Hardin v. State
| Decision Date | 29 May 2019 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-2629 |
| Citation | 124 N.E.3d 117 |
| Parties | Brian E. HARDIN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorney for Appellant: Glen E. Koch II, Boren, Oliver & Coffey, LLP, Martinsville, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Monika Prekopa Talbot, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] Brian E. Hardin appeals his conviction for dealing in methamphetamine as a level 2 felony. He raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence obtained from a vehicle located on the premises of a residence for which a search warrant was issued. We affirm.
[2] In September 2017, Indiana State Police Detective Joshua Allen was involved in an investigation into the finance and delivery of methamphetamine in Morgan County and surrounding counties. The main target of the investigation was Jerry Hall. Intercepted communications from a wiretap brought law enforcement's attention to Hardin.
[3] On September 26, 2017, Detective Allen completed an affidavit in support of a search warrant for Hardin's residence and asserted in part:
State's Suppression Hearing Exhibit 2.
[4] The court issued a search warrant, which states in part:
You are therefore AUTHORIZED AND ORDERED, in the name of the State of Indiana, with the necessary and proper assistance, to enter into (upon) the following described residence, to-wit: single story gray sided residence, with a partial brick front, and attached garage, and partially covered front porch with the numeric 5426 attached located at 5426 Collett Drive East, Camby, Morgan County, Indiana ....
State's Suppression Hearing Exhibit 1.
[5] Detective Allen, Indiana State Trooper Kent William Rohlfing, Detective Matt Fleener, and Indiana State Trooper John Patrick, arrived at Hardin's residence to execute the search warrant around 11 p.m. on September 26, 2017. Officers initially cleared the residence for subjects and then began searching for evidence and found plastic bags, heat seal bags that contained a crystal substance, digital scales, syringes, and two pieces of paper consistent with what Detective Allen knew to be a "pay and owe sheet." Transcript Volume II at 118. At some point, Hardin's girlfriend arrived at the residence and indicated that Hardin was picking up food at McDonald's. Trooper Patrick and Detective Allen left in separate vehicles to attempt to locate Hardin.
[6] Trooper Rohlfing observed Hardin arrive in a pickup truck and heard the garage door open at the same time as a vehicle pulled into the driveway. Trooper Rohlfing heard the door open and heard Detective Fleener identify himself as State Police and tell Hardin to show his hands. Hardin backpedaled in a quick manner, threw two McDonald's cups in the air, tripped, fell, kicked his arms and legs, and scooted along the ground. Detective Fleener "was able to get on top of [Hardin], basically in a full mount position," and Hardin continued to scream and kick. Id. at 74. Hardin eventually was able to spin to his stomach and raise himself off the ground. Trooper Rohlfing, who had injured his shoulder gaining entry to the residence, placed his foot on the back of Hardin's head and pushed him straight to the ground, stopping the fight.
[7] Trooper Rohlfing called Trooper Patrick and Detective Allen to inform them that Hardin was in custody at the residence, and Trooper Patrick and Detective Allen returned to the residence. Meanwhile, other officers located approximately $ 327,000 in cash and over a pound of methamphetamine in executing the search warrant on Hall's residence. Detective Allen performed a search of Hardin's vehicle and found more than 100 grams of methamphetamine in a bag underneath the driver's seat.
[8] On September 28, 2017, the State charged Hardin with Count I, dealing in methamphetamine as a level 2 felony, and Count II, possession of methamphetamine as a level 3 felony. On November 2, 2017, the State alleged that Hardin was an habitual offender. On April 17, 2018, Hardin filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized in the search of his home because "the search went beyond the scope of items and areas allowed to be searched by the Search Warrant ... and a search of the vehicle which [he] had driven to the scene was searched without probable cause or authorization by a search warrant." Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 21.
[9] On July 11, 2018, the court held a hearing on Hardin's motion at which Detective Allen testified. On July 18, 2018, the court denied Hardin's motion to suppress. Specifically, the court's order found that Hardin's vehicle "rested in the driveway and was therefore on the curtilage of the residence" and that "the search warrant that only described the residence of [Hardin] authorized the search of the vehicle while it remained within the curtilage of the residence." Id. at 61. The court also found that the automobile exception applied to the search of the vehicle.
[10] On September 11, 2018, the court held a bench trial. Hardin's counsel objected to the admission of the evidence found in his vehicle and argued a violation of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, and the court overruled the objection. The court found Hardin guilty of Counts I and II, and the State dismissed the habitual offender enhancement. The court found that Count II merged with Count I, and sentenced Hardin to twenty-two years executed.
[11] The issue is whether the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence. Although Hardin originally challenged the admission of the evidence through a motion to suppress, he now challenges the admission of the evidence at trial. Thus, the issue is appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence. See Guilmette v. State , 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 (Ind. 2014). "Because the trial court is best able to weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility, we review its rulings on admissibility for abuse of discretion and reverse only if a ruling is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.’ " Carpenter v. State , 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Clark v. State , 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013) ). "[T]he ultimate determination of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a question of law that we consider de novo." Id.
[12] In ruling on admissibility following the denial of a motion to suppress, the trial court considers the foundational evidence presented at trial. Id. If the foundational evidence at trial is not the same as that presented at the suppression hearing, the trial court must make its decision based upon trial evidence and may consider hearing evidence only if it does not conflict with trial evidence. Guilmette , 14 N.E.3d at 40 n.1.
[13] Hardin raises arguments under: (A) the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution; and (B) Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
[14] Under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The United States Supreme Court has held:
A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search. Thus, a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home for illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets, chests, drawers, and containers in which the weapon might be found. A warrant to open a footlocker to search for marihuana would also authorize the opening of packages found inside. A warrant to search a vehicle would support a search of every part of the vehicle that might contain the object of the search. When a legitimate search is under way, and when its purpose and its limits have been precisely defined, nice distinctions between closets, drawers, and containers, in the case of a home, or between glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a vehicle, must give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand.
United States v. Ross , 456 U.S. 798, 820-821, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2170-2171, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).
[15] In Sowers v. State , 724 N.E.2d 588, 590 (Ind. 2000), cert. denied , 531 U.S. 847, 121 S.Ct. 118, 148 L.Ed.2d 74 (2000), the Indiana Supreme Court addressed "whether the Fourth Amendment permits police officers who secure a lawful warrant for a residence at a specific address to search a tent in the backyard of that dwelling." The Court observed that the United States Supreme Court had explained that the purpose of the requirement in the Fourth Amendment prohibiting the...
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Hardin v. State
...vehicle based on the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision. Hardin v. State , 124 N.E.3d 117 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Relying on recent precedent from the Court of Appeals and the fact that Hardin did not challenge the trial court's findi......