Hardrick v. Harris
| Decision Date | 29 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:22-cv-44 |
| Parties | BERNARD HARDRICK, Plaintiff, v. UNKNOWN HARRIS et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim against Defendants Unknown Bailey-Webb and Erica Huss.
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Baraga Correctional Facility (AMF) in Baraga, Baraga County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) in Marquette, Marquette County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues mental health personnel at MBP-“Psych Harris,” “Psych Green,” and Unknown Bailey-Webb. He also sues MBP Warden Erica Huss.
Plaintiff reports that he suffers from extreme anxiety. He contends that his anxiety causes him to chew or bite the flesh off his hands. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Plaintiff claims the biting “causes bleeding and disfunction of his fingers, at time ” (Id.)
This is not the first time Plaintiff has raised this concern. In Hardrick v. Hares, No. 2:21-cv-64 (W.D. Mich.) Plaintiff alleged that he suffered “anxiety that causes him to bite the flesh off his own hands.” Id., (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) In that case, Plaintiff sued MBP Mental Health Chief Mark Hares, Assistant Mental Health Service Director Thomas Osier, and Mental Health personnel Unknown Holdwick and Unknown Green. Plaintiff also sued Warden Erica Huss. The Court concluded that Plaintiff had stated a claim against Defendants Hares and Holdwick, but that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim against Defendants Huss, Green, and Osier. Id., (Op. and Order., ECF Nos. 4, 5.)
Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Hares and Hardwick proceeded to mediation. The parties settled the case on August 16, 2021.
Plaintiff now acknowledges that the anxiety/chewing problem had resolved in early 2021. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) But it “started back again in June of 2021 due to ongoing untreated anxiety.” (Id.) Plaintiff reports that he spoke directly to Defendants Harris and Green during July of 2021, informing them that the anxiety/chewing problem continued. He showed them his hands. On July 28, 2021, Defendant Green told Plaintiff that he did not consider Plaintiff's case so serious that it required immediate treatment.
On August 11, 2021, Plaintiff wrote a mental health kite to “mental health staff” informing them that he still suffered the anxiety/chewing problem. That same day, Plaintiff spoke to Defendant Huss, informing her of the problem and asking her to order mental health staff to evaluate Plaintiff. (Id., PageID.3.) Plaintiff reports that Defendant Huss called Plaintiff a “retard.”
On August 16, 2021-the very day he settled his first anxiety/chewing suit-Plaintiff spoke with Defendant Harris. Harris repeated the conclusion that it was not that serious a problem but informed Plaintiff he would call Plaintiff out in a couple of weeks for an evaluation. (Id., PageID.4.) Plaintiff spoke again to Defendant Huss. She said: “I don't give a shit about you eating yourself Hardrick!” (Id.) But she suggested that he file a grievance. Plaintiff did.
On August 26, 2021, Defendant Harris evaluated Plaintiff regarding his claim of extreme anxiety. Harris again concluded that Plaintiff's condition was “not that serious.” (Id.)
The next day, Defendant Bailey-Webb interviewed Plaintiff regarding the grievance he had filed against Green, Harris, and Huss. Bailey-Webb also told Plaintiff that his condition was “not that serious.” (Id., PageID.5.)
Plaintiff contends that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and that Defendant Huss retaliated against him. He seeks hundreds of thousands of dollars in compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages.
Six months passed after the last events alleged before he filed the complaint. He does not allege that he continues to suffer the anxiety/chewing problem or indicate whether it resolved on its own, without treatment, as it did the first time. Plaintiff alleges that his anxiety chewing interferes with his ability to write. Because he has filed many handwritten complaints since the events of which he complains, it does not appear that the anxiety/chewing problem meaningfully interfered with his ability to write during or after the fall of 2021.
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) ().
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights because they were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious mental health needs. Plaintiff claims Defendant Huss failed to act on Plaintiff's obvious need for mental health care because “Plaintiff has a reputation for filing grievances ....” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.)
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment against those convicted of crimes. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment obligates prison authorities to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such care would be inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). Medical care includes medically necessary mental health treatment to inmates. See id. at 103; Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 239 F.3d 293, 301 (3d Cir. 2001); Lay v. Norris, No. 88-5757, 1989 WL 62498, at *4 (6th Cir. June 13, 1989); Potter v. Davis, No. 82-5783, 1985 WL 13129, at *2 (6th Cir. April 26, 1985).
The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001). Deliberate indifference may be manifested by a doctor's failure to respond to the medical needs of a prisoner, or by Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.
A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the seriousness of a prisoner's need[] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890,...
To continue reading
Request your trial