Hardy v. United States
| Decision Date | 18 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | 14-388L |
| Court | U.S. Claims Court |
| Parties | WILLIAM C. HARDY & BERTIE ANN HARDY et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. |
RCFC 59; Motion for Reconsideration; Rails-to-Trails; Causation Cedar Point Nursery
Elizabeth A. Gepford McCulley, Kansas City, MO, for plaintiffs.
David A. Harrington, United States Department of Justice Washington, DC, for defendant.
On April 8, 2021, the court issued an opinion denying plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, concluding that defendant was not liable for a taking with respect to eleven parcels located east of milepost 65.80 ("MP-65.80 parcels") in Newton County, Georgia. Plaintiffs now move for reconsideration of that opinion in light of the United States Supreme Court's ("Supreme Court") recent decision in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S.Ct. 2063 (2021). For the reasons discussed below, the court denies plaintiffs' motion.
The court has extensively chronicled the dispute surrounding the MP-65.80 parcels and will not repeat it here in full. See Hardy v. United States ("Hardy VII"), 153 Fed.Cl. 287, 289-91 (2021). In short, plaintiffs own real property subject to easements for railroad purposes in Newton County, Georgia. Defendant authorized the conversion of the railroad rights-of-way into recreational trails pursuant to the National Trails System Act ("NTSA"), conduct that resulted in a taking in violation of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Of the 156 parcels at issue in this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") affirmed defendant's liability for a taking with respect to 145 of them. Hardy v. United States ("Hardy VI"), 965 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
The remaining eleven parcels presented a unique scenario. The Central of Georgia Railroad ("CGA") initially requested authority to abandon "approximately 14.90 miles of rail line between milepost E 65.80 (at the point of the lines crossing of Route 229 in Newborn) and milepost E 80.70 (near the intersection of Washington Street SW., and Turner Lake Road SW., in Covington), in Newton County, Ga." Central of Georgia Railroad Company-Abandonment Exemption-in Newton County, Ga., 78 Fed. Reg. 43, 273 (July 19, 2013). The United States Surface Transportation Board ("Surface Transportation Board") copied this description verbatim when it issued the Notice of Interim Trail Use or abandonment ("NITU"). Cent. of Ga. R.R. Co.-Abandonment Exemption-in Newton Cnty., Ga., No. AB 290 (Sub-No. 343X), 2013 WL 4425647 (S.T.B. Aug. 19, 2013). But the description of MP-65.80, CGA later discovered, was incorrect. The descriptive parenthetical should have indicated that the milepost is located at "a point just east of the Ziegler Road crossing west of downtown Newborn." Corletto Decl. ¶ 7. CGA notified the Surface Transportation Board of the error, and the Surface Transportation Board corrected the NITU. Cent. of Ga. R.R. Co.-Abandonment Exemption-in Newton Cnty., Ga., No. AB 290 (Sub-No. 343X), 2016 WL 6839539, at *1-2 (S.T.B. Nov. 18, 2016).
The eleven parcels at issue were included in the August 2013 NITU, but not in the corrected NITU. On remand from the Federal Circuit, this court was instructed to answer "the question of whether and when the Railroad would have abandoned the portion of its rail line east of milepost E-65.80 absent the August 2013 NITU." Hardy VI, 965 F.3d at 1350. The court emphasized that it was bound by the Federal Circuit's decisions in Caquelin v. United States, 959 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2020), and Hardy VI. Hardy VII, 153 Fed.Cl. at 294. Thus, it indicated that it would evaluate the MP-65.80 parcels according to the causation rule laid out in Caquelin: "[A] NITU does not effect a taking if, even in the absence of a NITU, the railroad would not have abandoned its line (a necessary prerequisite for termination of the easement under state law) during the period of the NITU . . . ." Caquelin, 959 F.3d at 1363. After examining evidence related to Surface Transportation Board filings, CGA's explanation of its intent not to abandon, and the actions CGA took to maintain control over that section of the line, the court concluded that CGA would not have abandoned the line adjacent to the MP-65.80 parcels, had the NITU not been issued. Hardy VII, 153 Fed.Cl. at 296. Thus, defendant was not liable for a taking of those parcels. Id. at 296-97.
