Hardison v. A. H. Belo Corp.

• Decision Date: 29 February 1952
• Docket Number: No. 14472,14472
• Citation: 247 S.W.2d 167
• Parties: HARDISON v. A. H. BELO CORP.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 167

247 S.W.2d 167

HARDISON v.A. H. BELO CORP.

No. 14472.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

Feb. 29, 1952.

C. L. Hardison, pro se.

J. C. Muse, Jr., Dallas, for appellee.

YOUNG, Justice.

The original petition of appellant(plaintiff below), filed July 14, 1949, sought damages and an alleged breach of oral contract of employment.Interlocutory proceedings ensued, later to be noted; and on hearing of defendant's second motion to dismiss(May 18, 1951), the cause was accordingly dismissed on grounds stated in motion, with due exception and notice of appeal.

The cause of action alleged by plaintiff was in substance: That on or about March 29, 1945he was employed in capacity of nightwatchman by one Hugh Robbins, an authorized agent of defendant; it being specifically agreed that his employment should be 'for so long and for such a time as the services of the plaintiff were satisfactory and satisfactorily performed to the defendant'; that his initial salary rate was $26 per week, continuing until August 1946, when he was transferred to the job of elevator operator, with raises to $37 per week; performing said work in a manner satisfactory to defendant and conformable with original agreement of hiring until October 31, 1947, when he was summarily and arbitrarily discharged; that his life expectancy was 6.82 years and but for defendant's wrongful breach of contract, he could and would have rendered satisfactory services over such time, to his damage in amount of salary lost of $16,596.52; praying for such a judgment and costs.

Prior to said dismissal and on pretrial, defendant ahd urged special exceptions to the petition in question; generally as not stating a cause of action; and specifically, (interpreting the purported contract as one for life), that (1) an employment 'for such a time as the services of plaintiff were satisfactory and satisfactorily performed to the defendant' was without consideration, unilateral, and unenforceable against either party; and (2) because the words 'satisfactory and satisfactorily performed' are indefinite in time and created a contract of employment at will of the employer, terminable in fact by either party at will.Upon sustaining of foregoing exceptions by the court with leave to amend, plaintiff filed supplemental pleading alleging in part 'that in accepting said employment by defendanthe gave up, denied himself and forever relinquished a position of employment which was secure, permanent and guaranteed to him for the rest of his natural life.'

Appellant is a layman, prosecuting the appeal in propria persona; his brief not containing essential assignments or points.Of this, appellee properly complains; but any deficiency of procedure becomes unimportant in view of error apparent on face of the record;Ramsey v. Dunlop, 146 Tex. 196, 205 S.W.2d 979.In this connection, and perforce of the court action on exceptions, plaintiff's allegations with respect to terms of this alleged oral contract must be taken as true.

Appellee construes aforesaid petition as alleging a contract for life (apparently because plaintiff relies on life expectancy for his measure of damages), but in our opinion the pleading cannot be so interpreted.Actually claimed, in short, is that the parties have entered into one of those familiar 'satisfaction' contracts; i. e., an agreement under which the employee undertakes to render services satisfactory to the employer and to which a different principle of law is clearly applicable.6 A.L.R., Annotations, p. 1502.Under a contract to render satisfactory services it is not...