Hardwick v. State, 92-2251

Decision Date21 January 1994
Docket NumberNo. 92-2251,92-2251
Citation630 So.2d 1212
Parties19 Fla. L. Weekly D192 Keith HARDWICK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Anne Moorman Reeves, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Mark S. Dunn, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

COBB, Judge.

The appellant, Keith Hardwick, contends the trial evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated battery and, furthermore, that the trial court erred in sentencing him without first ordering a presentence investigation report.

The state's evidence was that Hardwick, who is six feet eight inches tall and weighs approximately 260 pounds, jerked the victim's purse away from her in a manner such that her left middle finger was broken in four places, requiring several surgeries.

The defendant argues that the state at most showed that he intended to take the victim's purse and not to inflict injury and that therefore the crime of aggravated battery, which in the absence of use of a deadly weapon, requires that the defendant specifically intend to cause great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement was not established. See Knott v. State, 573 So.2d 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991; State v. Horvatch, 413 So.2d 469 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982.

Affirmance on this point is mandated for two reasons. First, as the state points out, this ground for acquittal was not raised in the defendant's perfunctory motions for judgment of acquittal. 1 The state is correct that these "bare bones" motions will not allow a defendant to raise every possible claimed insufficiency in the evidence on appeal. See e.g., Patterson v. State, 391 So.2d 344 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980.

Second, the defendant, in moving for a judgment of acquittal, admits not only the facts stated and evidence adduced but also every conclusion favorable to the state that a jury might reasonably infer from the evidence. The court should not grant the motion unless the evidence is such that no view which the jury may lawfully take of it favorable to the state can be sustained under the law. Lynch v. State, 293 So.2d 44 (Fla.1974. See also Taylor v. State, 583 So.2d 323 (Fla.1991; Herman v. State, 472 So.2d 770 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985, rev. denied, 482 So.2d 348 (Fla.1986.

Section 784.045, Florida Statutes entitled "Aggravated battery" provides:

(1(a A person commits aggravated battery who, in committing battery:

1. Intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement; or

2. Uses a deadly weapon.

In an aggravated battery prosecution, the issue of whether the victim sustained great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement is a question of fact, the resolution of which should not be disturbed on appeal if supported by sufficient competent evidence. E.A. v. State, 599 So.2d 251 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992. The jury could have concluded that the victim's finger, which was broken in four places and which required repeated surgery including the insertion of metal pins, was a permanent disability or disfigurement particularly where, as here, the victim testified she no longer had full use of her hand.

The remaining questions concern the sufficiency of the evidence presented to show that the defendant "intentionally or knowingly" caused such an injury and the propriety of convictions for both robbery and aggravated battery arising out of a single course of criminal conduct. The defendant, recognizing that force, violence, assault, or putting in fear, is an essential element of robbery, argues that the force here was exerted in taking the purse and was not designed to produce the sort of physical harm the victim suffered. The defendant points out that nearly all the reported aggravated battery cases which do not involve use of a deadly weapon involve beatings, hittings, chokings and the like from which intent to do or knowledge of the requisite harm can easily be inferred. See e.g., Guthrie v. State, 407 So.2d 357 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981; Jackson v State, 338 So.2d 231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976. The defendant asserts there is no evidence that he intended to cause great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement to the victim.

The issue of proof of intent is, in this context, analogous to that involved in theft, another specific intent offense. See Healy v. Suntrust Service Corp., 569 So.2d 458 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990. As explained in Brewer v. State, 413 So.2d 1217, 1219-1220 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982, rev. denied, 426 So.2d 25 (Fla.1983:

Although the State must prove intent just as any other element of a crime, Uber v. State, 382 So.2d 1321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980, a defendant's mental intent is hardly ever subject to direct proof. Instead, the State must establish the defendant's intent (and a jury must reasonably attribute such intent based on the surrounding circumstances in the case. Keeping in mind the test to be applied to a motion for judgment of acquittal, a trial court should rarely, if ever, grant a motion for judgment of acquittal based on the state's failure to prove mental intent.

In the instant case, the victim testified to a violent encounter with the defendant:

A. Well, at that same time, I realized that it just wasn't falling out of my hand. It was being pulled to be taken. And he started running, and I was still trying to hold on to my purse.

Q. What happened then?

A. Well, when he was running and I was holding on to my purse and he was running with the purse, I was turned around very fast, jerked around. And I was still trying to hold on to it. And I remember being pulled like this and feeling the purse being pulled out of my hand.

It was just ripped out of my hand. And at that time I thought the purse strap had broken because he was stronger than me, and I couldn't hold the grip. But I realize that...

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21 cases
  • Knight v. State, 5D11–2875.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • February 27, 2013
    ...rarely, if ever, grant a motion for judgment of acquittal based on the state's failure to prove mental intent.” Hardwick v. State, 630 So.2d 1212, 1214 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (quoting Brewer v. State, 413 So.2d 1217, 1220 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)). “Whether one had intent is generally a question gi......
  • Johnson v. Singletary
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
    • April 26, 1995
    ...rarely, if ever, grant a motion for judgment of acquittal based on the state's failure to prove mental intent." Hardwick v. State, 630 So.2d 1212, 1214 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). "Evidence from which premeditation may be inferred includes such matters as the nature of the weapon used, the presenc......
  • State v. Sims
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • March 25, 2013
    ...837 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (emphasis added). In fact, intent usually is inferred based on circumstantial evidence. See Hardwick v. State, 630 So.2d 1212 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); State v. Tovar, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D2569, 2012 WL 5373443 (Fla. 2d DCA Nov. 2, 2012). In addition, the evidence, viewed in......
  • Kent v. State, 96-2590
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 5, 1997
    ...adduced, but also every conclusion favorable to the state that a jury might reasonably infer from the evidence. Hardwick v. State, 630 So.2d 1212 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). A reasonable inference from the victim's testimony is that the defendant carried and threatened her with a "razor-type knife......
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