Hardy v. State, No. 2-278A49

Docket NºNo. 2-278A49
Citation442 N.E.2d 378
Case DateNovember 23, 1982
CourtCourt of Appeals of Indiana

Page 378

442 N.E.2d 378
Kenny HARDY, Appellant-Defendant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
No. 2-278A49.
Court of Appeals of Indiana,
Fourth District.
Nov. 23, 1982.

Carolyn S. Holder, Lafayette, for appellant-defendant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Kenneth R. Stamm, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee-plaintiff.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

CONOVER, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Kenny Hardy was convicted of Unlawful Dealing in a Controlled Substance, Ind.Code 35-24.1-4.1-2 1 and was sentenced to five

Page 379

years imprisonment. That conviction was reversed by the Court of Appeals, Fourth District in Hardy v. State, (1981) Ind.App., 429 N.E.2d 281. The State's petition for rehearing was denied and it sought transfer to the Supreme Court. Transfer was granted pursuant to Ind.Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 11(B)(2)(a) and the decision and opinion of the Court of Appeals were vacated. The Supreme Court, Ind., 439 N.E.2d 153 further ordered the case remanded with instructions to grant the State's petition for rehearing and determine the issues in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Wireman v. State, (1982) Ind., 432 N.E.2d 1343.
ISSUES

1. Did the trial court improperly refuse to dismiss the indictment of the grand jury?

2. Was a pre-trial motion to suppress erroneously denied?

3. Did the trial court improperly admit hearsay testimony at the pre-trial suppression hearing?

4. Did the trial court give an incorrect jury instruction on the law of entrapment?

5. Was evidence admitted contrary to an order in limine?

FACTS

An informant, working with undercover police officers, identified Kenny Hardy as a suspected drug dealer. Working through the informant, the officers were introduced to Hardy. No drug transaction was discussed during the introductory meeting. One officer and the informant contacted Hardy a second time at Hardy's residence. At that meeting Hardy was questioned about the possibility of obtaining drugs. Hardy responded by telling the officer and informant that he would soon be able to sell quantities of drugs that had been stolen from a drugstore.

Hardy was approached a third time by the officers with their request to buy drugs. Hardy told them he did not have any drugs but offered to take them to a place where drugs could be purchased. The officers accepted the offer and proceeded to another residence where Hardy unsuccessfully attempted to purchase drugs. After the frustrated drug buy, the officers pressed Hardy to sell them drugs. Hardy agreed to sell the officers some percodan the following day.

The next evening Hardy was contacted concerning the sale of percodan. Hardy stated he had used all of the percodan but he did have some preludin and quaaludes he could sell. The officers purchased nine tablets (seven preludin and two quaaludes) for ten dollars. Hardy was subsequently arrested and charged with delivery of a controlled substance.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Our original decision in this matter, Hardy v. State, (1982) Ind.App., 429 N.E.2d 281, held the process used to select the grand jury 2 which indicted Hardy was so irregular as not to substantially comply with statutory requirements for jury selection. 3 Our reversal of the trial court's judgment was based in part on Wireman v. State, (1981) Ind.App., 418 N.E.2d 1182. Wireman, a former city judge, was indicted by the same grand jury which indicted Hardy. In Wireman we reversed the conviction, holding the grand jury selection process did not substantially comply with the statute. Id. at 1183. Since Hardy raised precisely the same legal issue in an equivalent factual setting we were constrained to reach the same result.

Page 380

The Indiana Supreme Court overruled Wireman, finding the grand jury had been properly selected and empanelled. Wireman, 432 N.E.2d at 1349. The Supreme Court, having decided precisely the issue upon which Hardy's conviction was reversed, has furnished new authority for our decision. Based thereon, we now conclude Hardy's indictment was valid.

After examining the other issues, we are still obliged to reverse Hardy's conviction. The instruction submitted to the jury instructing them on the affirmative defense of entrapment was not a correct statement of Indiana law.

At the close of the evidence the jury was given the following instruction on the defense of entrapment:

State's Proposed Instruction No. 3

If the defendant raises evidence that he was persuaded or induced by a public officer or employee to sell drugs and that such inducement was of such nature that normal law-abiding citizens would have been persuaded, then he has raised the defense of entrapment. You must determine whether there was such persuasion as would entrap an innocent person.

