Hardy v. Stumpf
Decision Date | 15 March 1974 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | , 7 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1091, 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9309 Veragene HARDY, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. William F. STUMPF et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 32689. |
Clifford C. Sweet, Suzanne Mounts, Thomas L. Fike, Legal Aid Society of Alameda County, Oakland, Carolyn E. Jones, Berkeley, for plaintiff and appellant.
Edward A. Goggin, City Atty., William C. Sharp, Deputy City Atty., Oakland, for defendants and respondents.
This is an appeal from a judgment denying a petition for a writ of mandate instituted by one Veragene Hardy, for herself, and all other women who would be interested in being police officers in the Oakland Police Department.
Appellant challenged the requirement of the Oakland Police Department that applicants for the position of patrolman had to be male, weigh 135 pounds and be 5 feet 7 inches tall. She also challenged as a denial of equal protection the requirement that applicants for the position of policewoman have more education and better eyesight than applicants for the position of patrolman.
The trial judge found that the size requirement for the position of patrolman was valid. He declined to rule on the question of whether the requirement that applicants be male was invalid on the ground that appellant was not large enough to meet the size requirements. Since this was a class suit brought on behalf of all women who wished to become patrolmen, the trial court should have decided the validity of the sex requirement. The issue has now become moot, however, since the City Council of Oakland, by ordinance and board resolution, has changed the requirements that limited the job of patrolman to males. 1 There is now but one category, that of 'Police Officer,' to which all qualified men and women may apply. One of the qualifications is a height of at least 5 feet 7 inches and a weight of 135 pounds.
The sole issue to which we address ourselves, therefore, is the question of whether the height and weight requirement impermissibly discriminatesagainst women as a class. Appellant has chosen a correct procedural means to present this issue for mandamus 'is an appropriate remedy for the enforcement of a civil right.' (Wrather-Alvarez etc., Inc. v. Hewicker, 147 Cal.App.2d 509, 511, 305 P.2d 236, 238.)
It is well settled under present law that a person, including a female, does have the right not to be discriminated against in employment. 2 (U.S.Const., 14th Amend.; Cal.Const., art. I, §§ 11, 21; Cal.Const., art. XX, § 18; Lab.Code, §§ 1410--1432, amended in 1970 to include Sex as a prohibited basis for discrimination in employment; Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal.3d 1, 95 Cal.Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529; tit. VII, Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e--2(a).) In Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, Supra, 5 Cal.3d 1, 16--18, 95 Cal.Rptr. 329, 339, 485 P.2d 529, the California Supreme Court discussed the proper standards for reviewing an employment classification based on sex when considering an equal protection argument. The court concluded that the application of the strict scrutiny standard of review applied to such a discrimination both because a fundamental right is involved, that of employment, and also because any classification based upon sex should be treated as suspect. (See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583.) This standard of review was described as follows:
(Westbrook v. Mihaly, supra, 2 Cal.3d 765, 784--785, 87 Cal.Rptr. 839, 471 P.2d 487.)' (Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, supra, 5 Cal.3d 1, 16--17, 95 Cal.Rptr. 329, 339, 485 P.2d 529.)
A classification may be considered discriminatory against one sex or another even though it does not do so directly. Thus a seemingly neutral job requirement which has the effect of disqualifying a disproportionate number of one sex is discriminatory and must be viewed under the strict scrutiny test. (Smith v. City of East Cleveland, D.C., 363 F.Supp. 1131, 1136--1138.) When scrutinizing suspect classifications, the courts may not accept stereotyped generalizations to justify dissimilar treatment but must review the evidence upon which these generalizations are based. (Frontiero v. Richardson, supra, 411 U.S. 677, 682--688, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583.) In reviewing the requirement that Cleveland policemen be 5 feet 8 inches in hight, a federal court recently stated: (Smith v. City of East Cleveland, supra, at p. 1139 of 363 F.Supp.)
The court in Smith was unable to find any rational support from the evidence before it for the height and weight requirements for Cleveland police officers and concluded the requirements were based solely on the stereotype of the large male police officer. (363 F.Supp. at p. 1144.) The court further noted that it had been unable to locate any other authority which had found a rational relationship between the size requirements for police officers and the job they performed.
(Smith v. City of East Cleveland, supra, 363 F.Supp. 1131, 1144.)
Appellant has cited to this court two other cases in which it was found that the employer had not demonstrated a rational relationship between size requirements and job requirements of positions similar to that a policeman. In State Division of Human Rights v. New York City Department of Parks and Recreation, 38 A.D.2d 25, 326 N.Y.S.2d 640 (First Dept. 1971), the size requirements (5 feet 7 inches, 135 pounds) were found not to be sufficiently related to the performance of the duties of a lifeguard. In In re Shirley Long, the United States Civil Service Commission Board of Appeals and Review (Nov. 13, 1972), found that the size requirements (5 feet 8 inches with proportionate weight) were not sufficiently related to the performance of the duties of a Park Police Officer with the National Park Service.
Respondents distinguish these cases from the case at hand on the ground that the finder-of-fact of those cases had found that there was not sufficient evidence of job relatedness. Clearly, the same argument would be made regarding the Smith case, a case decided too recently to appear in the briefs, for that was decided by a Federal District Court. Respondents argue that this court is confined to the substantial evidence rule on review and that the record contains sufficient evidence to sustain the findings of the trial court.
Respondents cite Castro v. Beecher, 334 F.Supp. 930 (D.C.Mass.1971), where the court pointed out by way of dictum that ...
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