Harewood v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.
| Decision Date | 08 May 2019 |
| Docket Number | 18-cv-05487 (KPF) (KHP) |
| Parties | HARRIET HAREWOOD, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ROBERT MERCEDES, in his official and individual Capacity as Principal of Middle School 390, ANDREA VARONA, in her official and individual Capacity as Assistant Principal of Middle School 390, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Plaintiff Harriet Harewood brings this action against her former employer, the New York City Department of Education ("DOE"), and the Principal and Assistant Principal of Middle School 390 ("MS 390") where she was formerly employed. She alleges that she was discriminated against because of her race and age in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., 42 U.S.C. §1981 ("Section 1981"), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYHRL"), N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"), N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint. For the reasons discussed below, I respectfully recommend that the motion be granted.
On July 11, 2017, prior to filing this action, Plaintiff timely filed a complaint of discrimination with the New York State Division of Human Rights ("Division"), alleging that the DOE had discriminated against her on the basis of race and age in violation of the NYHRL and the NYCHRL. (See Doc. No. 22-2, Division Determination and Order After Investigation dated January 3, 2018.) No individual respondents were named in that complaint. The complaint was dual-filed with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The Division took the laboring oar in investigating the complaint. On January 3, 2018, the Division issued a Determination and Order After Investigation (the "Determination") finding no probable cause to believe that the DOE had engaged in or is engaging in unlawful race and age discrimination against Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not appeal that finding or obtain an administrative dismissal from the Division.
On April 17, 2018, the EEOC adopted the Division's finding and mailed Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue. Plaintiff then timely filed the Complaint in the instant action on June 18, 2018 (within 90 days of receiving the Notice of Right to Sue). (Doc. No. 1 ("Compl.").) Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint.
Plaintiff, a 57year-old African American woman, was employed as an art teacher at MS 390 in the Bronx from September 1999 until she retired in June 2017. (Compl. ¶¶ 8-10.) She contends that her retirement constitutes a constructive discharge due to racial and/or age discrimination. (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 49-58.) At the time she retired, she was one of the oldest staffmembers with the most seniority. (Compl. ¶ 11.) Over the span of her career and up to the 2015-2016 school year, Plaintiff consistently received "satisfactory," "effective," and "highly effective" performance ratings. (Compl. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges that in the 2012-2013 school year MS 390's Principal, Defendant Robert Mercedes, allegedly began discriminating against older and/or black teachers and staff in favor of younger and/or Hispanic individuals, and ultimately began to harshly evaluate her performance in an effort to get her to leave the school and/or set her up for involuntary termination. (Compl. ¶¶ 13-15.)
Plaintiff alleges that Mercedes, who is of Dominican descent, began asking older and/or black teachers to leave the school or forced them to leave. (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 13.) She provides an example of a black special education teacher being rated worse than her Dominican co-teacher, leading to the termination of the black teacher's employment. (Compl. ¶ 14.) She claims this pattern continued and that Mercedes has replaced a significant percentage of the older and/or black staff with white and/or Dominican teachers and/or younger teachers. (Compl. ¶ 15.)
Plaintiff explains that she was treated differently than her non-black and younger peers in a number of ways. For example, she states that she had worked as the morning scheduler for years, earning extra income as a result, but in the 2013-2014 school year this role was taken from her and given to a younger individual of Dominican descent. (Compl. ¶ 16.) She claims that, in the same school year, Mercedes wrongfully interfered with her lunch period and then retaliated against her after she complained by increasing her teaching load beyond what was permissible under the union contract. (Compl. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff states that Mercedes changed her professional duty without her permission, denied her art supplies needed for her classes,and falsely claimed that other staff members complained about Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶¶ 18-19, 25, 26, 32.)
Plaintiff states that beginning in the 2013-14 school year and continuing thereafter, she was denied the opportunity to provide afterschool instruction to students to help them prepare portfolios for specialized high schools, causing loss of income. (Compl. ¶ 20.) This was work that Plaintiff had done previously. (Id.) Then, in January 2015, Mercedes informed Plaintiff and other black teachers that he wished to terminate their employment (presumably at the end of the school year, but the Complaint is silent on the timing). (Compl. ¶¶ 21-23.) He then unjustifiably eliminated the art classroom, resulting in Plaintiff having to teach using a mobile art cart with limited supplies. (Compl. ¶¶ 27-29.) Initially, Plaintiff was refused access to an elevator. Eventually, after complaining and providing a doctor's note, she was given elevator access. (Compl. ¶¶ 28-30.) In March 2015, Mercedes declined Plaintiff the opportunity to develop a book-making class that would have resulted in additional income. (Compl. ¶ 24.)
In the fall of 2015, Defendant Varona allegedly interfered with Plaintiff's lunch period without justification. (Compl. ¶ 31.) In January 2016, Plaintiff was removed from working in an after-school program, and the opportunity was given instead to a Dominican social worker. (Compl. ¶ 35.) In the spring of 2017, Varona gave Plaintiff a "less-than-effective" rating but refused to explain the basis. On May 9, 2017, Plaintiff received a disciplinary letter after a an allegedly flimsy investigation by Mercedes and based on what Plaintiff claims were false accusations of corporal punishment of a student. (Compl. ¶¶ 37-38.) On May 23, 2017, Plaintiff received a second "less-than-effective" rating. (Compl. ¶ 40.) Plaintiff grieved therating and its attached report, but, as of the filing of the Complaint, she had not received a response. (Compl. ¶ 41.)
Plaintiff took a leave of absence from work between May 28, 2017 and June 14, 2017 due to stress she was experiencing at work. (Compl. ¶ 42.) After Plaintiff returned, Mercedes issued another unwarranted disciplinary letter alleging that Plaintiff engaged in verbal abuse. (Compl. ¶ 44.) A disciplinary meeting was scheduled but then cancelled, and Mercedes refused to provide Plaintiff with a copy of the disciplinary letter. (Id.) Plaintiff elected to retire at the end of the 2016-2017 school year because of the harassment and discrimination by Mercedes and his administration. (Compl. ¶ 45.) Plaintiff contends that she was constructively discharged, as she never intended to stop working and would have continued working at least several more years. (Compl. ¶¶ 33, 45-46.) Plaintiff asserts that she was asked to attend a meeting about another allegation of corporal punishment and professional misconduct in May 2018, even though she had retired as of June 2017. (Compl. ¶ 48)
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972); Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 306 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Ofori-Tenkorang v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 460 F.3d 296, 300 (2d Cir.2006)). To survive the motion, the court must determine whether the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter . . . to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). While detailed factual allegations are not required, the complaint must contain more than mere"labels and conclusions or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. It must contain more than naked assertions devoid of "further factual enhancement." Id. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the "plausibility standard" asks for "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.
In Littlejohn v. City of New York, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit further elaborated on the "plausibility standard" in the context of claims for unlawful discrimination under Title VII. 795 F.3d at 310-11. Littlejohn held that the facts asserted in the complaint must "give plausible support to a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation"—the inference needed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the burden-shifting paradigm applicable to Title VII cases under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Id. at 311. However, the court made clear that it is not necessary at the pleading stage for a plaintiff to provide additional facts that would support the plausibility of "the ultimate question of whether the adverse employment action was attributable to discrimination." Id. Of course, some facts in a complaint may go to the plausibility of...
To continue reading
Request your trial