Even if this defense is raised by the evidence, the State may nevertheless prove that this defendant had the criminal intent to sell drugs. A person is entrapped where the State implants into an innocent mind the criminal intent to sell drugs. However, a person is not entrapped if he was predisposed to deliver drugs and if delivering drugs was not solely the idea of the police. It is not entrapment for the police to purchase drugs from a person who is ready and willing to sell and where the State merely affords him an opportunity to sell. (Emphasis added.)

Hardy contests the giving of the instruction on the ground it does not comport with Indiana law. Our entrapment defense has been statutorily adopted and reads:

Sec. 9. (a) It is a defense that:

(1) the prohibited conduct of the person was the product of a law enforcement officer, or his agent, using persuasion or other means likely to cause the person to engage in the conduct; and

(2) the person was not predisposed to commit the offense.

(b) Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit the offense does not constitute entrapment. (Emphasis added.)

Ind.Code 35-41-3-9. Hardy argues the instruction given permitted the jury to apply an objective 4 standard of review to the defense of entrapment and is therefore an incorrect statement of the law.

Indiana has a bifurcated entrapment procedure. Evidence must first be presented showing the illegal conduct was instigated by government agents. Gray v. State, (1967) 249 Ind. 629, 231 N.E.2d 793. Once this becomes apparent the State then has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant had a prior disposition to commit...

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4 practice notes
  • Cox v. State, No. 783S257
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • March 21, 1985
    ...upon an erroneous instruction or if the instruction was inconsistent and calculated to mislead the jury. Hardy v. State (1982), Ind.App., 442 N.E.2d 378. We do not believe the instruction was erroneous or inconsistent. While research does not reveal this particular instruction has been appr......
  • Micinski v. State, No. 71S04-8601
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • January 6, 1986
    ...on the instruction at issue or where the trial court's action leaves the jury in doubt as to the law. Hardy v. State (1982), Ind.App., 442 N.E.2d 378. It is apparent that the jury had some confusion on the point covered by Micinski's tendered instruction, since during deliberations they req......
  • Taylor v. State, No. 18A02-9307-CR-369
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • January 31, 1994
    ...negating his predisposition to sell cocaine. I disagree. Indiana has a bifurcated entrapment procedure. Hardy v. State (1982), Ind.App., 442 N.E.2d 378, 381. Evidence must first be presented showing the illegal conduct was instigated by government agents. Id. Once this becomes apparent, the......
  • Allen v. State, No. 82S00-8610-CR-938
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • February 5, 1988
    ...of the defendant's subjective intent and not of the relative strength of the State's inducement. Hardy v. State (1982), Ind.App., 442 N.E.2d 378. However, we find that the Court's Instruction No. 24 adequately focused the question of predisposition on the defendant's subjective intent; it r......
4 cases
  • Cox v. State, No. 783S257
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • March 21, 1985
    ...upon an erroneous instruction or if the instruction was inconsistent and calculated to mislead the jury. Hardy v. State (1982), Ind.App., 442 N.E.2d 378. We do not believe the instruction was erroneous or inconsistent. While research does not reveal this particular instruction has been appr......
  • Micinski v. State, No. 71S04-8601
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • January 6, 1986
    ...on the instruction at issue or where the trial court's action leaves the jury in doubt as to the law. Hardy v. State (1982), Ind.App., 442 N.E.2d 378. It is apparent that the jury had some confusion on the point covered by Micinski's tendered instruction, since during deliberations they req......
  • Taylor v. State, No. 18A02-9307-CR-369
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • January 31, 1994
    ...negating his predisposition to sell cocaine. I disagree. Indiana has a bifurcated entrapment procedure. Hardy v. State (1982), Ind.App., 442 N.E.2d 378, 381. Evidence must first be presented showing the illegal conduct was instigated by government agents. Id. Once this becomes apparent, the......
  • Allen v. State, No. 82S00-8610-CR-938
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • February 5, 1988
    ...of the defendant's subjective intent and not of the relative strength of the State's inducement. Hardy v. State (1982), Ind.App., 442 N.E.2d 378. However, we find that the Court's Instruction No. 24 adequately focused the question of predisposition on the defendant's subjective intent; it r......

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