Hardy-Rondash v. Hardy

• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts
• Docket Number: 24-P-54
• Decision Date: 10 November 2025
• Citation: Hardy-Rondash v. Hardy, 24-P-54 (Mass. App. Nov 10, 2025)
• Parties: CARMEN HARDY-RONDASH v. CASSIDI HARDY

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CARMEN HARDY-RONDASH v. CASSIDI HARDY

No. 24-P-54

Appeals Court of Massachusetts

November 10, 2025

Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass.App.Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass.App.Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

Rubin Hand & Smyth, JJ. ^[20]

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 2 3.0

The parties, Carmen Hardy-Rondash (father) and Cassidi Hardy (mother), were married in 2011. Four children were born of the marriage between 2012 and 2020. In June 2019, the father commenced divorce proceedings in the Probate and Family Court. In January 2023, the parties submitted for incorporation into the divorce judgment a "partial divorce agreement" (PDA) resolving several disputed issues. The remaining issues were tried on August 30 and September 8, 2023, and judgments issued on November 16, 2023 (divorce judgment^[1]) . Among other things the divorce judgment required the parties to comply with the terms of the PDA, granted the father sole legal and primary physical custody of the children, made the mother responsible for all transportation during parenting time transitions, ordered the mother to pay weekly child support of $389, and set forth additional provisions concerning the children and the parties' respective therapy-related obligations.

On appeal, the mother challenges (1) certain provisions of the divorce judgment that conflict with the terms of the PDA; (2) the allocation of all transportation responsibilities to her; (3) the amount of child support; (4) certain therapy-related provisions (including one that prohibits her from seeking modification of custody and parenting time unless a category E guardian ad litem previously appointed in the case [GAL] has certified that she has engaged in appropriate therapy); and (5) the judge's decision to limit the length of the trial to two days.^[2] We vacate so much of the divorce judgment that conflicts with the terms of the PDA, assigns all transportation responsibilities to the mother, and prohibits the mother from seeking modification absent the GAL's certification.

The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order. The divorce judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

Discussion.

1. Partial divorce agreement.

The mother contends that the judge erred by including provisions in the divorce judgment (concerning telephone contact with the children and transportation of the children to extracurricular activities) that directly conflict with provisions of the PDA, which was incorporated into the divorce judgment. We agree.

With respect to telephone contact with the children, the PDA allowed each parent to call the children once per day when they are in the other parent's care (including Friday, Saturday, and Sunday on alternating weekends). The divorce judgment, however, departed from the terms of the PDA by (a) restricting the parties' weekend telephone contact to Saturdays only (thereby eliminating Fridays and Sundays), and (b) requiring the mother's telephone contact on Tuesdays and Thursdays to occur at 7 P.M.^[3] The judge did not make any findings explaining the basis for these changes.

With respect to the children's extracurricular activities, the PDA provided, in relevant part, that each party "shall generally be responsible for transporting the children to and from their agreed upon extracurricular activities . . . during his/her respective parenting time" (emphasis added) . The divorce judgment, however, omitted "generally" and "agreed upon" from the preceding sentence and further provided that the parties "shall ensure that the children attend their scheduled practices, games, and events during their respective parenting time." It appears that these changes were adopted from the father's posttrial amended proposed judgment. The judge did not explain her reasoning for omitting the language in the PDA that limited the parties' transportation obligations to "agreed upon" extracurricular activities only. At trial, the mother testified that the father unilaterally enrolled the children in extracurricular activities during her parenting time (either without consulting her or over her objection), often in "inconvenient locations," which reduced her overall time spent with the children and "t[ook] up a lot of [her] parenting time with driving time." It is unclear whether the judge considered this testimony, as she did not address it in her findings. The mother contends that the judge erroneously (1) revisited issues previously settled by the parties in the PDA, asserting that "those issues were res judicata"; and (2) entered a divorce judgment that conflicted with the PDA without affording the mother notice and an opportunity to be heard. We are not persuaded that the telephone contact and extracurricular activities issues were subject to the doctrine of res judicata by virtue of their inclusion in the PDA, given that the PDA was not incorporated into a prior judgment (rather, it was incorporated into the divorce judgment). See Santos v. U.S. Bank Nat'1 Ass'n, 89 Mass.App.Ct. 687, 692 (2016) . However, we agree with the mother that she was deprived of adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard on those issues.

In a June 2023 trial scheduling order (June 2023 order), the trial judge ordered that the PDA "shall be incorporated into the Court's final Judgment." There was nothing in the June 2023 order, or the parties' pretrial memoranda,^[4] indicating that the issues addressed by the PDA remained contested for trial. See Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 490 Mass. 398, 426 (2022) ("[0]nce the issues are defined in a final pretrial order, 'they ought to be adhered to in the absence of some good and sufficient reason'" [citation omitted]). Moreover, based on the record before us, it appears that the father did not seek changes to the PDA until after the trial had already concluded.^[5] Because there was no indication from the judge or the father prior to (or during) the trial that the telephone contact and extracurricular activities issues remained in dispute, the mother was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to be heard and present evidence on those issues. See Brantley v. Hampden Div. of the Probate & Family Court Dep't, 457 Mass. 172, 187 (2010) ("Due process requires, at minimum, an opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner'" [citation omitted]).

In addition to the notice problem, there is a potential enforcement problem. The language of the divorce judgment is internally inconsistent insofar as it provides that the parties "shall abide by the terms of the [PDA]," yet includes certain provisions that directly conflict with the "terms" of the PDA. It is unclear which provisions are controlling and what the parties' rights and obligations are with respect to telephone contact and transportation of the children to extracurricular activities. As a result, the conflicting provisions of the PDA and divorce judgment have been rendered unenforceable insofar as a contempt finding cannot be based on ambiguous language. See Sax v. Sax, 53 Mass.App.Ct. 765, 771 (2002) . A remand is therefore necessary, not only to provide the mother with a meaningful opportunity to be heard, but also to allow the judge to redetermine and clarify the parties' rights and obligations with respect to these issues.

2. Transportation during parenting time transitions.

The mother contends that the judge abused her discretion by requiring the mother to be solely responsible for the children's transportation during all parenting time transitions without making adequate subsidiary findings in support thereof. We agree.

In or around October 2021, the parties entered into an agreement, which was incorporated into a temporary order, setting forth a temporary parenting plan under which all parenting time transitions would occur at the father's residence. Although the mother agreed to shoulder the entire transportation responsibility on a temporary basis, she sought to share that responsibility with the father on a permanent basis. In April 2022, the parties filed a stipulation identifying as a contested issue for trial the allocation of responsibility for the children's transportation during parenting time transitions. The mother also listed it as a contested issue for trial in her June 2023 pretrial memorandum, stating that she was seeking to have the father share in the transportation responsibilities. The mother reiterated this request in her posttrial amended proposed judgment.

During the pendency of the divorce proceedings, the GAL was appointed to, among other things, make recommendations regarding an appropriate parenting plan that would promote the children's best interests.^[6] In his final report submitted in December 2022, the GAL recommended that all parenting time transitions occur at fixed times at a location equidistant between the parties' homes. At trial, both parties testified regarding the GAL's transportation recommendations. The father stated that he did not agree with the GAL's recommendations, but did not elaborate as to why. The mother stated that she agreed with the GAL's recommendations, explaining that she...