Harding v. Fort Wayne Foundry/Pontiac Div., Inc.

Decision Date13 March 1996
Docket NumberCivil No. 1:95cv189.
Citation919 F. Supp. 1223
PartiesWilliam H. HARDING, Plaintiff, v. FORT WAYNE FOUNDRY/PONTIAC DIVISION, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Patrick L. Proctor, Warsco and Brogan, Fort Wayne, IN, for William H. Harding.

William H. Harding, Fort Wayne, IN, pro se.

J. Michael O'Hara, Anthony M. Stites, Barrett and McNagny, Fort Wayne, IN, for Fort Wayne Foundry/Pontiac Division, Inc.

ORDER

WILLIAM C. LEE, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant on December 13, 1995. The parties completed briefing the motion on January 16, 1996. For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment will be granted.

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). However, Rule 56(c) is not a requirement that the moving party negate his opponent's claim. Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 916 F.2d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir. 1990). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and in which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the directed verdict standard under Rule 50(a), which requires the court to grant a directed verdict where there can be but one reasonable conclusion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is not sufficient to successfully oppose summary judgment; "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. In Re Matter of Wildman, 859 F.2d 553, 557 (7th Cir.1988); Klein v. Ryan, 847 F.2d 368, 374 (7th Cir.1988); Valentine v. Joliet Township High School District No. 204, 802 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir.1986). No genuine issue for trial exists "where the record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 957 F.2d 317, 322 (7th Cir.1992) (quoting Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).

Initially, Rule 56 requires the moving party to inform the court of the basis for the motion, and to identify those portions of the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission on file," together with the affidavits, if any, which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53. The non-moving party may oppose the motion with any of the evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), but reliance on the pleadings alone is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 649 (7th Cir.1988); Guenin v. Sendra Corp., 700 F.Supp. 973, 974 (N.D.Ind. 1988); Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102, 105 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 960, 104 S.Ct. 392, 78 L.Ed.2d 336 (1983).

So that the district court may readily determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist, under Local Rule 56.1, the moving party is obligated to file with the court a "Statement of Material Facts" supported by appropriate citation to the record to which the moving party contends no genuine issues exist. In addition, the non-movant is obligated to file with the court a "Statement of Genuine Issues" supported by appropriate citation to the record outlining all material facts to which the non-movant contends exist that must be litigated. See, Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp. et al., 24 F.3d 918 (7th Cir.1994). In ruling on a summary judgment motion the court accepts as true the non-moving party's evidence, draws all legitimate inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and does not weigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-251, 106 S.CT. at 2511. Furthermore, in determining the motion for summary judgment, the court will assume that the facts as claimed and supported by admissible evidence by the moving party are admitted to exist without controversy, except to the extent that such facts are controverted in the "Statement of Genuine Issues" filed in opposition to the motion. L.R. 56.1

Substantive law determines which facts are material; that is, which facts might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not preclude summary judgment even when they are in dispute. Id. The issue of fact must be genuine. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e). To establish a genuine issue of fact, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1356; First National Bank of Cicero v. Lewco Securities Corp., 860 F.2d 1407, 1411 (7th Cir.1988). The non-moving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. A summary judgment determination is essentially an inquiry as to "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. Finally, the court notes that, "it is a gratuitous cruelty to parties and their witnesses to put them through the emotional ordeal of a trial when the outcome is foreordained" and in such cases summary judgment is appropriate. Mason v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank, 704 F.2d 361, 367 (7th Cir.1983).

Discussion

On September 23, 1992, the plaintiff, William H. Harding ("Harding"), was terminated from his employment at Fort Wayne Foundry/Pontiac Division, Inc. ("Foundry"). On October 13, 1992, Harding filed a Charge of Discrimination ("Charge") against the Foundry alleging that he had been the victim of racial harassment and discrimination. This Charge was filed with the Fort Wayne Metropolitan Humans Relations Commission ("Metro"), and Harding listed his address on the Charge as 4524 Jason Drive, Fort Wayne, Indiana 46835.

After filing his Charge with Metro, Harding experienced a succession of personal crises. Harding was unable to locate permanent employment and experienced financial difficulties, leading to the loss of his car and the eviction of his family (Harding had a wife and three children) from its home on Jason Drive. After the eviction, Harding and his family moved into the Fort Wayne Rescue Mission, 301 Superior St., Fort Wayne, Indiana. Shortly thereafter, Harding's wife took the children and moved in with her parents. Harding continued to live at the Fort Wayne Rescue Mission until he was arrested by the Fort Wayne Police Department on or about February 18, 1994. While Harding was in jail, his wife filed for divorce.

Harding was released from the Department of Corrections on or about August 6, 1994, and he again began living at the Fort Wayne Rescue Mission. On or about September 6, 1994, Harding left the Rescue Mission and stayed at a half-way house, Trinity House of Hope, 3028 Bowser St., Fort Wayne, Indiana. Later, on March 1, 1995, Harding began living at 1215 Emily Street, Fort Wayne, Indiana.

Meanwhile, Mr. Lee E. May, on behalf of Metro, was in the process of investigating Harding's claim against the Foundry. After completing his investigation, Mr. May filed a report and recommendation with Metro's Probable Cause Panel, and on November 10, 1993, the Panel issued a decision that there was probable cause to credit Harding's complaint. After the Panel issued its decision, Samuel L. Bolinger ("Bolinger"), a Metro staff attorney, made several attempts to contact Harding by certified mail and inform him of the decision. A certified letter was mailed to Harding at his Jason Drive address on February 17, 1994. On or about March 16, 1994, this letter was returned to Metro with a notification of a new address: Harding % Calvery, 1315 Hanna St, Fort Wayne, Indiana XXXXX-XXXX. On March 17, 1994, Metro sent another certified letter to Harding at the Hanna Street address. However this letter was returned with the notation that the service was: "Attempted — Not Known". On April 6, 1994, Metro mailed a certified letter to Harding in care of the True Love Baptist Church, 715 E. Wallace Street, Fort Wayne, Indiana. This letter was also returned to Metro. On June 23, 1994, the Panel dismissed Harding's Charge as constructive withdrawal.

In late August or early September 1994, Harding went to Bolinger's office to inquire about the status of his case. At this time, Harding informed Bolinger that he had been incarcerated and was unaware that the Panel had dismissed his Charge. Harding informed Bolinger that he should send all correspondence to the True Love Baptist Church, 715 E. Wallace, Fort Wayne, Indiana. At this time, Bolinger advised Harding that he needed to obtain a Right to Sue letter from the EEOC and also informed Harding that he should consider retaining counsel1. Bolinger recommended several Fort Wayne attorneys, including Chris Meyers.

After speaking with Bolinger, Harding went to Chris Meyers' office and spoke with Meyers' paralegal. The paralegal told Harding that he needed to provide them with documents from Metro. Thus, on the same day, Harding went back to Metro and Bolinger gave Harding an envelope containing documents. Harding then took the documents to...

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    ...personality/post-traumatic stress disorder, where no showing of inability to handle own affairs); Harding v. Ft. Wayne Foundry/Pontiac Div., Inc., 919 F.Supp. 1223, 1229 (N.D.Ind.1996) (homelessness for several months and endurance of a “series of personal crises”). Plaintiff's situation do......
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