Harding Glass Co., Inc. v. Jones

• Citation: 640 P.2d 1123
• Decision Date: 11 January 1982
• Docket Number: No. 80SC222,80SC222
• Parties: HARDING GLASS COMPANY, INC., a Missouri corporation, Bill Stephens and Everett Young, Petitioners, v. Robert JONES and Barbara Jones, on their own behalf and on behalf of theirdaughter, Gretchen Jones, a minor, Respondents.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 1123

640 P.2d 1123

HARDING GLASS COMPANY, INC., a Missouri corporation, Bill Stephens and Everett Young, Petitioners, v. Robert JONES and Barbara Jones, on their own behalf and on behalf of theirdaughter, Gretchen Jones, a minor Respondents.

No. 80SC222.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

Jan. 11, 1982.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 1, 1982.

Cook, Gilles & Schaefer, Elwyn F. Schaefer, and DeMoulin, Anderson, Campbell & Laugesen, Laird Campbell, J. Kent Miller, Denver, for petitioners.

Russell E. Vigil, Denver, for respondents.

Williams, Trine, Greenstein & Griffith, P. C., Joel H. Greenstein, J. Conrad Metcalf, Boulder, for amicus curiae Colorado Trial Lawyers Ass'n.

Roath & Brega, P. C., J. Stephen McGuire, Denver, for amicus curiae Caryl Adams, Individually, and as trustee of the V. M. Johnson 1962 Trust.

Fairfield & Woods, Charles E. Mathseon, Jac K. Sperling, Denver, for amicus curiae Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.

LOHR, Justice.

We granted certiorari to review the decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals in Jones v. Harding Glass Co., Inc., Colo.App., 619 P.2d 777 (1980), which held that a claim for exemplary damages was not subject to the one-year statute of limitations contained in section 13-80-104, C.R.S.1973. We conclude that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over this case because the trial court erred in determining that the ruling appealed from could be certified as a final judgment under C.R.C.P. 54(b). Therefore, we return the case to the court of appeals with directions to dismiss the appeal. ¹

The procedural background relevant to the jurisdictional issue which we address can be briefly summarized. On January 11, 1979, Robert and Barbara Jones filed a complaint on their own behalf and on behalf of their minor daughter, Gretchen Jones, in the Denver District Court, seeking compensatory and punitive damages against Harding Glass Company, its manager, and one of its truck drivers. The complaint alleged that Gretchen Jones suffered personal injuries on June 21, 1977, when a Harding Glass Company truck struck the bicycle on which she was riding. Two claims for relief were set forth in the complaint. The first was founded on negligence and supported a prayer for actual damages. Punitive, or exemplary, damages were sought based on the second claim, which alleged willful, wanton, and reckless conduct.

The defendants asserted in their answer that the claim for punitive damages was barred by a one-year statute of limitations, section 13-80-104, C.R.S.1973, and subsequently moved for a partial summary judgment on this basis. The trial court granted the defendants' motion, determined that there was no just reason for delaying the entry of final judgment on the exemplary damages claim, and directed that a final judgment be entered pursuant to C.R.C.P. 54(b) dismissing that claim. The plaintiffs appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that the one-year statute of limitations was inapplicable. We then granted certiorari.

I.

All the parties contend that the court of appeals and this court have jurisdiction to review the partial summary judgment by virtue of C.R.C.P. 54(b), which provides When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims, or parties and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.

This rule creates an exception to the general requirement that an entire case be resolved by a final judgment before an appeal is brought. See section 13-4-102(1), C.R.S.1973 (1980 Supp.); C.A.R. 1(a). ²

In deciding whether to issue a Rule 54(b) certification (i.e., an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and an express direction for the entry of judgment) with respect to a decision which does not dispose of the entire case in a multiple claims action, a trial court must engage in a three-step process. First, it must determine that the decision to be certified is a ruling upon an entire "claim for relief." Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 1460, 64 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980); ³ Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 76 S.Ct. 895, 100 L.Ed. 1297 (1956); see Trans Central Airlines, Inc. v. Peter J. McBreen & Associates, Inc., 31 Colo.App. 71, 497 P.2d 1033 (1972). Next, it must conclude that the decision is final "in the sense of an ultimate disposition of an individual claim." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, supra, 351 U.S. at 436, 76 S.Ct. at 900, 100 L.Ed. at 1306; accord, Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., supra; Trans Central Airlines, Inc. v. Peter J. McBreen & Associates, Inc., supra. Finally, the trial court must determine whether there is just reason for delay in entry of a final judgment on the claim. Id.

