Hardwick v. Pierce
Decision Date | 10 December 2015 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 12–1254–SLR |
Parties | James Hardwick, Petitioner, v. David Pierce, Warden, and Attorney General of the State of Delaware, Respondents. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
James Hardwick. Pro se petitioner.
Gregory E. Smith. Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for respondents.
ROBINSON
Petitioner James Hardwick (“petitioner”) is a Delaware inmate in custody at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center in Wilmington, Delaware. Presently before the court is petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254
. (D.I. 3; D.I. 11) For the reasons that follow, the court will dismiss his application.
As set forth by the Delaware Supreme Court in Hardwick v. State, 971 A.2d 130, 132 (Del.2009)
, and by the Superior Court in State v. Hardwick, 2011 WL 2535559 (Del.Super. June 7, 2011), the facts leading to petitioner's arrest and conviction as a consequence of having sexual relations with his underage stepdaughter, Alice Smith, and her friend, Peggy Lane (both pseudonyms), are as follows:
.
Hardwick, 2011 WL 2535559, at *2
.
During the police investigation, Detective Rubin of the Newark Police Department interrogated Matthew, the only other individual with information regarding the allegations. During that interrogation, Matthew claimed that petitioner and he did not commit the alleged sexual acts. The State taped that interview and sent it to defense counsel. The defense hired a defense investigator to interview Matthew.
.
Petitioner was arrested on September 5, 2007. (D.I. 16 at 3) On November 26, 2007 he was indicted on thirty-six counts of first degree rape, two counts of attempted second degree rape, and two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child. He was re-indicted on March 3, 2008. Id.
On May 27, 2008, a five day jury trial commenced in the Superior Court. (D.I. 16 at 4) The tapes of the phone calls between petitioner and Peggy were admitted into evidence during the trial. See Hardwick v. State, 47 A.3d 523 (Table), 2012 WL 1067150, at *1 (Del. Mar. 27, 2012)
. Both Alice and Peggy testified during the trial, but Matthew did not.2 Id.
At the close of the evidence, and before jury instructions, the Superior Court dismissed seven counts of first degree rape, and the counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child. The jury convicted petitioner on all remaining charges. Id. The Superior Court sentenced petitioner to thirty-one consecutive life sentences. Id. Represented by new counsel, petitioner appealed. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences on April 22, 2009. See
In June 2009, petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61
(“Rule 61 motion”) asserting, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel. The Superior Court appointed counsel to represent petitioner, but petitioner discharged counsel and proceeded pro se. On March 10, 2011, the Superior Court denied the Rule 61 motion, and then re-issued its opinion on June 7, 2011. See
Hardwick, 2011 WL 2535559. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that judgment on March 27, 2012. See
Petitioner timely filed a § 2254
application in this court. (D.I.1) The State filed an answer, arguing that the court should deny the application because the claims are either procedurally barred or do not warrant relief under § 2254(d). (D.I.16)
A federal court may consider a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner only “on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)
. One prerequisite to federal habeas review is that a petitioner must exhaust all remedies available in the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The exhaustion requirement is grounded on principles of comity to ensure that state courts have the initial opportunity to review federal constitutional challenges to state convictions. Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 192 (3d Cir.2000). A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by “fairly presenting” the substance of the federal habeas claim to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding, and in a procedural manner permitting the state courts to consider it on the merits. See
Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) ; Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989).
A petitioner's failure to exhaust state remedies will be excused if state procedural rules preclude him from seeking further relief in state courts. Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir.2000)
; see
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297–98, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). Although treated as technically exhausted, such claims are nonetheless procedurally defaulted. Lines, 208 F.3d at 160 ; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750–51, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). Similarly, if a petitioner presents a habeas claim to the state's highest court, but that court “clearly and expressly” refuses to review the merits of the claim due to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, the claim is exhausted but procedurally defaulted. See
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546 ; Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260–64, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989).
A federal court cannot review the merits of procedurally defaulted claims unless the petitioner demonstrates either cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice resulting therefrom, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will result if the court does not review the claims. McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir.1999)
, 501 U.S. at 750–51, 111 S.Ct. 2546. To demonstrate cause for a procedural default, a petitioner must show that “some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). To demonstrate...
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