Harig v. City of Buffalo
Decision Date | 08 December 2021 |
Docket Number | Case No. 1:18-cv-00503 |
Parties | Austin J. HARIG, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF BUFFALO, Jason Heidinger, Lisa Wedlake, Douglas Hayden, John Bannister, Kyma Dickinson, Sara Jo Keaton, Joshua Heidinger, Michael Sullivan, Caryn Anderson, Patrick McDonald, and Robert Felschow, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
Chad A. Davenport, Rupp Baase Pfalzgraf Cunningham LLC, Buffalo, NY, for Plaintiff.
David M. Lee, Corporation Counsel the City of Buffalo, Maeve Eileen Huggins, City of Buffalo Law Department, Buffalo, NY, for Defendant City of Buffalo.
David M. Lee, Pro Hac Vice, Corporation Counsel the City of Buffalo, Maeve Eileen Huggins, City of Buffalo Law Department, Buffalo, NY, for Defendants Jason Heidinger, Lisa Wedlake, Douglas Hayden, John Bannister, Kyma Dickinson, Sara Jo Keaton, Joshua Heidinger, Michael Sullivan, Caryn Anderson, Patrick McDonald, Robert Felschow.
This action arises out of Plaintiff Austin J. Harig's ("Plaintiff") arrest on June 8, 2016 for allegedly allowing minors to drink alcohol and smoke marijuana in his apartment as well as his arrest on August 25, 2016 for an assault that took place at his apartment. He asserts claims against Defendants City of Buffalo ("Defendant City"). John Bannister ("Defendant Bannister"), Sara Jo Keaton ("Defendant Keaton"),1 Kyma Dickinson ("Defendant Dickinson"), Joshua Heidinger, Jason Heidinger, Michael Sullivan ("Defendant Sullivan"), Lisa Wedlake ("Defendant Wedlake"),2 Douglas Hayden ("Defendant Hayden"), Caryn Anderson ("Defendant Anderson"), Robert Felschow ("Defendant Felschow"), and Patrick McDonald ("Defendant McDonald") (collectively, "Defendants"). Each individual Defendant is alleged to be a Buffalo Police Department ("BPD") police officer or a police lieutenant employed by Defendant City during the relevant time. Plaintiff's claims are asserted against Defendants in their individual and official capacities.
Plaintiff alleges five causes of action arising out of his June 8, 2016 arrest, which he frames as follows: malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants City, Anderson, McDonald, and Felschow (Count I); false arrest in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants City, Anderson, McDonald, and Felschow (Count II); failure to prevent unconstitutional acts in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Anderson, McDonald, and Felschow (Count III); assault in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants City, Anderson, McDonald, and Felschow (Count IV); and battery in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants City, Anderson, McDonald, and Felschow (Count V).
Plaintiff also asserts causes of action arising out of his August 25, 2016 arrest, which he frames as follows: malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants City, Hayden, Bannister, Dickinson, Keaton, Joshua Heidinger, Jason Heidinger, Anderson, Wedlake, and Sullivan (Count VI); false arrest in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants City, Hayden, Bannister, Dickinson, Keaton, Joshua Heidinger, Jason Heidinger, Anderson, Wedlake, and Sullivan (Count VII); failure to prevent unconstitutional acts in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Hayden. Bannister, Dickinson, Keaton, Joshua Heidinger, Jason Heidinger, Anderson, Wedlake, and Sullivan (Count VIII); assault in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants City, Hayden, Bannister, Dickinson, Keaton, Joshua Heidinger, Jason Heidinger, Anderson, Wedlake, and Sullivan (Count IX); and battery in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants City, Hayden, Bannister, Dickinson, Keaton, Joshua Heidinger, Jason Heidinger, Anderson, Wedlake, and Sullivan (Count X). In addition, Plaintiff alleges malicious prosecution under state common law against all Defendants (Count XI).
On February 26, 2021, Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings with regard to certain claims and for summary judgment. On May 10, 2021, Plaintiff opposed that motion and cross-moved for summary judgment. The court denied Plaintiff's cross-motion on September 27, 2021 as untimely but agreed to treat the facts and arguments set forth therein as support for his opposition to Defendants’ motions.
Because Plaintiff consented to dismissal of certain claims at oral argument, the court dismissed all claims against Defendant City; Counts IV, V, IX, and X; all official capacity claims against the individual Defendants; and the claims arising out of Plaintiff's August 25, 2016 arrest against Defendant Anderson.
Plaintiff is represented by Chad A. Davenport, Esq., and James Ostrowski, Esq. Defendants are represented by David M. Lee, Esq.
Defendants assert that they are entitled to judgment on the pleadings with regard to Plaintiff's claims against Defendants McDonald and Felschow arising out of Plaintiff's August 25, 2016 arrest because Plaintiff does not allege their personal involvement in that event. In addition, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's August 25, 2016 malicious prosecution claim must be dismissed against Defendants Wedlake, Hayden, Dickinson, Joshua Heidinger, and Jason Heidinger because they were not involved in charging him with a crime.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides "[a]fter the pleadings are closed--but early enough not to delay trial--a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." A Rule 12(c) motion is judged by the same standards applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Irish Lesbian & Gay Org. v. Giuliani , 143 F.3d 638, 644 (2d Cir. 1998). The standard of review on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion requires the court to accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor. Martine's Serv. Ctr., Inc. v. Town of Wallkill , 554 F. App'x 32, 34 (2d Cir. 2014). However, legal conclusions are not assumed to be true, and "[t]he complaint must plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Smith v. Local 819 I.B.T. Pension Plan , 291 F.3d 236, 240 (2d Cir. 2002) () (internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets in original).
A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint is evaluated using a "two-pronged approach[.]" Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. First, the court discounts legal conclusions and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements[.]" Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Second, the court considers whether the factual allegations, taken as true, "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The court does not "weigh the evidence" or "evaluate the likelihood" that a plaintiff will prevail on his or her claims. Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc. , 852 F.3d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 2017) ; see also Kardovich v. Pfizer, Inc. , 97 F. Supp. 3d 131, 140 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) ().
Defendants argue that BPD officers who did not have personal involvement in Plaintiff's August 25, 2016 arrest and the subsequent criminal prosecution cannot be held liable for claims arising therefrom. The court agrees. See Spavone v. N. Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs. , 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) () (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff responds to this argument in a footnote, citing his statement of facts in support of his cross-motion for summary judgment as the grounds for opposing Defendants’ motion. To the extent his Complaint can be construed as asserting claims arising out of the events on August 25, 2016 against Defendants McDonald and Felschow, Plaintiff did not allege they responded to the incident or participated in charging him. Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings dismissing any claims arising out of the August 25, 2016 arrest and prosecution against Defendants McDonald and Felschow for lack of personal involvement is therefore GRANTED.
Defendants further argue that Defendants Wedlake, Hayden, Dickinson, Joshua Heidinger, and Jason Heidinger "played no role in pressing the criminal charges against Plaintiff on August 25, 2016." (Doc. 39-1 at 23.) Because this claim cannot be resolved on the basis of the pleadings, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings with regard to Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim arising out of his August...
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