Harding v. Albert

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MURPHY
• Citation: Harding v. Albert, 373 Ill. 94, 25 N.E.2d 32 (Ill. 1940)
• Decision Date: 13 February 1940
• Docket Number: No. 25419.,25419.
• Parties: HARDING et al. v. ALBERT et al.

373 Ill. 94

25 N.E.2d 32

HARDING et al.

v.ALBERT et al.

No. 25419.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 15, 1939.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Feb. 13, 1940.

Proceeding to contest an election to the offices of City Commissioners, by W. J. Harding and others against Chris Albert and others. From a decree dismissing the petition, petitioners appeal.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.Appeal from Circuit Court, Macon County; Charles Y. Miller, judge.

James S. Baldwin, of Decatur (Perley T. Lupton, of Decatur, of counsel), for appellants.

Weilepp & Wilson, of Decatur, for appellees.

MURPHY, Justice.

Chris Albert, Beecher Hughey, John L. Rehfelt and Earl V. Smith, in April, 1938, were elected commissioners of the city of Decatur. The appellants, who are electors, filed a petition in the circuit court of Macon county to contest their election. The successful and defeated candidates were made defendants. The court, on motion, dismissed the petition, and the point for decision is whether an elector of a city operating under the Commission Form of Municipal Government Act can contest the election of a commissioner.

The petitioners alleged that the city of Decatur was organized under the Cities and Villages Act, and, prior to January 1, 1931, adopted the commission form of government in the manner provided therein by article 13. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1939, c. 24, § 265 et seq. It is not claimed the city ever adopted the City Elections Act of 1885. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1939, c. 46, § 159 et seq. Section 1 of the Commission Form of Municipal Government Act provides, among other things, that all cities and villages adopting said act shall, ‘In addition to all rights, powers and authority in them vested, under and by virtue of said Acts [meaning the general Cities and Villages act and all acts amendatory thereto], have and they are hereby vested with the further and additional rights, powers and authority contained in this act,’ etc. The city, upon the adoption of the act, retained the power and authority vested in it under the Cities and Villages Act, subject, however, to any changes made by the Commission Form of Municipal Government Act. The only provision in the last mentioned act which bears upon the contest of an election of a commissioner is sub-paragraph (e) of section 18 of article 13. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1939, c. 24, § 282(e). It reads: ‘All general and special municipal elections * * * shall be held, conducted and contested under the election law in force in such city,’ etc. Section 10 of article 4 of the Cities and Villages Act, provides that the manner of conducting and voting at elections to be held under the Cities and Villages Act and contesting the same, etc., ‘shall be the same, as nearly as may be, as in the case of the election of county officers, under the general laws of this state,’ etc. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1939, c. 24, § 60.

In Welsh v. Shumway, 232 Ill. 54, 83 N.E. 549, this court held that elections in cities and villages are brought under the scope of the General Election Law by reason of section 10 of article 4 of the Cities and Villages Act and not because of any reference in the General Election Law to elections in cities and villages. This holding was restated in Nesladek v. Kanka, 341 Ill. 180, 173 N.E. 94.

Section 112 of the General Election Law (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1939, c. 46, § 115), includes elections to county offices in the general designation of elections which may be contested and provides: ‘The election of any person declared elected to any office, * * * may be contested by any elector of the state, judicial division, district, county, town or precinct in and for which the person is declared elected.’ Appellees urge that the failure of this section to include cities as one of the governmental subdivisions from which an elector may contest an election, renders the statute inapplicable to a proceeding to contest the election of a city commissioner. Such construction would render the contest provisions in subparagraph (e) of section 18 of the Commission Form of Municipal Government Act, and section 10 of article 4 of the Cities and Villages Act, a nullity, because no other statutory provision grants to an elector or defeated candidate the right to contest the election of a commissioner.

In construing the applicable sections of various acts involved, the court must, if possible, ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Where the spirit and intention of the legislature in adopting the acts are clearly expressed and their objects and purposes are clearly set forth, the courts are not confined to the literal meaning of the words used, when to do so will defeat the obvious intention of the legislature and result in absurd consequences not contemplated by it. In such cases, the literal language of the statute may be departed from and words may be changed, altered, modified and supplied, or omitted entirely, if necessary to obviate any repugnancy or inconsistency between the language used and the intention of the legislature as gathered from a consideration of the whole act and the previous condition of legislation upon that subject. People v. Fox, 269 Ill. 300, 110 N.E. 26. In Bowman v. Industrial...