Hardin v. State
| Decision Date | 05 October 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 30422,30422 |
| Citation | 201 N.E.2d 333,246 Ind. 23 |
| Parties | Fred W. HARDIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
M. Walter Bell, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen., David S. Wedding, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant was charged by affidavit in three (3) counts with: (1) robbery, (2) grand larceny, and (3) automobile banditry. After a trial by jury appellant was convicted of grand larceny and automobile banditry and was finded in the sum of $500.00 and sentenced for a term of one (1) to ten (10) years in the Indiana State Prison. This appeal followed the overruling of his motion for new trial.
Appellant first contends the jury's verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence.
The evidence favorable to the state is that Frank Ebner, an employee of the Marion County Treasurer's office, on February 2, 1962, at about 9 a. m. was walking in the city of Indianapolis to the bank to deposit certain checks and cash receipts from the treasurer's office when he was accosted by two men. Ebner testified one of the two men jerked the black grip, which contained the money and checks, out of his hand and that as he was pulled around by the force of the jerk he saw two men running down the parking lot toward Virginia Avenue.
Larry Storms, a parking lot attendant, stated that on February 2, 1962, at about 9 a. m. he saw appellant and another man run through the parking lot (the same lot the witness Ebner saw the men running through), and that appellant was carrying a black bag under his coat. He identified appellant in the court room as the man running through the parking lot with the bag. He also testified they ran down the alley, got into a car and drove away.
Rosie McDuff testified she saw appellant at her house on February 2, 1962, with what appeard to be a bag under his arm. She further stated that when appellant saw the police coming, gave her money that was bound with a rubber band.
There was further evidence from officer Davenport as to appellant's oral confession of the crime wherein appellant allegedly stated that George Sneed and Bad Foot Stanley (Rutland) participated with him in the robbery of Frank Ebner of February 2, 1962; that it was not appellant's idea to commit the robbery but that he was more or less called in to help; that Rosie McDuff didn't have anything to do with it but that she was not telling all the truth as she knew they divided that money out at her house because they gave her $10.00 a piece and the bag and checks were burned out at her house. When questioned as to who snatched the bag, appellant stated Sneed was with the car and that he (appellant) snatched the bag, that (Stanley) Rutland was with him and they cut back through the lot toward the car in which they proceeded by devious route to Rosie McDuff's place where they divided the money and split up.
Appellant has contended that the evidence is insufficient as it failed to show that he had the exclusive possession of the stolen property. While this may be an element of circumstantial evidence cases, it is not here applicable as the instant case was not predicated solely on circumstantial evidence. The testimony of witness Storms only moments after the crime was committed was to the effect he saw appellant running through the parking lot with a black bag, and such evidence is further supported by appellant's uncontradicted confession. It appears therefore that the fact circumstantial evidence was relied upon to establish appellant's possession of the stolen goods is not here a decisive matter, as appellant's guilt was shown by his own confession, which was direct evidence. Evans v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 55, 63, 155 N.E. 203, 205.
There is further no showing in this case that the confession was made under inducement, but even if such showing had been made it would not avail appellant as there was sufficient proof of the corpus delicti to sustain such a confession (i. e., a showing that a crime of the nature and character of that...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Snyder v. State
...of the accused. Mendez v. State (1977), Ind., 367 N.E.2d 1081; Carmon v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 1, 349 N.E.2d 167; Hardin v. State (1964), 246 Ind. 23, 201 N.E.2d 333. Snyder first argues that there is a total lack of evidence that he was not entitled to control over the disposition of the ......
-
Mendez v. State
...to but one inference, which inference is in favor of the accused. Bash v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 671, 262 N.E.2d 386; Hardin v. State, (1964) 246 Ind. 23, 201 N.E.2d 333, reh. den. 246 Ind. 28, 202 N.E.2d 164. Entrapment, as a defense, exists when the defendant has been induced or lured by ......
-
Bash v. State
...conflict and susceptible to only one inference in favor of the accused. Davis v. State (1968), Ind., 239 N.E.2d 601; Hardin v. State (1964), 246 Ind. 23, 201 N.E.2d 333, 202 N.E.2d Premeditated malice encompasses the intent, consciously conceived, to take a life as well as the opportunity t......
-
Franklin v. State
...to but one inference, which inference is in favor of the accused, Bash v. State, (1972) 254 Ind. 671, 262 N.E.2d 386; Hardin v. State, (1964), 246 Ind. 23, 201 N.E.2d 333, Reh. Den. 246 Ind. 23, 202 N.E.2d 164. When the determination of an issue involves the weight to be given evidence of t......