Hardy v. State, CR-03-1855.

• Decision Date: 28 January 2005
• Docket Number: CR-03-1855.
• Citation: Hardy v. State, 920 So.2d 1117 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005)
• Parties: Darryl HARDY v. STATE of Alabama.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

920 So.2d 1117

Darryl HARDY v.STATE of Alabama.

CR-03-1855.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

January 28, 2005.

George H. Jones, Birmingham, for appellant.

Troy King, atty. gen., and Kristi L. Deason Hagood, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

BASCHAB, Judge.

The appellant, Darryl Hardy, was charged with three counts of capital murder for the killing of Christian Hill.Count I charged him with murder made capital because he committed it during the course of a robbery, § 13A-5-40(a)(2),Ala.Code 1975; Count II charged him with murder made capital because he committed it by or through the use of a deadly weapon fired or otherwise used within or from a vehicle, § 13A-5-40(a)(18),Ala.Code 1975; and Count III charged him with murder made capital because he committed it by or through the use of a deadly weapon while the victim was in a vehicle, § 13A-5-40(a)(17),Ala.Code 1975.The jury found the appellant guilty of the lesser included offense of felony-murder on all three counts, violations of § 13A-6-2(a)(3),Ala.Code 1975.The trial court sentenced him to serve concurrent terms of life in prison on each conviction.The appellant filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied.This appeal followed.

I.

The appellant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress a statement he made to law enforcement officers.¹(Issue II in the appellant's brief.)Specifically, he contends that he did not voluntarily make the statement because, "based on his age and mental IQ of 66, the length of time being held in the interrogation room clearly demonstrates that his will was overborne by the pressure and circumstances of his youth."(Appellant's briefat p. 33.)

"It has long been held that a confession, or any inculpatory statement, is involuntary if it is either coerced through force or induced through an express or implied promise of leniency.Bram v. United States,168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568(1897).In Culombe [v. Connecticut], 367 U.S. [568] at 602, 81 S.Ct. [1860] at 1879, [6 L.Ed.2d 1037(1961)]the Supreme Court of the United States explained that for a confession to be voluntary, the defendant must have the capacity to exercise his own free will in choosing to confess.If his capacity has been impaired, that is, `if his will has been overborne' by coercion or inducement, then the confession is involuntary and cannot be admitted into evidence.Id.(emphasis added).

"The Supreme Court has stated that when a court is determining whether a confession was given voluntarily it must consider the `totality of the circumstances.'Boulden v. Holman,394 U.S. 478, 480, 89 S.Ct. 1138, 1139-40, 22 L.Ed.2d 433(1969);Greenwald v. Wisconsin,390 U.S. 519, 521, 88 S.Ct. 1152, 1154, 20 L.Ed.2d 77(1968);seeBeecher v. Alabama,389 U.S. 35, 38, 88 S.Ct. 189, 191, 19 L.Ed.2d 35(1967).Alabama courts have also held that a court must consider the totality of the circumstances to determine if the defendant's will was overborne by coercion or inducement.SeeEx parte Matthews,601 So.2d 52, 54(Ala.)(stating that a court must analyze a confession by looking at the totality of the circumstances), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1206, 112 S.Ct. 2996, 120 L.Ed.2d 872(1992);Jackson v. State,562 So.2d 1373, 1380(Ala.Crim. App.1990)(stating that, to admit a confession, a court must determine that the defendant's will was not overborne by pressures and circumstances swirling around him);Eakes v. State,387 So.2d 855, 859(Ala.Crim.App.1978)(stating that the true test to be employed is `whether the defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed')(emphasis added).Thus, to determine whether McLeod's confession was improperly induced, we must determine if his will was `overborne' by an implied promise of leniency.

"....

"... Thus, the test of involuntariness of a confession, or other inculpatory statement, is not whether the defendant bargained with the police, but whether in his discussions with the police, which may have included bargaining, the defendant's will was overborne by `apprehension of harm or hope of favor.'SeeGaddy,698 So.2d at 1154(quotingEx parte Weeks,531 So.2d 643, 644(Ala.1988));Culombe,367 U.S. at 602, 81 S.Ct. at 1879;Jackson,562 So.2d at 1380.To determine if a defendant's will has been overborne, we must assess `the conduct of the law enforcement officials in creating pressure and the suspect's capacity to resist that pressure'; `[t]he defendant's personal characteristics as well as his prior experience with the criminal justice system are factors to be considered in determining [the defendant's] susceptibility to police pressures.'Jackson,562 So.2d at 1380-81(citations omitted)."

