Hardy v. Hardy
| Decision Date | 28 February 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 3425.,3425. |
| Citation | 197 A.2d 923 |
| Parties | William HARDY, Jr., Appellant, v. Lucretia W. HARDY, Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Francis L. Young, Jr., Washington, D. C., with whom Thomas S. Jackson, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee. Before HOOD, Chief Judge, and QUINN and MYERS, Associate Judges.
This is an appeal from a judgment upon a jury verdict in favor of appellee for damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident in Maryland and from denial of alternative motions by appellant for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.
Appellant was driving appellee, his mother, together with several other ladies, to attend church in Maryland. Appellee and another passenger were seated next to the driver on the front seat. The route took them past the house occupied by appellee's married daughter where appellee requested a brief stop for use of toilet facilities. Appellant stopped his car across the street from the house. The other occupant of the front seat, sitting on the right-hand side, made no move to alight, whereupon appellant got out to go around to the other side of the car to open the door for her. He left the ignition on, the engine running, and the left front door standing open. He thought he had applied the hand brake and had placed the gear selector lever in "park" position. He noticed that his mother was moving around on the front seat, as if attempting to leave the automobile from the left side, so he turned back to assist her, but by this time the car was moving rapidly.1 Appellant grabbed the steering wheel and turned it to avoid striking objects ahead, but could not reduce its momentum. As a result, the car crossed the roadway and struck a tree. All occupants in the vehicle were injured by the impact. Appellee testified that her need to seek the bathroom was too great to delay until the other passenger in the front seat had alighted in order to allow appellee to get out on the right side. She did not realize that the car engine was still running. By reason of her size, she experienced difficulty in passing under the steering wheel to reach the left front door, but she recalled nothing beyond that point. There is no showing of any warning or admonition given her at any time by appellant.
The trial judge instructed the jury on negligence, contributory negligence, proximate cause, the pertinent language of Section 247, Article 66½, Annotated Code of Maryland,2 and measure of damages.
Appellant contends that the trial judge erred in refusing to direct a verdict in his favor on the grounds that (1) there was no proof of his negligence which, as a matter of law, was the proximate cause of the accident; and (2) that appellee's negligence, contributory negligence, or her intervening acts were the proximate cause of the accident. We do not agree.
The record contains conflicting testimony as to the cause of the accident which was properly submitted to the jury to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to reconcile conflicts in the description of events and to draw all reasonable inferences from proven facts. McKnight v. Neal, D.C. Cir., 320 F.2d 750, 751. Only in exceptional cases will questions of negligence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause pass from the realm of fact to one of law. They become questions for the court when only one reasonable conclusion can be drawn from all the evidence. Unless plainly contrary to the weight of the evidence, determination by the jury of factual issues will not be disturbed. Zappelloni v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 176 A.2d 784; Corson & Gruman Co. v. Zuber, D.C.Mun. App., 152 A.2d 566; Cox v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, D.C.Mun.App., 120 A. 2d 214.
Although District of Columbia law controls procedural matters in the trial, Maryland law governs substantive questions when the accident occurs in that state.
"* * * as we pointed out in Boland v. Love, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 337, 341, 222 F.2d 27, 31 (1955), the law of the District of Columbia controls as to whether there is sufficient evidence to take the case to the jury, whereas the law of the place of injury — here, Pennsylvania — controls as to the standard of conduct required of the parties, including * * the question `whether the particular conduct involved here is or is not negligent'." Machanic v. Storey, 115 U.S. App.D.C. 87, 89, 317 F.2d 151, 153.
We therefore look to Maryland law for guidance as to the standard of conduct to be applied...
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