Hareld v. Napolitano
Decision Date | 16 November 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 91-309-A,91-309-A |
Citation | 615 A.2d 1015 |
Parties | Barbara HARELD v. Stephen NAPOLITANO, in his capacity as Treasurer of the City of Providence. ppeal. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
In this matter the plaintiff appeals from the granting of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict in the Superior Court. This law suit arose out of a slip and fall resulting in injuries to the plaintiff, Barbara Hareld, caused by an accumulation of snow and ice on a city-owned sidewalk in the city of Providence. We affirm.
General Laws 1956 (1989 Reenactment) § 24-5-14 requires that the cities and towns provide for ice and snow removal from public highways and sidewalks. The statute also provides that nothing in that section shall be construed to make the municipality liable for failure to remove the snow and ice unless the municipality has received notice of the ice or snow obstruction at least twenty-four hours before the injury occurred. The parties agree that defendant city was not given notice of the obstruction twenty-four hours before the occurrence of plaintiff's injury as required by § 24-5-14.
On appeal plaintiff raises two issues. She first argues that the trial justice ruled improperly that the notice required under § 24-5-14 was a condition precedent that must be complied with before she can bring this tort action against the municipality. The defendant argues that in Barroso v. Pepin, 106 R.I. 502, 261 A.2d 277 (1970), this court recognized that in implementing the waiver of governmental immunity as set out in G.L.1956 (1968 Reenactment) chapter 5 of title 24 and G.L.1956 chapter 15 of title 45, the Legislature intended to provide procedures for bringing actions against municipalities for injuries. In Barroso this court also recognized that the Legislature included the notice requirements as conditions precedent to bringing the claim to limit the availability of such claims. The court said:
Barroso, 106 R.I. at 506, 261 A.2d at 279.
In Barroso the plaintiff was in an identical situation to that of plaintiff in this case. She had fallen on an icy sidewalk and suffered injuries. She brought suit against the city pursuant to the provisions of § 45-15-5. The city argued that the suit should be dismissed because the plaintiff's right to sue, conferred by §§ 45-15-8 and 45-15-9, required that the municipality be given notice of the claim within sixty days of its occurrence. The plaintiff argued against dismissal, saying that §§ 45-15-8 and 45-15-9 were not applicable because a separate remedy was available under §§ 24-5-13 and 24-5-14. This court held however, that chapter 5 of title 24 was not enacted to establish any distinct and separate remedy applicable to snow and ice cases but rather to restrict availability of § 45-15-8 in such cases. Barroso, 106 R.I. at 508, 261 A.2d at 280. In that case the trial court's grant of the city's motion to dismiss was affirmed.
Also, in her brief plaintiff adopts a very narrow interpretation of § 24-5-14 regarding the notification that must be given. She argues that she, the claimant, must be the person who notifies the city of the ice or snowy condition, thereby automatically exposing herself to a virtual admission of comparative negligence. The fact is that the statute does not mandate that the claimant be the person who gives notice to the city. The sole requisite is that notice must have been given of the obstruction or dangerous situation by someone at least twenty-four hours before the time of the injury. The obvious rationale behind that requirement was that the municipality would then have an opportunity to eliminate the accumulation of ice and snow if it desired to do so. The fact that in this case the director of public works for the city stated that if given notice, the city would probably not have taken corrective action does not change the situation. The statute sets forth a condition precedent that any claimant must meet.
In the second issue plaintiff argues that the notice requirement in § 24-5-14 is unconstitutional and therefore not a bar to her claim against the city. She bases her argument on a statement we made in Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering Co., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I.1984): " ,' of the Rhode Island Constitution. 1 471 A.2d at 198. We also stated in Kennedy that 471 A.2d at 198. There are many instances wherein the Legislature has placed reasonable limits...
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State v. Almonte, 93-374-C
...be interpreted to bar the Legislature from enacting laws that may limit a party from bringing a claim in the courts. Hareld v. Napolitano, 615 A.2d 1015, 1017 (R.I.1992). Therefore, question 2 should be answered in the The third question asks: "3. Does the Privileged Communications Act, § 9......
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Marshall v. City of Providence
...the injury. We have ruled that the notice requirement is a condition precedent to the plaintiff's right of action. Hareld v. Napolitano, 615 A.2d 1015, 1016 (R.I.1992) (citing Barroso v. Pepin, 106 R.I. 502, 506, 261 A.2d 277, 279 (1970)). It may not be waived. Batchelder v. White, 28 R.I. ......
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Ramos v. Napolitano
...held that the notice requirement set forth in § 45-15-9 is a condition precedent to the plaintiff's right of action. Hareld v. Napolitano, 615 A.2d 1015, 1016 (R.I.1992) (citing Barroso v. Pepin, 106 R.I. 502, 506, 261 A.2d 277, 279 (1970)). It may not be waived. Batchelder v. White, 28 R.I......
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Connor v. Napolitano
...condition precedent to the right of action. See e.g., Marshall v. City of Providence, 633 A.2d 1360, 1361 (R.I.1993); Hareld v. Napolitano, 615 A.2d 1015, 1016 (R.I.1992). Consequently, the trial justice was correct in granting summary judgment since the required notice was not sent to the ......