Hardy v. Caterpillar Global Mining Equip., LLC

Decision Date18 February 2016
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 4:14-cv-00492
PartiesVENDETTA D. HARDY, Plaintiff, v. CATERPILLAR GLOBAL MINING EQUIPMENT, LLC, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

VENDETTA D. HARDY, Plaintiff,
v.
CATERPILLAR GLOBAL MINING EQUIPMENT, LLC, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:14-cv-00492

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SHERMAN DIVISION

February 18, 2016


MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Now before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 14). Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition (Dkt. 23), Defendant has filed a reply (Dkt. 26), and Plaintiff has filed a surreply (Dkt. 27). Also before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant's Summary Judgment Evidence (Dkt. 24). Defendant has filed a response (Dkt. 28), and Plaintiff has filed a reply (Dkt. 32). As set forth below, Plaintiff's motion to strike (Dkt. 24) is DENIED, and Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 14) is DENIED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Vendetta D. Hardy ("Plaintiff" or "Hardy"), was hired by Bucyrus as a manufacturing engineer ("ME") at its Denison, Texas facility in April 2011. Dkt. 1 at ¶ 7. Caterpillar ("Defendant" or "Caterpillar" or "CAT") acquired Bucyrus in July 2011, and thereafter became successor employer to Bucyrus. Id. at ¶ 6. According to Plaintiff, beginning in July 2011, and throughout her employment, Caterpillar employed approximately 12 MEs at the Denison facility, retaining the same scheme for job classification as was used at Bucyrus. Id. Plaintiff states that some of the MEs held the title of ME I, most held the title of ME II, and one

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held the title of ME III. Id. Plaintiff states that she was hired by Bucyrus as a ME II. Id. at ¶ 7. Her initial supervisor was Jim Rice ("Rice") until December 2011, and then Tim Pecenka ("Pecenka") until February 2013, and then Matt Sauter ("Sauter") until her termination in August 2013. Id. at ¶ 7.

Plaintiff alleges that "[t]hroughout [her] employment with Caterpillar between July 2011 and August 2013, [she] was subjected to race and sex discrimination in that there was disparate treatment between her male white and other non-black ME II peers..." Id. at ¶ 20. Plaintiff alleges that she was "misclassified" as an ME I, which was not corrected even after she complained to human resources. Plaintiff also alleges that she was "falsely" informed that Caterpillar was not offering tuition reimbursement toward completion of her master's degree, but she later determined she was eligible for tuition reimbursement. Id. at ¶ 8. According to Plaintiff, her "male white and otherwise non-black [ME II] peers were not similarly misclassified or subjected to false statements as to their eligibility for [tuition] benefits." Id.

In February 2012, Plaintiff received her "2011 partial year performance evaluation ... which accorded her an overall rating of meets expectations." Id. at ¶ 9. Plaintiff states she received "only a limited raise and bonus [] for 2012" and that the raise she received was "at the same level provided employees holding the title of ME I, not her male white and otherwise non-black peers holding the title of ME II." Id. Plaintiff alleges that she complained again about the misclassification as an ME I. She also contends that in addition to receiving a "minimum raise and bonus" as a result of the alleged misclassification, she also was not "invited to a leadership training workshop in early 2012 afforded to her male white and other non-black peers holding the title of ME II." Id. at ¶ 10. In February 2013, Plaintiff received a 2012 performance with an overall rating of "valued performance," also referred to as "a 3C rating." Id. at ¶ 11. Plaintiff

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received no raise as a result of said 3C rating for 2012. Id. at ¶ 12. In both cases, Plaintiff alleges that she deserved more favorable performance evaluation ratings than she actually received. Id. at ¶¶ 9-12. Plaintiff further alleges that "[i]n March and April 2013, [she] was assigned an unreasonable number of tasks to perform" and subjected to "disparate assignment of tasks." Id. at ¶ 14.