On June 23, 2021, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Cedar Point, which analyzed the taking implications of a California regulation that allowed labor organizations to access the property of agricultural employers to discuss unionization with employees. 141 S.Ct. at 2069. Two employers-fruit growers-objected to the regulation's unilateral grant of access to their private property, asserting that this uncompensated right of access was an unconstitutional per se physical taking. Id. at 2069-70. The Court agreed. Rejecting the application of the tests outlined in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), and Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012), the Court explained that a government-authorized physical invasion of private property constitutes a per se physical taking. Cedar Point, 141 S.Ct. at 2074, 2077-79. This is true, the Court emphasized, whether the physical appropriation is permanent or temporary. Id. at 2074.
In light of the Supreme Court's decision, plaintiffs filed their motion for reconsideration on July 6, 2021. Plaintiffs read Cedar Point as "completely reject[ing] the notion that any Court must engage in a detailed multi-factored analysis to determine the 'causation' in a Trails Act takings case . . . ." Pls.' Mot. 5. Because Cedar Point invalidates Caquelin, plaintiffs claim, the court must disregard the Federal Circuit's specific instructions and reconsider its Hardy VII opinion, thus finding defendant liable for a taking of the MP-65.80 parcels that were erroneously identified and not part of the corrected NITU. Id. at 1, 8. In response, defendant maintains that "[t]he Supreme Court in Cedar Point did not discuss, much less change, established causation principles." Def.'s Resp. 2. Neither party requested oral argument, and the court finds it unnecessary. This motion is now fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.
A motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(a) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC") is a request for extraordinary relief and is not to be used by a dissatisfied party to relitigate the case. Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Four Rivers Invs., Inc. v. United States, 78 Fed.Cl. 662, 664 (2007); Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. United States, 44 Fed.Cl. 298, 300 (1999), aff'd per curiam, 250 F.3d 762 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision). Consequently, such a motion "does not provide an occasion for a party 'to raise arguments that it could have raised previously, but did not'" or to "reassert arguments that the Court already has considered." Four Rivers Invs., Inc., 78 Fed.Cl. at 664 (quoting Browning Ferris Indus., Inc. & Subsidiaries v. United States, No. 05-738T, 2007 WL 1412087, at *1 (Fed. Cl. May 10, 2007)). However, the court may grant a motion for reconsideration if "there has been an intervening change in the controlling law, newly discovered evidence, or a need to correct clear factual or legal error or prevent manifest injustice." Biery v. United States, 818 F.3d 704, 711 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Young v. United States, 94 Fed.Cl. 671, 674 (Fed. Cl. 2010)). "The decision whether to grant reconsideration lies largely within the discretion of the [trial] court." Yuba Nat. Res., Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1990); accord Biery, 818 F.3d at 711.
Plaintiffs move for reconsideration based on an alleged change in the controlling law. Pls.' Mot. 2 (), 8 (urging the court to grant reconsideration "based on the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Cedar Point Nursery"). Thus, the court focuses narrowly on whether Cedar Point requires it to disregard the instructions of the Federal Circuit and reach a different conclusion regarding the application of Caquelin to the MP-65.80 parcels. The court concludes that it does not.
Before exploring the implications of Cedar Point, the court addresses plaintiffs' depiction of Caquelin itself. The court begins by stating a settled principle of law: The frameworks set out in Arkansas Game and Penn Central do not apply to per se physical takings of any duration. Indeed, in Caquelin, the Federal Circuit decisively rejected the application of Arkansas Game and Penn Central to takings triggered by the issuance of a NITU under the NTSA.[1] Caquelin, 959 F.3d at 1366-70. Similarly, in Cedar Point, the Supreme Court emphasized that these frameworks are irrelevant where the government has physically appropriated private property. 141 S.Ct. at 2072, 2078-79. Plaintiffs repeatedly, enthusiastically embrace these holdings. E.g., Pls.' Mot. 5-8; Pls.' Reply 13-14. Defendant, at least for the purposes of plaintiffs' motion, does not dispute them.
But plaintiffs misapply this settled principle of per se physical takings law by conflating the analysis in Arkansas Game and Penn Central...
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