Hardin v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd.

• Decision Date: 26 January 1937
• Docket Number: (No. 8484)
• Citation: 118 W.Va. 198
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Chloe Farley Hardin v. Workmen's CompensationAppeal Board and Puritan Coal Corporation

118 W.Va. 198

Chloe Farley Hardin

v. Workmen's CompensationAppeal Board and Puritan Coal Corporation

(No. 8484)

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted January 13, 1937.

Decided January 26, 1937.

1.Master and Servant

In case of an injury resulting in the death of an employee, the statute governing compensation to the dependents of the deceased, in effect at the date of the original injury, controls the award, and not the statute in force at the date of the death of the employee.

2.Master and Servant

Section 10, Article 4, Chapter 23, of the Code, as amended by Chapter 78, Acts of the Legislature, Regular Session, 1935, does not operate to extend the right of dependents to compensation, beyond that existing at the date of the original injury.

Appeal from Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Chloe Farley Hardin, claimant, to recover compensation for the death of her husband, Preston Hardin, from an injury sustained while employed by the Puritan Coal Corporation. From a ruling of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board affirming the action of the Commissioner in refusing her application for compensation, claimant appeals.

Affirmed.

Wade H. Bronson, for appellant.

Homer A. Holt, Attorney General, and Kenneth E. Hines, Assistant Attorney General, for Compensation Appeal Board.

Hogg & Crawford, for Puritan Coal Corporation.

Fox, Judge:

The sole question in this case involves the application to the facts presented of Section 10, Article 4, Chapter 23, of the Code, as amended by Chapter 78, Acts of the Legislature, Regular Session, 1935, respecting the rights to compensation of dependents of a deceased person.

Preston Hardin suffered injury on the 29th day of October, 1930. At that date the pertinent statute (23-4-10) was in the language following:

"In case the personal injury causes death within the period of one year from the date of the original injury, and the disability is continuous from the date of such injury until date of death, the benefits shall be in the amounts and to the persons as follows: ".

The amendment involved makes the above quoted section read:

"In case the personal injury causes death within the period of six years, and the disability is continuous from date of such injury until date of death, the benefits shall be in the amounts, and to the persons, as follows: ".

The facts are not in dispute. Hardin was injured on October 29, 1930. He died on the 10th day of February, 1936, leaving a widow and two children who are alleged to be dependents. It is conceded that the original injury caused his death, and that the disability under which the decedent suffered was continuous from the date of injury until death. After the death of Hardin, these dependents filed an application for compensation, which application the compensation commissioner refused on the theory that claimants were not entitled to such compensation under the provisions of the amendment above mentioned, and by inference held that the statute in effect at the date of the injury to the deceased controlled, and not that in force at the date of his death.

Claimants contend, first, that the amendment to the section above quoted affects only a matter of procedure; and, second, that their rights grew out of the death of their decedent and not out of the accident causing the death.

We are first met with the question as to the relations existing between the decedent and his employer. We are of the opinion that these relations were contractual in their nature. This results from the provisions of the statute requiring election of the employer to contribute to the compensation fund, and the requirement of notice to employees of such election, thereby, on the one hand, creating an agreement on the part of employer to contribute to the fund, and on the other, an agreement on the part of the employee to accept the benefits of the fund, and the consequent waiver of his right to assert claims against the employer, growing out of his employment, outside of the funds created for his benefit. The case of Gooding v. Ott, 77 W. Va. 487, 87 S. E. 862, L. R. A. 1916D, 637, holds that where a statute makes acceptance optional, and the parties freely and voluntarily enter into a contract of employment with reference to the statute, the statute should be read into the contract as an integral part thereof, binding the parties, and enforceable in any jurisdiction the same as any other contract. Under the holding of this Court, such contractual relation was created as between the employer and employee, and was in existence at the date of the injury out of which claimant's rights, if any, arise, and it follows that the rights of the claimant must be determined as of the date of the injury to Preston Hardin. This holding is supported by a general line of authorities. See note 82 A. L. R. 1244, wherein it is stated:

"The right of the employee to compensation arises from the contractual relation between him and his employer existing at that time, and the statute then in force forms a part of the contract of employment and determines the substantive rights and obligations of the parties. No subsequent amendment in relation to the compensation recoverable can operate retrospectively to affect in any way the rights and obligations prior thereto fixed."

This being true, there was no jurisdiction in the compensation commissioner to award compensation to Hardin's dependents after the expiration of one year from the date of the original injury. This was...