On May 6, 2013, Plaintiff was placed on an action plan, which she contends contemplated a workload that "was unrealistic for a single person." Id. at ¶ 15. Plaintiff alleges that Sauter did not inform her that she was not satisfying the terms of the plan and that she was informed that she was meeting the expectations of the plan. Id. Although the plan called for regular meetings with Sauter to assess her compliance with the plan, Hardy alleges that Sauter "avoided or minimized" meeting with her. Id. Plaintiff also alleges that Sauter did not immediately respond to her complaint about a workplace altercation that occurred on July 29, 2013 where she alleges that "[a male employee] yelled, cursed and lunged at her." Id. at ¶ 18. Plaintiff states she had previously complained to Sauter regarding the same individual. Id. According to Plaintiff, her employment with Caterpillar was terminated on August 15, 2013, even though she had complied with the action plan. Id. at ¶¶ 15-19.

Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on or about July 31, 2014. Plaintiff has alleged race and gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff has further alleged that she was retaliated against after she complained of one or more acts of discrimination. Plaintiff also raises discrimination claims based on race and gender under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code, § 21.001 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981("§ 1981"). Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code is the primary state discrimination statute and applies to the same protected

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categories as Title VII and is governed by the same legal framework.1 Plaintiff also brings claims under the Equal Pay Act ("EPA").

Defendant seeks summary judgment of Plaintiff's claims, arguing that: (a) there is no direct evidence of discrimination; and (b) there is no circumstantial evidence of discrimination because Plaintiff cannot show that she was qualified for her position and has not identified any comparator employees; and (c) because Caterpillar has offered a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff's termination. See Dkt. 14 at 24-29. Defendant further argues that Plaintiff's retaliation claim should be dismissed because: (a) she did not engage in any protected activity; (b) she has not identified any connection between a protected activity and an adverse employment action; and (c) Caterpillar has offered a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for Plaintiff's termination. See Dkt. 14 at 29-34. Finally, with respect to Plaintiff's EPA claim, Defendant argues that any pay differential between Plaintiff and the identified comparators was based on a valid EPA exception and that Plaintiff is unable to show that the offered reasons are pretextual. See Dkt. 14 at 34-38.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence and all justifiable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 549, 119 S. Ct. 1545, 143 L. Ed.2d 731 (1999). The appropriate inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require

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Submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden to prove there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Goel, 274 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 2001). In sustaining this burden, the movant must identify those portions of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L. Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party, however, "need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). The movant's burden is only to point out the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case. Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996).

In response, the nonmovant's motion "may not rest upon mere allegations contained in the pleadings, but must set forth and support by summary judgment evidence specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial." Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255-57, 106 S. Ct. at 2513-14). Once the moving party makes a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must look beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts in the record to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Stults, 76 F.3d at 655. The citations to evidence must be specific, as the district court is not required to "scour the record" to determine whether the evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact. E.D. Tex. Local R. CV-56(d). Neither "conclusory allegations" nor "unsubstantiated assertions" will satisfy the nonmovant's burden. Stults, 76 F.3d at 655.

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EVIDENCE PRESENTED

In support of its motion, Defendant offers the following summary judgment evidence:

1) Oral Deposition Testimony of Plaintiff Vendetta D. Hardy, provided on March 16, 2015;

2) Oral Deposition Testimony of Matthew Sauter, provided on August 4, 2015;

3) Oral Deposition Testimony of Timothy Pecenka, provided on August 4, 2015;

4) Declaration of Patricia Fanning as custodian of records for CAT attaching copies of documents produced by Caterpillar, as follows:

a) Exhibit A, Receipt and Understanding of Caterpillar's Policies for New Employees/ Rehires/Recalls signed by Vendetta Hardy on August 18, 2011;

b) Exhibit B, selected pages of CAT's Code of Conduct;

c) Exhibit C, CAT's Employee Handbook effective December 2011;

d)
...

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