Hardwick Farmers' Elevator Co. v. Chi., R. I. & P. Ry. Co.

• Citation: 124 N.W. 819,110 Minn. 25
• Parties: HARDWICK FARMERS' ELEVATOR CO. v. CHICAGO, R. I. & P. RY. CO.
• Decision Date: 28 January 1910
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

110 Minn. 25

124 N.W. 819

HARDWICK FARMERS' ELEVATOR CO.

v.CHICAGO, R. I. & P. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 28, 1910.

Appeal from District Court, Rock County; P. E. Brown, Judge.

Action by the Hardwick Farmers' Elevator Company against the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

Chapter 23, p. 25, Laws Minn. 1907 (Rev. Laws Supp. 1909, ss 2023-1 to 2023-13), imposed the duty upon any railroad company to furnish suitable cars to all persons applying therefor in good faith, to provide and keep suitable facilities for handling the same, to receive and transport empty or loaded cars furnished by any connecting road, to furnish to the shipper the number of cars applied for in writing within 48 hours at terminal points and 72 hours at intermediate points from the receipt of the application. Section 11 provided: ‘The period during which the movement of freight or furnishing cars is suspended on account of strikes, public calamities, accident, or any cause not within the power of the railroad company to prevent, or during which the loading or unloading of freight by shipper or consignee is delayed by reason of inclement weather which would make loading or unloading impracticable, or any cause not in the power of said shipper or consignee to prevent, shall be added to the free time allowed in this act and counted as additional free time.’ In addition to damages the carrier was made responsible to the shipper for the sum of $1 per day for every car failed to be furnished together with reasonable attorney's fees for bringing such suit, to be taxed and paid as costs.

In an action brought thereunder the defendant railroad company asserted as a first defense that it was reasonably within the terms of the act, because a freight congestion had rendered it impossible for defendant to furnish cars sooner than it did. It is held:

That this was a question of fact, and that the verdict of the jury for plaintiff must be sustained, inasmuch as this court was not furnished with the transcript of the testimony and could not review the evidence.

For a second defense, defendant asserted the unconstitutionality of the law as an attempted regulation of interstate commerce, and as failing to comply with the federal requirement concerning ‘due process of law.’ It is held:

(1) The law by its terms applied to interstate and intrastate commerce. The merchandise transported between two points within this state, which was carried by defendant's lines through a neighboring state and back into this state, was interstate commerce.

(2) The expression ‘any cause not within the power of the shipper or consignee to prevent’ and the term ‘accident,’ which occurred in the enumerated cases excepted from the operation of the act, are to be broadly construed, and include all causes not reasonably within the power of the carrier to prevent.

(3) The power of the government may be divided into four classes: (1) Those which belong exclusively to the states; (2) those which belong exclusively to the national government; (3) those which may be exercised concurrently and independently by both; (4) those which may be exercised by the states, but only until Congress shall see fit to act upon the subject.

(4) State laws enacted in the exercise of the police power and indirectly and remotely affecting interstate commerce, being in aid thereof and not a burden thereon, may be within the fourth class of cases and enforceable, unless superseded by some act of Congress, if they are reasonable in their operation.

(5) The so-called reciprocal demurrage law was designed, and in operation tended, to insure the prompt performance by the carrier of its common-law duty to furnish cars for transportation of freight, and was not displaced by the interstate commerce act (Act Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3154]), as amended by the Hepburn law (Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909, p. 1149]), primarily intended to secure reasonable rates and to prevent unjust discriminations.

(6) The law made sufficient allowance for practical difficulties in railroad management, in its enumeration of exceptions to liability, and was reasonable and constitutional. Houston R. R. v. Mayes, 201 U. S. 321, 26 Sup. Ct. 491, 50 L. Ed. 772, followed and applied.

Third. The provision requiring the payment of reasonable attorney's fees is not invalid because it imposes a charge on carriers, and not on debtors generally, inasmuch as the statute was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the state. A. J. Daley and Stringer 3 Seymour, for appellant.

