Hardy v. University Interscholastic League

• Decision Date: 10 May 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-1802,84-1802
• Citation: 759 F.2d 1233
• Parties: 24 Ed. Law Rep. 720 Billy Ralph HARDY and Kathryn Jeane Hardy, Individually and as Next Friend of Charles Wayne Hardy, a Minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The UNIVERSITY INTERSCHOLASTIC LEAGUE, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Summary Calendar.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1233

759 F.2d 1233

24 Ed. Law Rep. 720

Billy Ralph HARDY and Kathryn Jeane Hardy, Individually and as Next Friend of Charles Wayne Hardy, a Minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The UNIVERSITY INTERSCHOLASTIC LEAGUE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 84-1802

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

May 10, 1985.

James A. Childress, William T. Hall, Austin, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellants,

Bunton, Nolan, Ode, Lucius D. Bunton, Margaret A. Cooper, John L. Darrouzet, Austin, Tex., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before REAVLEY, POLITZ and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.

HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

After 17-year-old Charles Wayne Hardy moved from Early, Texas to San Saba, Texas, the University Interscholastic League ruled him ineligible for high school football. Hardy and his parents filed a suit in state court against UIL, its members and two of its subcommittees, and the Early school superintendent, asserting violations of both Texas law and the United States Constitution. The defendants removed to federal court and moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the entire complaint with prejudice. We affirm the dismissal of the federal claims, but because the complaint contains state-law claims never argued to the district court, we hold that the district court should have remanded those claims to state court.

I

On June 26, 1984, the Hardys filed an Original Petition for Injunction in the district court of San Saba County, Texas. The complaint alleges that Charles Hardy lived with his father in Early from 1981 until April of 1984, when the two moved to the Hardy family farm in San Saba. Under UIL rules, Charles could not play football for San Saba High School during 1984-85 unless he obtained a Previous Athletic Participation Form signed by the Early superintendent and football coach, or unless the Executive Committee of District XIII AA (composed of one representative from each district high school) voted to allow him to play. The Early coach and superintendent refused to sign the participation form, and the district committee ruled Charles ineligible.

The complaint accuses the defendants of conspiring to keep Charles from participating in sports in retribution for the Hardys' opposition to unspecified "harsh and oppressive action" taken against Charles and other Early students by the Early superintendent and school administration. In addition, it alleges that the district committee met without notice, in violation of the Texas Open Meeting Act, and allowed improper school representatives to vote, in contravention of the UIL constitution. The complaint further recites that the committee ruling was "erroneous, arbitrary and capricious, and without factual basis." Finally, without elaboration, the complaint asserts a deprivation of a "constitutionally protected interest" in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States and Texas Constitutions.

The defendants removed to federal court, answered, and moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Their brief in support of this motion argued only that the due process and equal protection claims lacked merit. The district court, without opinion, granted the motion and dismissed the entire complaint with prejudice.

II

The district court correctly entered judgment on the pleadings on the Hardys' constitutional claims. Participation in interscholastic athletics is not an "interest" protected by the Due Process Clause. Niles v. University Interscholastic League, 715 F.2d 1027, 1031 (5th Cir.1983). Nor do the UIL's rules for classifying athletes as eligible or noneligible violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. The allegation of arbitrary and capricious action also adds nothing in the absence of a protectible property or liberty interest. Whatever the role of the elusive idea of substantive due process, it is not applicable here. As Justice Stevens, then Judge, put it:

The Fourteenth Amendment prevents the state from depriving any person of liberty or property without due process of law. As Roth squarely holds, the right to procedural due process is applicable only to state action which impairs a person's interest in either liberty or property. Certainly the constitutional right to "substantive" due process is no greater than the right to procedural due process. Accordingly, the absence of any claim by the plaintiff that an interest in liberty or property has been impaired is a fatal defect in her substantive due process argument.

Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consolidated School District, 492 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir.1974).

We repeat: we are not super referees over high school athletic programs. Questions about eligibility for competition may loom large...