Hardney v. Castro
| Docket Number | 2:21-CV-01040-TLN-DMC |
| Decision Date | 19 April 2022 |
| Parties | JOHN HARDNEY, Petitioner, v. R. CASTRO, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Petitioner a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the Court are Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 1, Respondent's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 12, and Petitioner's traverse, ECF No 13.
The state trial court recited the following facts, and Petitioner has not offered any clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that these facts are correct:
The latest reasoned decision on the merits is from the California Superior Court. See ECF No. 1 at 74-79. Petitioner raised two claims, first that he was not given a Youth Offender Parole Hearing (“YOPH”) to which he was entitled, and second that his 34 years of incarceration for a non-homicide offense violates the Eighth Amendment's bar of cruel and unusual punishment. ECF No. 1 at 75. The trial court denied both claims.
The first claim was denied because the trial court found that Petitioner was not entitled to a YOPH. Id. at 76. The YOPH program was created by California Penal Code section 3051, enacted in 2014, which established “a parole eligibility mechanism that provides a person serving a sentence for crimes that he or she committed as a juvenile the opportunity to obtain release when he or she has shown that he or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity . . . .” Id. (citing Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1.) Originally targeted at offenders 18 years and younger, expansions to the program have extended the benefits to those 25 years and younger at the time of the controlling offense. Id. However, this procedural mechanism is not available to “those that have already been paroled or otherwise had a meaningful opportunity to obtain parole.” Id. (citing In re Howerton (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 875, 881; In re Brownlee (2020) 50 Cal.App.720, 725 (); § 3051(a)(2)(C) Because Petitioner previously received a parole hearing in 2011 and in 2017, the superior court denied his claim.
Petitioner's second claim was that his sentence is disproportionate to his culpability in violation of the Eight Amendment. At the time, Petitioner had served 34 years of his 28 year and 8 months to life sentence. Id. at 77. In evaluating his claim, the trial court compared Petitioner's situation with the facts of In re Palmer (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1199, 1202, a case the court describes as providing an example of what facts are needed for the court to conclude a sentence is disproportionate. Id. In Palmer, the 17-year-old petitioner pled guilty to kidnapping for robbery and was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, of which he served 30 years in prison. The court concluded “that in light of the petitioner's age at the time of the offense and attendant diminishment of his culpability, and the facts that he attempted to minimize the danger he posed by using an unloaded weapon and did not physically injure his victim, his continued incarceration has become so disproportionate to his individual culpability as to be ‘constitutionally excessive.'” Id. at 1214.
The trial court distinguished the facts of Palmer from Petitioner's case by noting that 24-year-old Petitioner's sentence was based on six separate crimes, including three counts of rape with the use of force or fear and a kidnapping for robbery, whereas the petitioner in Palmer was convicted of a single offense which did not involve any violence or result in injury. See ECF No. 1 at 78. Finally, the trial court referenced the significant amount of information involving the petitioner's socio-economic background the court in Palmer used to make its decision, whereas Petitioner did not provide enough information. Id. Petitioner did provide some information, but the information was “insufficient for the Court to understand circumstances of the offense, including its motive, the extent of the petitioner's involvement in the crime, the manner in which the crime was committed, and the consequences of petitioner's acts.” Id. The trial court concluded that petitioner's sentence is not disproportionate to his culpability for three rapes, a sexual battery, and a kidnapping for robbery. Id. ().
Following the denial by the trial court, Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. ECF No. 1 at 4. The California Supreme Court denied the petition for failure to include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence, citing to People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474. Id. at 74.
The instant petition, filed on June 14, 2021, sets forth two claims for relief. See ECF No. 1, see also ECF No. 13 at 3, 5. The petition was not clear as to the number of claims asserted. See ECF No. 1. In his traverse, filed on January 18, 2022, Petitioner clarified that he is asserting only two claims: (1) the California Supreme Court improperly denied him a YOPH in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantees, and (2) his sentence is grossly disproportionate to his culpability in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. See ECF No. 13 at 3, 5. On December 13, 2021, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss arguing that one claim is based on state law, the other claim is not cognizable, and that both claims were not exhausted. See ECF No. 12 at 7. Respondent also alleged that some of Petitioner's claims identified in the petition were untimely. Id. However, Petitioner clarified he is not asserting those claims alleged to be untimely, thereby eliminating the need to evaluate the untimeliness affirmative defense. See Id. at 3.
Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are presumptively applicable. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998). The AEDPA does not, however, apply in all circumstances. When it is clear that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner's claim, because it was not raised in state court or because the court denied it on procedural grounds, the AEDPA deference scheme does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim de novo. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2002) (); see also Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2002) (); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3rd. Cir.2001) (reviewing petition de novo where state court had issued a ruling on the merits of a related claim, but not the claim alleged by petitioner). When the state court does not reach the merits of a claim, “concerns about comity and federalism . . . do not exist.” Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167.
Where AEDPA is applicable, federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is not available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:
Under § 2254(d)(1), federal habeas relief is available only where the state court's decision is “contrary to” or represents an “unreasonable application of' clearly established law. Under both standards “clearly established law” means those holdings of the United States Supreme Court as of the time of the relevant state court decision. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring,...
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