Hariri v. Portland State Univ.
| Decision Date | 02 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | 3:15-CV-1076-PK |
| Parties | MOHAMAD HARIRI, Plaintiff, v. PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Plaintiff Mohamad Hariri filed this action against defendant Portland State University ("PSU") and against PSU professor Gwen Shusterman on June 17, 2015. Effective July 12, 2016, Hariri amended his complaint, abandoning his claims against Shusterman. By and through his amended complaint, Hariri alleges that he was baselessly accused of academic misconduct, in consequence of which he was suspended for one year from attendance at PSU and received a lower than deserved grade in one of his classes. Arising out of the foregoing, Hariri alleges PSU's liability (i) under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.) for unlawful discrimination based on race, color, and/or national origin, (ii) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights, and (iii) under Oregon common law for negligence. Hariri seeks award of economic damages in the amount of $160,000 plus an additional amount for unspecified medical expenses, award of non-economic damages in the amount of $200,000, award of punitive damages in the amount of $200,000, post-judgment interest on all money damages, award of his attorney fees and costs, injunctive relief requiring defendants to reverse his suspension, raise his grade in one of his classes, expunge the accusation of misconduct and the suspension from his academic record, train all "managers and HR staff" at PSU to undergo counseling and training regarding illegal discrimination, and update PSU policies regarding "treatment of minorities." This court has federal-question jurisdiction over Hariri's federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and may properly exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Hariri's state-law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 for so long as Hariri's federal claims remain properly before it.
Now before the court is PSU's motion (#54) for summary judgment, I have considered the motion and all of the pleadings and papers on file. For the reasons set forth below, PSU's motion is granted in its entirety, and summary judgment is entered in PSU's favor as to each of Hariri's claims.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine disputeas to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party taking the position that a material fact either "cannot be or is genuinely disputed" must support that position either by citation to specific evidence of record "including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials," by showing that the evidence of record does not establish either the presence or absence of such a dispute, or by showing that an opposing party is unable to produce sufficient admissible evidence to establish the presence or absence of such a dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The substantive law governing a claim or defense determines whether a fact is material. See Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1998).
Summary judgment is not proper if material factual issues exist for trial. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 318, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1261 (1996). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the district courts of the United States must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and may neither make credibility determinations nor perform any weighing of the evidence. See, e.g., Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 554-55 (1990); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
Plaintiff Hariri is an American of Arab descent, specifically of Lebanese and Syrian ancestry. Defendant PSU is a public, nonprofit educational institution. It is undisputed that PSUreceives portions of its funding from the State of Oregon and from the federal government, among other sources.
Plaintiff Hariri enrolled as a full-time undergraduate student at PSU in Fall 2009, prior to which he spent two academic years as an undergraduate studying at a community college in Oregon.2 See Declaration (#26) of Nicolle DuPont dated March 1, 2016 ("DuPont Decl."), Exhs. 5, 6. Although Hariri received failing grades, only marginally passing grades, and marks indicating the absence of any basis for evaluating academic performance in some of his coursework, he nevertheless ultimately graduated from the undergraduate program offered by defendant PSU with a bachelor's degree in general science in 2013. See id., Exh. 1. After graduation from PSU, Hariri applied unsuccessfully to dental schools, during the course of which process he learned that the presence of failing grades on his college transcript could negatively impact his applications, See id., Exh. 7. In consequence, beginning in 2014 Hariri began petitioning PSU both to expunge from his transcript courses in which he completed none of the work and to permit him to retake classes in which he received failing or nearly failing grades. See id., Exhs. 3, 7. PSU denied several such petitions, but in September 2014 granted Hariri the opportunity to retake four courses in which he had previously received poor grades, See id.,Exhs. 4, 7. In Fall 2014, Hariri enrolled at PSU as a post-baccalaureate student for the purpose of retaking those four courses. See id., Exh. 1.3
Among the courses Hariri retook in Fall 2014 was General Chemistry I, also known as Chemistry 221, which was taught by former defendant Shusterman. See id. Because over 350 students were enrolled in Chemistry 221 in that quarter, the students were divided into groups (or "neighborhoods") of approximately 20, each of which was assigned a "learning assistant" or "LA." Runkles-Pearson Decl., Exh. 5 (the Deposition of Dillon Willis (collectively with Stanford Decl., Exh. 4, "Willis Depo."), 6:9-7:21; see also Declaration (#22) of Gwen Shusterman dated March 1, 2016 ("Shusterman Decl.), ¶¶ 3-4, The learning assistant assigned to Hariri's "neighborhood" was Dillon Willis. See Willis Depo., 6:9 - 7:21; see also Shusterman Decl., ¶ 5.
The final examination for Chemistry 221 was scheduled for December 8, 2014, See Shusterman Decl., Exh. 4. Pursuant to Shusterman's written policy, students were required to bring photographic identification documents to the final examination. See id., Exh. 5. Also pursuant to Shusterman's written policy, Chemistry 221 students were advised that the final examination could be rescheduled for students who had a conflict with the regular schedule, and that "[i]llness. . . and family emergencies" (inter alia) were considered valid grounds for rescheduling the final examination. See id., Exh. 4. In addition, Chemistry 221 students were advised in writing at the beginning of the term that Id.
Hariri and PSU offer conflicting evidence as to whether Hariri sat for the Chemistry 221 final examination on December 8, 2014, with his fellow students. Hariri testified that he did so, and that he handed his completed examination to learning assistant Willis after he finished writing it See Hariri Depo., 179:5-23. Hariri testified that Willis asked him for photographic identification, and that he replied that he did not have it on his person. See id. Hariri testified that Willis told him that the two of them should discuss the matter with Shusterman, but that Hariri observed that there were already students forming a line to speak with Shusterman, whereupon he left without exchanging further words with Willis, leaving his examination in Willis' possession. See id.
By contrast, Willis testified that in the latter half of the final examination period, a man of evident Asian descent whom Willis "did not recognize" walked up to him and handed him an examination bearing Hariri's name. Willis Depo., 11:3 - 12:9. Willis testified that he knew Hariri by sight, and knew that the man attempting to turn in the examination was not Hariri. See id., 6:6-13, 11:14-22, 14:4-11. Willis testified that he asked the man to show his photographic identification, and that the man told him he had not been aware that he needed to bring it to the final examination, See id., 11:18-24. Willis testified that he told the man he would need to speak with Shusterman and then began walking toward Shusterman, expecting the man to follow. See id., 11:25 - 12:5. Willis testified that he looked over his shoulder to confirm that the man was following him only to discover that the man had left the examination room. See id. Willis testified that he then approached Shusterman, gave her the examination bearing Hariri's name,and advised her that the man who had handed the examination in was not Hariri. See id., 14:16 - 15:2. Shusterman testified consistently that Willis handed her an examination bearing Hariri's name and told her that the person who handed it in had no photographic identification and was not Hariri. See Stanford Decl., Exh. 2 (the Deposition of Gwen Shusterman (collectively with Runkles-Pearson Decl., Exh. 2, "Shusterman Depo."), 16:3 - 17:18. Shusterman testified that after receiving the examination bearing Hariri's name from Willis, she set the examination aside for further consideration. See id., 17:23 - 18:3.
At some time after Hariri filed...
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