Hardy v. Brookhart
Decision Date | 19 October 1970 |
Docket Number | No. 17,17 |
Citation | 259 Md. 317,270 A.2d 119 |
Parties | , 8 UCC Rep.Serv. 359 Russell HARDY, Sr. v. Smith W. BROOKHART et al., etc. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Russell Hardy, Sr., in pro per.
James Willard Davis, Westminster (Dulany, Davis & Smith, Westminster, on the brief), for appellees.
Argued before HAMMOND, C. J., and BARNES, McWILLIAMS, FINAN, SINGLEY, SMITH and DIGGES, JJ.
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the appellees, plaintiffs below, in the amount of $7,647.50. Appellees, members of a law firm, brought suit against appellant Hardy (their former client) on two promissory notes made to the order of the firm for legal services rendered. It is the second time in twenty months that the differences between the parties have surfaced in this Court. 1 This time we reach the merits of the case.
The issues which this Court must decide are whether the notes were signed voluntarily and knowingly by the appellant, and if so, whether there was valid consideration for the notes.
The facts which gave rise to the controversy before us are as follows:
In 1962, appellant Hardy, in the midst of martial difficulties, sued his wife in the United States District Court for the District of Colubmia in Civil Action 4075-61. This was an effort by him to recover the entire proceeds from the sale of their former residence in Kenwood, Maryland, and to impress a trust on certain securities held by his wife, but which she had purchased with household funds given her throughout the years by the appellant. Initially, Hardy, himself an attorney, handled his own case. However, pursuant to an agreement dated November 27, 1963, he retained appellee Brookhart and an attorney by the name of Irving G. McCann (now deceased) to represent him in the above mentioned suit. The agreement of November 27, 1963, is referred to in subsequent agreements between the parties and while we deem it unnecessary to quote the entire agreement, we think it important to keep in mind that the agreement of November 27, 1963, provided that in return for their legal services, Hardy was to pay the attorneys $5,000.00, but 'if the case shall be tried and a judgment entered for Hardy in the amount of $40,000.00 or more, the total compensation payable to Brookhart and McCann shall be $10,000.00.'
On October 30, 1964, the district court found for Hardy in the suit regarding the securities, and impressed them with a trust in his favor amounting to $22,652.07. As to the proceeds from the sale of the house, the district court ruled that these proceeds, in the form of several cashier checks, were property held in tenancy by the entirety, and inasmuch as the appellant and his wife were still legally married, could not be awarded to either party without the consent of the other.
Appellant Hardy elected to appeal this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and toward this end executed an agreement on March 16, 1965, with the law firm of 'Brookhart, Becker & Dorsey, Esquires, a partnership.' In this second agreement Hardy acknowledged his indebtedness to Brookhart and McCann in the amount of $5,000.00 by virtue of the first agreement signed in November, 1963, and executed a demand note payable to those two attorneys. He also retained the firm to represent him in his appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, agreed to pay them $1,500.00 to perfect the appeal, and executed a promissory note for that amount 'payable to said law firm at the time of the court of appeals decision.' (It should be noted that both of these notes have been paid and are not the subject of the present lawsuit.)
On April 20, 1965, Hardy obtained a divorce in the Circuit Court For Montgomery County. On December 15, 1965, the United States Court of Appeals affirmed the district court decision, but on January 5, 1966, modified its decision (apparently in view of the recent divorce) to allow Hardy to renew his motion in the district court for the entire proceeds from the sale of the residence. Hardy returned to the district court and persevered with his litigation.
