Harding v. Grisham
| Decision Date | 13 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 22-CV-22-JFH |
| Parties | KENNETH ALLEN HARDING Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM L. GRISHAM, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Love County, a political subdivision of the State of Oklahoma, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Oklahoma |
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (“Motion to Dismiss”) filed jointly by Defendant William L. Grisham (“Defendant Grisham”), Defendant Jeff Mullinax (“Defendant Mullinax”), and Defendant Love County (“Defendant County”) (collectively “Defendants”). Dkt. No. 11. Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiff Kenneth Allen Harding's (“Plaintiff”) claims against Defendants for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id at 2. Plaintiff opposes Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. Nos. 16, 19. For the reasons set forth below Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 11] is GRANTED.
In considering a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) a court must determine whether the claimant has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss is properly granted when a complaint provides no “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint must contain enough “facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and the factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (citations omitted). “Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 562. For the purpose of making the dismissal determination, a court must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true, even if doubtful in fact, and must construe the allegations in the light most favorable to a claimant. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007); Moffett v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 291 F.3d 1227, 1231 (10th Cir. 2002). However, a court need not accept as true those allegations that are conclusory in nature. Erikson v. Pawnee Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 263 F.3d 1151, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 2001). "[C]onclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109-10 (10th Cir. 1991).
“A pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. at 1110. While Plaintiff is presently pro se, Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the time of filing his Complaint.[1] Therefore, the liberal construction and less stringent standard will not be applied to the Court's review of the Plaintiff's Complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
Taking Plaintiff's allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as it must at this stage, the Court briefly recounts the allegations. On or about June 25, 2020 at approximately 11:45 p.m., while Plaintiff was driving a commercial vehicle on Interstate 35 in Love County, Oklahoma, Love County Sheriff's Deputy, Jeff Mullinax, conducted a traffic stop on Plaintiff's vehicle. Dkt. No. 2-2 at 4. During the traffic stop, Defendant Mullinax determined that Plaintiff's commercial driver's license (“CDL”) issued by the State of Texas had expired. Id. At that time, Plaintiff advised Defendant Mullinax that, due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the expiration of commercial driver's licenses had been administratively extended. Id. Defendant Mullinax did not accept Plaintiff's statement as true, or independently verify that Plaintiff's CDL was valid by an administrative extension. Id. Plaintiff was arrested and booked into the Love County Jail on charges of driving without a license and improper lane use.[2] Dkt. No. 2-2 at 4.
Following the booking process, Plaintiff was required to undergo a delousing treatment. Id. at 5. At that time, Plaintiff informed Love County Jail staff that he had been diagnosed with gastroenteritis and that he was currently taking a prescription antibiotic for treatment. Id. Because Plaintiff was unable to secure a bail bondsman, he was held in the Love County Jail overnight. Id. Plaintiff was not provided access to his prescription antibiotic while in custody overnight. Dkt. No. 2-2 at 5.
The next day, Plaintiff was arraigned in Love County District Court. Id. At the arraignment, the driving without a license charge was dismissed and Plaintiff pled not guilty to the improper lane use charge. Id. Plaintiff was released several hours after being arraigned. Id. Because he did not have access to his prescription antibiotic while in the Love County Jail, Plaintiff had to seek additional medical treatment for his gastroenteritis following his release. Dkt. No. 22 at 5.
Plaintiff asserts all claims against Defendant Grisham and Defendant Mullinax in their official capacities as Love County Sheriff and Love County Deputy Sheriff, respectively. Dkt. No. 2-2 at 2-8. However, asserting claims against Defendant Grisham and Defendant Mullinax in their official capacities is “essentially another way of pleading an action against the county or municipality [they] represent.” Porro v, Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1328 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Because Plaintiff has asserted identical claims against Defendant County, his claims against Defendant Grisham and Defendant Mullinax in their official capacities are subsumed within the claims against Defendant County. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) (citations omitted) (“There is no longer a need to bring official-capacity actions against local government officials, for under Monell, local government units can be sued directly for damages and injunctive or declaratory relief.”); see also London v. Hill, No. 11-CV-028, 2012 WL 529934, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 13, 2012) (internal citations omitted) (“[W]here a local governmental entity is sued along with an official of that entity in his or her official capacity, the official capacity claims are subsumed within the claims against the government entity and, therefore, the official capacity claims against individual defendants are properly dismissed as redundant.”)). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Grisham and Defendant Mullinax in their official capacities are redundant and should be dismissed.
Oklahoma law is in accord. A "[s]uit against a government officer in his or her official capacity is [considered] a suit against the entity that the officer represents" and "is improper under the [Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (“OGTCA”), 51 O.S. §§ 151, et. seq.]" Speight v. Presley, 203 P.3d 173, 179 (Okla. 2008); accord Pellegrino v. State ex rel. Cameron Univ., 63 P.3d 535, 537 (Okla. 2003). The OGTCA requires that a suit brought pursuant to its provisions "name as defendant the state or political subdivision against which liability is sought to be established" and specifically prohibits naming as a defendant an employee acting within the scope of his or her employment. See 51 O.S. § 163(C).
For these reasons, the Court dismisses all claims asserted by Plaintiff against Defendant Grisham and Defendant Mullinax in their official capacities. As amendment would be futile, the official capacity claims against Defendant Grisham and Defendant Mullinax are dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff also asserts all claims against Defendant Mullinax in his individual capacity. Dkt. No. 2-2 at 2-8.[3] Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mullinax unlawfully arrested and detained Plaintiff for driving without a license, a crime which he urges did not occur. Id. Defendants argue that Defendant Mullinax is entitled to qualified immunity and that, further, Plaintiff was lawfully arrested and detained on an improper lane use charge. Dkt. No. 11 at 5, 7.
The defense of qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages arising from claims brought against them in their individual capacities. McFall v. Bednar, 407 F.3d 1081, 1087 (10th Cir. 2005). In establishing the defense of qualified immunity, the Supreme Court has attempted to balance the protection of civil rights and "the need to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority." Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1043 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982)).
Individual government actors retain their immunity unless the plaintiff can show that they violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818).
Plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully arrested and detained on the driving without a license charge because, due to an administrative extension, his expired license was still valid at the time of his arrest. Dkt. No. 2-2 at 4. Plaintiff urges that while Defendant Mullinax was unaware of this administrative extension, he could have, and should have, verified the administrate extension either on his phone or by using his squad car computer prior to arresting Plaintiff. Id.
Tenth Circuit law is clear that “[a]n...
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