McLeod v. State,718 So.2d 727, 729-30(Ala.1998)(footnote omitted).Further,

"`"[w]e have often held that `the fact that a defendant may suffer from a mental impairment or low intelligence will not, without other evidence, render a confession involuntary.'SeeColorado v. Connelly,479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 520, 93 L.Ed.2d 473(1986);Baker v. State,599 So.2d 60, 63(Ala.Cr.App.1991), State v. Austin,[596 So.2d 598(Ala.Crim.App.1991)], Holladay v. State,549 So.2d 122(Ala Cr.App.1988), aff'd, 549 So.2d 135(Ala.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1012, 110 S.Ct. 575, 107 L.Ed.2d 569(1989)."

"`Youngblood v. State,656 So.2d 385, 387(Ala.Cr.App.1993).

"`"[A]defendant's mental impairment, even if it exists, is merely one factor affecting the validity of his waiver of rights and the voluntariness of his confession.See generallyAnnot., 8 A.L.R.4th 16(1981).`While an accused's intelligence and literacy are important factors to be considered in determining whether he intelligently and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights and made a confession, weak intellect or illiteracy alone will not render a confession inadmissible.'Hobbs v. State,401 So.2d 276, 282(Ala.Cr.App.1981)."

"`Whittle v. State,518 So.2d 793, 796-97(Ala.Cr.App.1987).'

"672 So.2d at 1337."

Jackson v. State,791 So.2d 979, 1009-10(Ala.Crim.App.2000)(quotingDobyne v. State,672 So.2d 1319(Ala.Crim.App.1994), aff'd, 672 So.2d 1354(Ala.1995)).

Roy Bristow testified that he was a homicide investigator with the Birmingham Police Department; that, between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. on December 4, 2002, the appellant was brought to the Birmingham Police Department and placed in a room; that he interviewed the appellant three times; and that the last time he talked to the appellant was around 8:30 p.m.He also testified that the appellant was not in custody at the time of the first statement; that he did not read the appellant his juvenile Miranda² rights at that time; that he did not tell the appellant that it would be better or worse for him if he made a statement; that he did not do anything that would make the appellant so happy, angry, upset, or hurt that he did not know what he was doing; that he did not tell the appellant that anything good or bad would happen to him if he did not make a statement; that he talked to the appellant between fifteen and twenty minutes; that the appellant did not make any admissions during that statement; that he told the appellant that he appreciated him coming and talking to him and then he left the room; and that the appellant stayed in the room.Bristow further testified that he and another detective went back into the room about twenty minutes later; that he advised the appellant of his juvenile Miranda rights at that time; that the appellant said that he wanted to talk; that the appellant then read the waiver of rights form out loud and signed it; that he did not threaten the appellant or force him to talk; that he did not do anything that would make the appellant so happy, angry, upset, or hurt that he would not know what he was doing; that he did not tell the appellant it would be better or worse for him if he did not make a statement; that the second interview lasted about thirty-five minutes; that the appellant did not make any admissions during that statement; that, at the end of the second statement, the appellant mentioned something about an attorney, and he did not ask the appellant any questions after that; and that he arrested the appellant and left the room.He testified that, over an hour later, he returned to the room because the appellant was knocking on the door; that, when he opened the door, the appellant said he wanted to talk to him; that he closed the door and went and got a video recorder; that, when he came back, he and another detective established that the appellant wanted to talk to them without an attorney; that he reminded the appellant of his Miranda rights, and the appellant indicated that he remembered them; that he did not threaten the appellant or force him to talk; that he did not tell the appellant it would be better or worse for him if he made a statement; that he did not tell the appellant that it would be worse for him if he did not make a statement; and that he did not do anything to make the appellant so happy, angry, or upset that he did not know what he was doing.Bristow also testified that the appellant was sixteen years old; that he believed that both of the appellant's parents were deceased; and that the appellant did not ask to speak to a parent or guardian.Finally, he testified that he did not ask the appellant what grade level he had completed in school or if he had been treated for a mental disorder; that the appellant told him he had smoked marijuana during the twenty-four hours before the interview, but gave conflicting times as to when he actually smoked the marijuana; that it was his impression that the appellant understood what was going on during each of the interviews; and that the appellant seemed to understand what waiving his rights meant.

Based on Bristow's testimony regarding the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, the trial court could have...