In a decision rendered February 23, 1966, the district court again denied Hardy's claim to the entire proceeds, but rendered judgment for him in the amount of $22,510.33, which represented one-half of the proceeds from the sale of the house after certain tax claims had been satisfied. Appellant Hardy, distressed with this second ruling of the district court, decided on yet another appeal. Accordingly, he executed a third agreement in which there was reference again made to the agreement of November 27, 1963. We think it necessary to set forth this third agreement in full:
'AGREEMENT'
'This AGREEMENT made and entered into this 3rd day of March, 1966, by and between RUSSELL HARDY, SR., and BROOKHART, BECKER & DORSEY, ESQUIRES, a partnership, witnesseth:
WHEREAS, a final judgment was entered on February 23, 1966, by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in the case of Russell Hardy, Sr., Plaintiff v. Elisabeth C. Hardy, Defendant, Civil Action Number 4075-61, with respect to Count 4 of the Complaint, and a timely Notice of Appeal shall be filed as to said judgment by plaintiff; and
WHEREAS, by virtue of a certain AGREEMENT dated November 27, 1963, and the judgments of said District Court of October 30, 1964, and February 23, 1966, said RUSSELL HARDY, SR. (is indebted to the law firm of BROOKHART, BECKER & DORSEY in the additional sum of $5,000.00) for professional services incident to their representation of him in said District Court with respect to Count 4 of the Complaint whereby said judgment of February 23, 1966, was rendered; and
WHEREAS, the said RUSSELL HARDY, SR., is desirous of retaining the services of said law firm of BROOKHART, BECKER & DORSEY to represent him in said appeal with respect to said judgment of February 23, 1966, before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual covenants herein contained, the parties agree as follows:
1. The said law firm of BROOKHART, BECKER & DORSEY is retained by RUSSELL HARDY, SR. to represent him in connection with the appeal from said judgment of February 23, 1966.
2. RUSSELL HARDY, SR. shall compensate the said law firm of BROOKHART, BECKER & DORSEY for professional services to be rendered in said Court of Appeals in the sum of $1,500.00, which sum shall be due and payable upon a decision being rendered in connection with the aforesaid appeal by said Court of Appeals, and such debt shall be evidenced by a non-interest bearing promissory note executed contemporaneously with the Agreement by said RUSSELL HARDY, SR., payable to said law firm at the time of the court of appeals decision.
3. Contemporaneous with the execution of this AGREEMENT, RUSSELL HARDY, SR., shall execute a promissory note payable to Brookhart, Becker & Dorsey, on demand in the face amount of $5,000.00 bearing interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of execution until paid, which sum represents the additional amount payable by RUSSELL HARDY, SR. to said firm, pursuant to said AGREEMENT of November 27, 1963, and by virtue of the judgments of said District Court of October 30, 1964, and February 23, 1966, whereby said RUSSELL HARDY, SR. has received judgments in his favor in excess of $40,000.00.
4. RUSSELL HARDY, SR. agrees to pay directly all expenses incident to said appeal and shall contract directly with Thiel Press in printing all briefs and joint appendix.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their hands and seals all on the date first herein above written.
/s/ Russell Hardy, Sr. (Seal)
BROOKHART, BECKER & DORSEY
/s/ By Smith W. Brookhart'
At the same time, he executed the following two promissory notes:
'On demand I promise to pay to the order of Brookhart, Becker & Dorsey Five Thousand and 00/00 ($5,000.00) Dollars For value received with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum until paid.
Payable at Suite 1300, 1700 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
/s/ Russell Hardy, Sr.
Washington, D.C.
Upon decision of Court of Appeals in appeal of Civil Action 4075-61 I promise to pay to the order of Brookhart, Becker & Dorsey One Thousand five hundred and 00/00 ($1,500.00) Dollars for value received, with interest at the rate of zero percent per annum until paid.
Payable at Suite 1300, 1700 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
/s/ Russell Hardy, Sr.
Washington, D.C.
It is these two notes and the above agreement which are the matters in controversy.
Appellant, in a previous appeal in this matter, claimed an offsetting amount of $5,000.00 allegedly due him by appellees for legal services rendered by him to them. In the light of the opinion of this Court written by McWilliams, J., in Hardy v. Brookhart, et al., 252 Md. 107, 249 A.2d 148 (1969), the appellant has abandoned that contention. Instead, for the purposes of this appeal he has harkened back to substantially the same position first espoused by him in August, 1967, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (before removal of the case to Carroll County), namely, that the notes in question were 'without consideration,' that the law firm had been paid in full, that the legal service to which the notes were to be applied had not in fact been rendered and that he is not indebted to the appellees herein. We disagree.
In his brief, Hardy alleges eight assignments of error, which for purposes of this opinion will be condensed. First, Hardy urges that he did not read the questioned contract, or at least did not read it carefully, and that the presumption of fraud and invalidity which attends challenged transactions between attorneys and their clients should be applied in this case. At this juncture it should be pointed out that appellant Hardy has been a practicing...
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