendant on the first proposition might show an outstanding title in the assignee in bankruptcy, as against plaintiff, and upon the second and third propositions, that a complete bar had been made out against plaintiff, under both the 8th and 9th sections of the Conveyance Act of 1845. The instructions given under the evidence would, perhaps, authorize the jury to find any or all the propositions for defendant. But the finding being general, we have no means of knowing how the jury found on the several propositions submitted. We can, with as much propriety, suppose they found one as another, and if it should appear the evidence would not support a finding for defendant as to any single proposition, or that the law applicable to the facts had been so erroneously stated as to mislead the jury, it would seem to follow there ought to be a new trial.

With regard to the first proposition, the jury were instructed that, if the deed dated May 1, 1841, purporting to be executed by Bailey and Reynolds to Brower and Wynkoop, acknowledged in September, 1842, was not, in fact, delivered until after Bailey and Reynolds had been adjudicated bankrupts, in March and July, 1842, and an assignee appointed, then they should find for defendant.

Waiving any discussion of the question of law contained in this charge, we may say the evidence as to the delivery of the deed was very slight, and it is exceedingly doubtful whether it was sufficient to overcome the presumption it was delivered on the day it bears date. But, assuming the law was stated correctly, we should, under the rule, be inclined to hold the verdict should stand, on the ground it is the province of the jury to settle all questions of fact.

As to the second proposition, the law was given with entire accuracy, and even favorably for plaintiff. That the deed from the sheriff to Stuart was color of title, was conclusively settled by our former decision, but as to the good faith of Stuart in obtaining color of title, this record contains some additional testimony which renders that question doubtful in the extreme, if it does not establish the fact of actual bad faith. After all, it is a question of fact for the jury, upon the evidence, and as the testimony is not of a conclusive character either way, if we could know they found it for defendant, we might say, as we could as to...