Harding v. Long

• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Avery, J
• Citation: Harding v. Long, 103 N. C. 1, 9 S. E. 445, 14 Am. St. Rep. 775 (N.C. 1889)
• Decision Date: 09 April 1889
• Parties: Harding et al. v. Long et al.

9 S.E. 445

(103 N.C. 1)

Harding et al.

v.Long et al.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 9, 1889.

Cancellation or Deed—Fraud.

In an action to cancel a deed alleged to have been procured by false and fraudulent representations, it is error to charge, on an issue submitted to a jury, that the jury must be "satisfied beyond all reasonable question " that such representations were made to induce the execution of the deed. Satisfactory proof is all that is required.

This was a proceeding brought before the clerk of the superior court of Yadkin county to have dower allotted, and tried on issues framed for the jury, at the spring term, 1889, of said court, before Philips, J. The defendant Mary E. Harding had executed a deed for her unassigned dower in the land of her deceased husband to the plaintiffs, who were his brothers, for the consideration of $275. When the plaintiffs asked before the clerk in this proceeding to have dower assigned to them, as her grantees, in her husband's land, she answered that the plaintiffs, being her brothers-in-law, had her confidence, and, taking advantage of her distress, immediately after her husband's death made false and fraudulent representations as to the condition of his estate, especially the probable value of her dower after selling the land to satisfy a debt secured by mortgage thereon, and thereby induced her to execute said deed. The following issue was submitted to the jury: "Was the deed described in the petition of the plaintiffs obtained from the defendant Mary E. Harding through fraud or undue influence on the part of plaintiffs?" In support of this issue the defendant Mary E. Harding introduced testimony tending to show fraud and undue influence by representations made by the plaintiffs, her brothers-in-law, that the estate of her husband would be worth very little after the payment of debts. Plaintiffs introduced testimony to the contrary. There was a judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal.

A. E. Holton and Glenn & Glenn, for appellants. Batehelor & Devereux, for appellees.

Avery, J. We think that the judge who tried the case erred in instructing the jury as to the measure of testimony required to establish the allegation that the execution of the deed had been procured by fraud or undue influence. Defendant asked the court to instruct the jury "that if the price paid by the plaintiffs was so inadequate as to amount to apparent fraud, ' or the situation of the parties so unequal as to give the plaintiffs the opportunity of making their own terms, the burden rests on the plaintiffs to show that the transaction was fair, and that there was no fraud or undue influence." The court charged the jury as follows: "The defendant Mary E. Harding claims that the deed executed was obtained from her by the fraudulent misrepresentations of the plaintiffs, and that advantage was taken of her situation and distress consequent upon the recent death of her husband. The plaintiffs claim that she acted voluntarily, with a full knowledge of her rights and what she was doing: that no fraudulent misrepresentations were made, or fraudulent and controlling influence was exercised, to induce her to make the deed. Mere inadequacy of price alone is no ground for setting aside the deed executed by Mary E. Harding. Fraud or undue influence must be proved, and the burden is upon the defendant Mary E. Harding, who seeks to set aside the deed, to satisfy the jury by clear, strong, and convincing proof that fraudulent misrepresentations were made, or a fraudulent and controlling influence was exercised, to induce her to make the deed which she would not otherwise have made. Unless the jury are so satisfied beyond all reasonable question, they must answer the issue ' No.' "

