Hardin v. Hussmann Corp.

Decision Date07 March 1995
Docket NumberNo. 93-3926EM,93-3926EM
Citation45 F.3d 262
Parties66 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1369, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,516 William D. HARDIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HUSSMANN CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

David C. Howard, St. Louis, MO, for appellant.

Mark J. Bremer, St. Louis, MO, Robert Useted and Rebecca Stith, St. Louis appeared on the brief, for appellee.

Before MORRIS S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, JOHN R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and MELLOY, ** Chief District Judge.

MELLOY, Chief District Judge.

William Hardin appeals from a summary judgment granted to Hussmann Corporation (Hussmann) on his claim that Hussmann terminated his employment, at the age of 51, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. Secs. 621-634 (1982). The parties consented the case to a magistrate judge who held that Hussmann was entitled to summary judgment as Hardin was terminated pursuant to a reduction-in-force (RIF) and had failed to present a prima facie case of age discrimination. Hardin argues 1) the magistrate judge erroneously concluded that Hardin was required to show the more stringent prima facie case pursuant to a RIF; 2) even if there was a legitimate RIF, Hardin met the prima facie showing necessary; and 3) alternatively, the magistrate judge erred in ruling on the summary judgment before the completion of discovery. We Reverse.

I.

Hussmann hired Hardin in 1981 as a research engineer when Hardin was forty-three. Shortly after being hired, Jim Gaines, Hardin's first supervisor, told Hardin that it was unusual for Hussmann to hire someone over the age of forty as an engineer. In 1986, Hussmann transferred Hardin into its Research and Development Department (R & D) and gave Hardin the title of design engineer.

Shortly before Hardin's termination, he lent a technical book dating from the 1950's to Charles Thomas, Hussmann's Vice-President of Engineering. Upon returning the book, Thomas told Hardin that such an antiquated book should be kept out of sight as it might give their customers the wrong image. Hardin does not allege that Thomas took part in the decision to terminate him, however, Thomas did make the comment in the presence of Richard McCollum, the head of R & D who did make the decision to terminate Hardin.

In May of 1989, Hussmann's CEO decided that there would be a corporate downsizing and told the department heads how many personnel they would have to "lose." The CEO told McCollum he was to fire two of the approximately fifty-four employees in R & D. McCollum then met with his immediate subordinate, Richard Bienvenu, and after a thirty minute discussion, McCollum made the decision to terminate Hardin and twenty-eight year old design engineer Cynthia Monds. McCollum's proffered reason for his decision is that Hardin and Monds had the worst performance records and that they contributed the least to the department.

On April 3, 1989, Todd Russom, age twenty-six, transferred into R & D. Hussmann terminated Hardin on May 15, 1989. On May 22, 1989, David Zielinski, age thirty-three, transferred into R & D as an "evaluation engineer," and in June of 1989, Hussmann advertised to fill a "design engineer" position.

II.

As a preliminary matter, Hussmann has filed a motion before this court to strike Hardin's brief and portions of his appendix on the basis that Hardin did not submit portions of his appendix to the district court for its consideration of the summary judgment motion. Hardin does not dispute that he failed to submit to the district court most of the materials complained of by Hussmann, however, he argues that the additional materials have not prejudiced Hussmann. As we will not consider materials that were not before the district court, see Hicks v. Mickelson, 835 F.2d 721, 724 (8th Cir.1987), we grant Hussmann's motion to strike the additional materials. We deny the portion of Hussmann's motion asking that we strike Hardin's brief. The improper appendix material is largely irrelevant to Hardin's various contentions of error and we have taken appropriate note of the points in Hardin's brief that the improper materials support.

III.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Hase v. Missouri Div. of Employment Security, 972 F.2d 893, 895 (8th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2332, 124 L.Ed.2d 244 (1993). We will affirm the grant of summary judgment if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Bashara v. Black Hills Corp., 26 F.3d 820 (8th Cir.1994).

We make our de novo review recognizing that summary judgments should only be used sparingly in employment discrimination cases. Haglof v. Northwest Rehabilitation, Inc., 910 F.2d 492, 495 (8th Cir.1990); Hillebrand v. M-Tron Indus., Inc., 827 F.2d 363, 364 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004, 109 S.Ct. 782, 102 L.Ed.2d 774 (1988). Summary judgments should only be granted in those rare instances where there is no dispute of fact and where there exists only one conclusion. Id. "All the evidence must point one way and be susceptible of no reasonable inferences sustaining the position of the nonmoving party." Johnson v. Minnesota Historical Society, 931 F.2d 1239, 1244 (8th Cir.1991) (quoting Holley v. Sanyo Manufacturing, Inc., 771 F.2d 1161, 1164 (8th Cir.1985)).

Using the "shifting burdens" analysis laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), the plaintiff must first establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facia case of age discrimination. 1 More specifically, the plaintiff is required to show: 1) he was in the protected age group, i.e., older than forty; 2) he was qualified; 3) despite his qualifications, he was discharged; and 4) a non-member of the protected age group replaced the plaintiff and was assigned to do the same work. Kehoe v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 995 F.2d 117, 119 (8th Cir.1993).

The importance of the prima facie showing is that it creates the inference that the employer terminated the plaintiff for an impermissible reason. In recognition that a RIF is a legitimate reason for termination, we require plaintiffs discharged pursuant to a RIF, to come forward with an "additional showing" that age was a factor in their termination. Bashara v. Black Hills Corporation, 26 F.3d at 823. Further, if a plaintiff is terminated pursuant to a RIF, he or she cannot meet the fourth factor stated above as the plaintiff's position upon termination is either eliminated or combined with another position. Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., Inc., 771 F.2d at 1165.

Hardin argues that the magistrate judge erred when he found that there had been a legitimate RIF. Hardin admitted in his resistance to summary judgment that Hussmann had engaged in a RIF on the date of his termination, but argued that it was not a legitimate RIF. Hardin argues that the RIF was not legitimate as (1) Hussmann was not having financial difficulties and (2) Hussmann did not provide objective criteria to decide which positions to eliminate.

As we observed in Hillebrand, 827 F.2d at 367, most companies implementing a RIF have a stated plan to reduce expenses by eliminating jobs and they also provide company decision-makers with objective criteria by which to determine which jobs to eliminate. Hussmann asserts it embarked on a RIF because it had failed to meet the profit levels targeted by its parent corporation. Hussmann does not deny it failed to provide objective criteria, but argues that this does not require a finding that the RIF did not occur.

When a company's decision to reduce its workforce is due to the exercise of its business judgment it need not provide evidence of financial distress to make it a "legitimate" RIF. See Bashara, 26 F.3d at 824-25 (no requirement that a company be failing financially before embarking on a RIF). Further, a company does not need to provide objective criteria for determining who should be discharged to make the RIF "legitimate." Whether criteria is provided does not overcome the fact that the company made a business decision to reduce its workforce and therefore had a legitimate reason for terminating qualified employees. Accordingly, we find the magistrate judge correctly concluded that Hussmann terminated Hardin as part of a RIF and consequently, the magistrate judge correctly required Hardin to make the more stringent prima facie showing of a termination pursuant to a RIF.

IV.

In addressing the summary judgment motion, the magistrate judge, citing Holley, required Hardin to show the following factors to make a prima facie case of discrimination: 1) he was at least forty years old at the time of termination; 2) his job performance met the employer's legitimate expectations; 3) he was terminated despite his performance; 4) his job continued to exist in its various parts; and 5) his age was a determining factor in defendant's actions. The parties do not object to this list of requirements.

Hardin and Hussmann agree that Hardin met the...

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