The task of assessing whether there is just reason for delay is committed to the trial court's sound judicial discretion. Id. Review of a trial court's ruling on that question is limited to an inquiry into whether that discretion has been abused. "The reviewing court should disturb the trial court's assessment of the equities only if it can say that the judge's conclusion was clearly unreasonable." Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., supra, 446 U.S. at 10, 100 S.Ct. at 1466, 64 L.Ed.2d at 13. A trial court's determinations that a "claim for relief" is the subject of the decision sought to be certified and that the decision is final, however, are not truly discretionary. The correctness of these two determinations is fully reviewable by an appellate court. This has been expressed by the statement that the trial court "cannot, in the exercise of its discretion, treat as 'final' ⁴ that which is not 'final'." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, supra, 351 U.S. at 437, 76 S.Ct. at 900, 100 L.Ed. at 1307; accord, Cinerama, Inc. v. Sweet Music, S. A., 482 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1973); Trans Central Airlines, Inc. v. Peter J. McBreen & Associates, Inc., supra; see 6 Moore's Federal Practice P 54.30(1) (2d Ed. 1980); Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 377, § 4(b), (c) (1954 and Later Case Service).

II.

In the case now before us, the appropriateness of the trial court's Rule 54(b) certification was not challenged by the parties in the court of appeals. When we granted certiorari, we directed briefing of all issues, including the propriety of the certification. All parties now argue that the certification was proper.

As we have noted, however, a Rule 54(b) certification effects an exception to the general rule that an entire case must be decided prior to appeal of any ruling in the case. Accordingly, an appellate court's jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of a decision so certified is dependent upon the correctness of the certification. For this reason, we are obligated to raise and resolve the question of the legal sufficiency of the Rule 54(b) certification on our own motion if necessary. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 96 S.Ct. 1202, 47 L.Ed.2d 435 (1976); see Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 377, § 2(b) (1954 and Later Case Service).

In considering whether the Rule 54(b) certification was proper, our inquiry focuses on whether the punitive damages claim constitutes a "claim for relief" within the meaning of C.R.C.P. 54(b). As pertinent here, C.R.C.P. 54(b) is limited by its own terms to an action involving multiple claims for relief, at least one of which has been fully adjudicated. "Rule 54(b) may properly be applied only to actions in which there has been a final decision on one or more but fewer than all the multiple claims raised." Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572 at 583 n.21, 100 S.Ct. 800, 807, 63 L.Ed.2d 36 (1980). The lower courts apparently acted on the premise that each of the separately asserted claims for compensatory and punitive damages in the plaintiffs' complaint states a distinct claim for relief, and concluded that the trial court's partial summary judgment fully disposed of one of those claims. We conclude that the premise is erroneous and the resulting conclusion incorrect.

The definition of a claim for relief for purposes of Rule 54(b) has proved elusive, 10 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2657 (1973), but it is clear that a complaint asserting a single legal right states only a single claim, e.g., Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel, supra; Acha v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1978); Cole v. Peterson Realty, Inc., 432 A.2d 752 (Me.1981); see 10 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2657 (1973). ⁵ This conclusion pertains even though multiple remedies may be sought for the alleged violation of that legal right. Id.

The Colorado statute providing for the recovery of exemplary damages, section 13-21-102, C.R.S.1973, does not create a separate legal right. It provides: In all civil actions in which damages are assessed by a jury for a wrong done to the person, or to personal or real property, and the injury complained of is attended by circumstances of fraud, malice or insult, or a wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party's rights and feelings, the jury, in addition to the actual damages sustained by such party, may award him reasonable exemplary damages.

That statute applies only when a civil wrong has been attended by aggravating circumstances;...