In order to give proper effect to the words "so satisfied, " we must consider the instruction as if the language used had been the following: "Unless the jury are satisfied beyond all reasonable question that fraudulent representations were made, or a fraudulent and controlling influence was exercised, to induce her to make the deed, which she would not otherwise have made, they must answer the issue • No.' " In Lee v. Pearce, 68 N. C. 77, it was held by this court to be error to instruct a jury that fraud must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to justify a verdict finding fraud. In the opinion, Chief Justice Pearson, for the court, says: "It is very questionable whether this formula, which has been acted upon in the trial of capital cases, has answered any useful purpose; but it has never been extended to civil actions. There the rule is, if the evidence creates in the mind of the jury a belief that the allegation is true, they should so find." The facts in that case were that the plaintiff alleged that one of the defendants, taking advantage of the friendly and confidential relations subsisting between him and the testatrix, under whom the plaintiffs claimed, fraudulently induced her to sign a deed, conveying her land to the other defendant, his wife. Here, the feme defendant's brothers-in-law are charged with having abused her confidence, and induced her to convey her dower interest. There is no sufficient allegation in either case that the relations were such as to raise a presumption in law of fraud, so as to shift the burden, and require the party charged with the fraud to rebut it by satisfactory evidence. The issue in that cause, as in this, was, under the former practice, cognizable only in a court of equity. We are unable to draw any distinction between proving "beyond reasonable doubt" and beyond "reasonable question, " unless we treat the latter expression as the stronger of the two. One of our leading lexicographers defines "question" to mean (in such connections as that in which it appears in the charge of the judge) "doubt, " another, "dispute." So, if the former definition be adopted, the words are synonymous; if the latter be correct, it may be that there is still room for reasonable dispute, when the doubt that lingers in the mind is no longer within the domain of sound reason.

The rule that the evidence must be sufficient to produce belief in the minds of the jury that the allegation of fraud is true, in order to invalidate and set aside a deed, is equivalent to saying that the fraud alleged must be true to the satisfaction of the jury, or so as to satisfy the minds of the jury of their truth; and this has been declared by this court to be very different in its import from proving a fact beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Ellick, 2 Winst. Eq. 56; State v. Vann, 82 N. C. 635. In State v. Vann, Justice Dillard, for the court, says, in reference to testimony offered in behalf of a prisoner: "And, in the making of such extenuating or acquitting proofs, the law puts on him the onus to do so, not excluding all reasonable doubts, but merely to the extent of satisfying the jury." On the other hand, in State v. Payne, 86 N. C. 611, Justice Ashe, delivering the opinion, after calling attention to the fact that in State v. Ellick the erroneous principle stated in State v. Johnson, 3 Jones, (N. C.) 266, had been overruled, and a defendant was no longer required to establish mitigating or justifying circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, says further: "In it [referring to State v. Ellick] is corrected what we consider as erroneous in the decision of Com. v. York, 9 Mete. 93, that matters of excuse or extenuation which the prisoner is to prove must be decided according to the preponderance of evidence. It is more correct to say, as we think, that they must be proved to the satisfaction of the jury." The exact language used by the court in Lee v. Pearce, supra, was adopted in the instruction given by the court below in McLeod v. Billiard, 84 N. C. 515, and, being excepted to, was approved by this court in overruling the exception.

Counsel for the plaintiff insisted that the rule laid down for this court by Justice Merrimon in Ely v. Early, 94 N. C. 7, as appli-cable where actions are brought to correct deeds, must govern this case. The language used in Ely v. Early, and made the basis of instruction in this case, to which it was never intended to apply, was as follows: "That the court may, in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, correct a mistake in a deed or other written instrument, such as that alleged in the complaint, is not controverted; but it will do so only where the mistake is made to appear by clear, strong, and convincing proof. The court must be satis-fled from the evidence, beyond reasonable question, of the alleged mistake." Speaking of the deed they say further: "In such cases the court will not disturb the deed or other writing, and upon the strong ground that the parties have agreed to make the writing evidence between them as to the matters contained in it. It must stand until, by a weight of proof greater than itself, a court of equity, in the exercise of a very high and delicate jurisdiction, shall correct it." That action was brought by the plaintiff in part to correct a deed made by mutual mistake of the grantor and grantee as alleged, and it will be observed that the court, in express terms, lay down the rule as applicable only where the parties ask the equitable relief of correcting a deed. There was no reason why the distinction should have been drawn in that case between the degree of proof necessary in cases of that kind and other cases involving an issue of fraud. In Loftin v. Loftin, 96 N. C. 100, 1 S. E. Rep. 837, it was held that the evidence of...