Harding v. Antonelli
| Decision Date | 13 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.: 5:18-cv-01878-JMC |
| Parties | Veotis Harding, Petitioner, v. Warden Bryan Antonelli, Respondent. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court of South Carolina |
Petitioner Veotis Harding, proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) This matter is before the court upon review of the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation ("Report") filed August 14, 2018. (ECF No. 15.) The Report recommends that the court DISMISS Petitioner's Petition without prejudice. (ECF No. 1.) For the reasons stated herein, the court ACCEPTS the Report and DISMISSES Petitioner's Petition (ECF No. 1) without prejudice.
The Report sets forth the relevant facts and legal standards, which the court incorporates herein without a full recitation. (ECF No. 15 at 1-3.) On August 28, 2003, Petitioner plead guilty in the Eastern District of North Carolina to thirty-five (35) counts of money laundering and fourteen (14) related counts based on his operation of escort businesses serving as a front for a prostitution ring. United States v. Harding, No. 5:02-cr-00191-BO-1, ECF No. 61 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 3, 2017) ("Criminal Case")). He was sentenced to forty (40) years in prison. (Id.)
Petitioner appealed both his conviction and his sentence. (ECF No. 76 (Criminal Case)); see also United States v. Harding, 143 F. App'x 536 (4th Cir. 2005). On August 24, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Petitioner's conviction, vacated the sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing. (ECF No. 76 (Criminal Case)); see also Harding, 143 F. App'x at 539. Upon remand, Petitioner was sentenced to 330 months (27.5 years) of imprisonment. (ECF No. 89 (Criminal Case); see also ECF No. 1-1 at 4); Harding v. Owens, Civil Action No. 5:12-cv-01213-JMC, ECF No. 18-3 at 12 (D.S.C. Nov. 30, 2012).
Petitioner again appealed his sentence contending that it was unreasonable. United States v. Harding, 228 F. App'x 272 (4th Cir. 2007). The Fourth Circuit ultimately affirmed Petitioner's sentence. Id. at 273.
Among the many crimes for which Petitioner was convicted, one charge pertained to money laundering in furtherance of the criminal enterprise. (See ECF No. 61 (Criminal Case).) On June 2, 2008, a plurality of the Supreme Court in United States v. Santos "[found] a merger problem with money-laundering charges where the laundering is part of the criminal enterprise itself" (ECF No. 15 at 2), and thus limited the term "proceeds" in the federal money-laundering provision (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)) to profits. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008). Because "proceeds" was ambiguous, the rule of lenity applied. Id. at 523. Thus, forfeitures applied only to profits and not to receipts. Id.
On September 25, 2008, Petitioner filed a motion seeking an extension of the time to file a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion; however, Petitioner indicated neither knowledge of the Santos decision nor intent to seek relief due to the change in the law. (ECF Nos. 100, 104 (Criminal Case)); see also Harding v. Owens, 615 F. App'x 146, 147 (4th Cir. 2015). Petitioner's Motion seeking an extension of time was denied as untimely. (ECF No. 1 at 2 (5:12-cv-01213-JMC).)
When the Fourth Circuit retroactively applied Santos to collateral review in United States v. Halstead, 634 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2011), Petitioner thereafter filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging invalid convictions under United States v. Santos. (ECF No. 1 at 11-17.) Positing that the proceeds he generated from money-laundering were spent maintaining the prostitution ring, Petitioner requested leniency. (Id. at 12-13.) Additionally, Petitioner requested a writ of audita querela1 under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) and a writ of coram nobis2. (ECF No. 22 at 8-11 (5:12-cv-01213-JMC).)
Invalid convictions fall into two categories: (1) those that a federal prisoner could not have challenged in his initial § 2255 petition because any challenge was squarely foreclosed by binding Circuit precedent that the Supreme Court only subsequently overturned; and (2) those that a petitioner could have, but failed to, challenge earlier. Petitioner's May 2012 claim fit squarely in the latter, seeking relief from his alleged erroneous convictions and sentences. (ECF No. 22 at 8 (5:12-cv-01213-JMC).) Because Petitioner failed to make the requisite showing that relief is "inadequate or ineffective" under § 2255, this court held his § 2241 petition was not properly before the court. (ECF No. 31 at 8-11 (No. 5:12-cv-01213-JMC).)
This court subsequently transferred Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Coram Nobis to the court of conviction, where Petitioner once more filed a § 2255 motion, challenging his guilty plea as involuntary because of "police and prosecutorial misconduct" and invoking "United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008) . . . , double jeopardy, and a sentencing claim based on Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)." (ECF No. 15 at 1-2 (citing ECF Nos. 107, 110 (Criminal Case)).) The Eastern District of North Carolina ultimately dismissed the petition finding that Petitioner had an "unobstructed procedural shot" to assert his invalid conviction through a § 2255 motion when the window was available and observed "that Petitioner had previously filed a § 2241 petition in [the District of South Carolina] in May 2012." (ECF No. 15 at 2; see also ECF No. 1-1 (5:12-cv-01213-JMC).) Nevertheless, the Eastern District of North Carolina provided Petitioner an opportunity to convert his § 2241 petition into a § 2255 motion to vacate, which he accepted. (ECF Nos. 52, 53, 55 (Criminal Case); see also ECF No. 31 at 8 (5:12-cv-01213-JMC).) Upon review, the Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed Petitioner's § 2255 motion as untimely. (ECF Nos. 128, 129 (Criminal Case).)
As the Report lays out, Petitioner's § 2241 petition alleges his eighteen (18) violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 and seventeen (17) violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 are invalid under Santos. (ECF Nos. 1-1 at 7-22; 15 at 2-3; see also ECF No. 31 at 8-11 (No. 5:12-cv-01213-JMC); ECF Nos. 52, 53, 55 (Criminal Case).) Specifically, Petitioner avers the money-laundering provisions do not encompass those persons who use revenue from illegal activities "to pay for the essential expenses of operating that same illegal business." (ECF No. 1 at 16.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit did not authorize Petitioner's motion before he filed this case. (ECF No. 15 at 3.)
The Magistrate Judge's report is made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the District of South Carolina. The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this court, which has no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with this court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the report to which specific objections are made. Diamond v. Colonial Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005). In the absence of specific objections to the report, this court is not required to provide an explanation for adopting the recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). Rather, "in the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond, 416 F.3d at 315 () (emphasis added). Furthermore, failure to file specific written objections to the report results in a party's waiver of the right to appeal from the judgment of the District Court based upon such recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Thus, the court may accept, reject, modify, in whole or in part, the Magistrate Judge's recommendation or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The court is required to interpret pro se documents liberally and will hold those documents to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. See Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978); see also Hardin v. United States, C/A No. 7:12-cv-0118-GRA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127988, 2012 WL 3945314, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 10, 2012). Additionally, pro se documents must be construed in a manner, "no matter how inartfully pleaded, to see whether they could provide a basis for relief." Garrett v. Elko, No. 95-7939, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21271, 1997 WL 457667, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1997). Although pro se documents are liberally construed by federal courts, "[t]he 'special judicial solicitude' with which a district court should view pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate." Weller v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
"[I]t is well established that defendants convicted in federal court are obligated to seek habeas relief from their convictions and sentences through [28 U.S.C.] § 2255." Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir. 1997)). A motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is typically used to challenge the manner in which a sentence is executed. See In re Vial, 115 F.3d at 1194 n.5. However, a petitioner can challenge his federal sentence under § 2241 if he can satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the § 2255 savings clause, which states:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that...
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