C. H. Christopherson, for respondent.

This was an action brought by plaintiff and respondent elevator company against defendant and appellant railroad company under the so-called reciprocal demurrage law (chapter 23, p. 25, Laws Minn. 1907 [Rev. Laws Supp. 1909, §§ 2023-1 to 2023-13]), to recover $1 a day for every day on which defendant failed at specified times to furnish cars to plaintiff for the movement of grain from a point in Minnesota to other points in Minnesota and to points in other states. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in the sum of $218, being $1 for every day's delay and $50 as attorney's fees. From judgment entered therein this appeal was taken. Other cases involving the validity of the same law were submitted at the same time. All material relevant points made by various counsel are intended to be included in the opinion which follows.

So far as here involved, chapter 23 is as follows:

‘Section 1. It shall be the duty of any railroad company to furnish suitable car or cars to every and all persons, without discrimination, who may apply therefor in good faith for the transportation of any and all kinds of freight, * * * and also to receive and transport in like manner the empty or loaded cars furnished by any connecting railroad, to be delivered at any station or stations on the line of its road, to be loaded or discharged, or reloaded and returned to the road so connected. * * *

‘When the owner, manager or shipper of any freight of any kind shall make application in writing to any superintendent, agent, or other person in charge of transportation of any railroad company, at any point that cars are desired in or upon which to ship any freight, it shall be the duty of such railroad company to supply the number of cars so required at the point indicated in the application within a reasonable time thereafter, not to exceed forty-eight hours at terminal points and seventy-two hours at intermediate points, from the receipt of such application, Sundays and legal holidays excepted, and shall supply such cars to the person or persons so applying therefor in the order in which such applications are made, without giving preference to any person. * * *

‘When cars are applied for under the provisions of this chapter, if they are not furnished within the time herein stated, the railroad company so failing to furnish them shall forfeit to the party or parties so applying for them the sum of one dollar per day for each car failed to be furnished, to be recovered in any court of competent jurisdiction, together with all damages such applicant may have sustained. * * *

‘Sec. 10. The payment by said railroad company of demurrage provided in this act, shall in no way invalidate or offset any claim any shipper or consignee may have or make for damages occasioned by delay on the part of such railroad company, or other cause, but shall be a further remedy and in addition to any already existing. Nor shall anything herein contained be held to lessen the duties of any common carrier in the shipment of live stock or other perishable property.

‘Sec. 11. The period during which the movement of freight or furnishing cars is suspended on account of strikes, public calamities, accident, or any cause not within the power of the railroad company to prevent, or during which the loading or unloading of freight by shipper or consignee is delayed by reason of inclement weather which would make loading or unloading impracticable, or any cause not in the power of said shipper or consignee to prevent, shall be added to the free time allowed in this act and counted as additional free time. * * *

‘Sec. 13. When suit is brought to collect any of the damages, forfeitures or demurrage charges, providef for in this act, said suit may be brought in any court in this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter and parties under the then existing cause; and if the plaintiff therein recover judgment such plaintiff shall also recover a reasonable attorney's fee for bringing such suit, to be taxed as costs in other cases and paid as other costs by defendant in such suit.’

JAGGARD, J. (after stating the facts as above).

The defenses interposed were, first, that because of a freight congestion, one of the greatest in the history of commerce, it was impossible for defendant to furnish cars any sooner than it did. On the evidence adduced, the trial court submitted to the jury the question whether or not it was within the power of the railroad company to have furnished the cars when demanded. The verdict of the jury for plaintiff must be sustained on this point, for this court was not furnished with a transcript of the testimony. No question on the subject is therefore presented for our consideration. The verdict must stand, in the absence of other objection. Mead v. Billings, 40 Minn. 505, 42 N. W. 472;Brackett v. Cunningham, 44 Minn. 498, 47 N. W. 157.

The second defense asserted was that the law was unconstitutional under the state and federal Constitutions, especially as an attempted regulation of interstate commerce in violation of section 8, art. 1, Const. U. S., and the laws of Congress, and has failed to comply with the acts of Congress and section 1, art. 14, Const. Amend. U....