Hardrick v. Weitzel
| Decision Date | 26 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 4:23-cv-46-CDL-MSH |
| Parties | EDRICK HARDRICK, Plaintiff, v. LORETTA WEITZEL, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Edrick Hardrick's complaint seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). Also pending is his recast motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 6). Having reviewed his application to proceed IFP, the Court finds Hardrick is currently unable to prepay the Court's filing fee. His motion to proceed IFP is thus GRANTED.[1]Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP however, his claims must be screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1915(e). For the reasons stated below, the Court recommends that all of Hardrick's claims be dismissed except his § 1983 and state law claims against Defendants Weitzel and Diggs and that this case be stayed pending resolution of Hardrick's state criminal charges.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), once a court grants a plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed IFP, the court “shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” An action is frivolous when the complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Additionally, “[a] case is frivolous if the factual allegations are clearly baseless, or if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Johnson v. Wilbur, 375 Fed.Appx. 960, 963 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The factual allegations in a complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and cannot “‘merely create[] a suspicion of a legally cognizable right of action.'” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). In other words, the complaint must allege “enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting a claim. Id. at 556. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and are liberally construed.” Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, while “[c]ourts do and should show a leniency to pro se litigants not enjoyed by those with the benefit of a legal education,” the Court is not permitted “to serve as de facto counsel for a party” by “rewrit[ing] an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) overruled on other grounds as recognized in Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010).
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements or fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, the complaint is subject to dismissal. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
Hardrick's complaint is not the model of clarity. He describes himself as “a child of Anu” who “resides in the kingdom of heaven” and suggests the state courts lack jurisdiction over him. Compl. 2, 4, ECF No. 1. He contends he was “enjoying his life when without probable cause or warrant backed by oath or affirmation, or affidavit or contract proposal of a sort, [Defendants] and agents began the interference on [his] personal and private property.” Id. at 4. Specifically, he alleges he was operating a motor vehicle on September 30, 2022, when he was pulled over in Columbus, Muscogee County, Georgia by Defendant Loretta Weitzel, a police officer. Id. at 2-3, ECF. No. 1. Officers began performing field sobriety tests on Hardrick, which he alleges he passed. Id. at 3. Nevertheless, Hardrick was told he was under arrest for drinking and driving and was taken to the police station. Id. Once at the police station, Hardrick “took more drinking tests,” which he also passed. Id. However, instead of being released, Hardrick was charged with “something different” than the reason they brought him to the station. Compl. 3. Hardrick does not allege exactly what this other charge was, but he contends it was a “false traffic ticket.” Id. He identifies officer Cibert Diggs as the “fictional agent . . . entering in the false claim against Edrick.”[2]Id.
Hardrick states he appeared in court on October 5, 2022, before Judge Steven Smith. Id. Hardrick alleges that instead of dismissing the charge, Judge Smith violated the cannons of judicial ethics by setting a new court date.[3]Id. at 3-4. Feeling he was not properly served with notice, Hardrick did not appear at the new court date and Defendant Judge Pythias Temesgen, the Judge of the State Court of Muscogee County, issued a bench warrant. Id. at 4. Hardrick then called the Court and spoke with Katrina Wolff-who Hardick identifies as “a clerk or solicitor employed by Muscogee County”-who told him he must come to Court to get the warrant dismissed. Compl. 2, 4. She also refused Hardrick's request to send a “new case letter” or provide him with a transcript. Id.
Hardrick's complaint contains four counts. In the first count, he alleges a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights by “trespass,” contending Defendants' acts were unreasonable, unjustified, excessive, and interfered with his right to free will. Id. at 5. In count two, he alleges a Fourth Amendment violation through “false arrest,” alleging Defendants had no probable cause to arrest him. Id. at 6. In count three, he alleges a state law claim for assault and battery, stating he “sustained physical and emotional injuries” as a result of the incident. Id. at 7. In count four, he alleges a state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, asserting Defendants' actions were taken “intentionally with malice, willfulness, and reckless indifference to the rights and safety of Plaintiff[].” Id. at 8. Hardrick sees compensatory and punitive damages and a “permanent injunction directing and ordering [Defendants] not to further harass or deprive rights without [his] express consent or other valid authorization.” Compl. 5-10.
“In order to prevail on a civil rights action under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he or she was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under the color of state law.” Lloyd v. Leeper, 451 F.Supp.3d 1314, 1322 (M.D. Fla. 2020) (quoting Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001)). The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend IV. Lloyd, 451 F.Supp.3d. at 1323 (internal citations omitted). A plaintiff may state a claim based on a traffic stop unsupported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion regardless of whether he is subsequently subjected to a search or arrest. See Porter v. Porterfield, No. 14-61800-CIV, 2015 WL 2341922, at *4 (S.D. Fla. May 14, 2015) ( plaintiff stated a § 1983 claim based on initial stop of the vehicle alone). Further, “[a] warrantless arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment and forms a basis for a section 1983 claim.” Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1996).
Construed liberally, Hardrick alleges Weitzel stopped his vehicle without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Although he does not allege what role, if any, she played following the initial stop, Hardrick's complaint is sufficient to state a § 1983 claim based on the initial stop alone. Further, he alleges that despite knowing he had not committed a drunk driving offense, Diggs falsely charged him with an alternate crime despite lack of probable cause. This is also sufficient to state a § 1983 claim.
Nevertheless while Hardrick sufficiently states § 1983 claims against Weitzel and Diggs, his § 1983 claims against the remaining defendants must be dismissed. First, judicial immunity bars Hardrick's claims against Defendants Smith and Temesgen. “Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages under section 1983 for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” McBrearty v. Koji, 348 Fed.Appx. 437, 439 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991)). “A judge does not act in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction' when he acts erroneously, maliciously,...
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