Harlan v. Lee

• Decision Date: 13 December 1939
• Docket Number: 50.
• Parties: HARLAN v. LEE.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

9 A.2d 839

177 Md. 437

HARLAN v. LEE.

No. 50.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

December 13, 1939

Appeal from Circuit Court, Harford County; Frederick Lee Cobourn Judge.

Suit by John L. G. Lee, trustee, against William H. Harlan for an injunction prohibiting and restraining defendant from making the claim that he had an exclusive easement in a particular street and for other relief. From an order overruling a demurrer to the whole bill of complaint, defendant appeals.

Reversed.

William H. Harlan, of Bel Air, for appellant.

John L G. Lee, of Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before BOND, C.J., and OFFUTT, PARKE, SLOAN, SHEHAN, JOHNSON, and DELAPLAINE, JJ.

SHEHAN Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Harford County overruling a demurrer to the whole bill of complaint filed by John L. G. Lee, trustee, appointed by a decree under a creditors bill, for the sale of certain property of Caroline W. Harrison, deceased. His power and authority, under the trust, was limited to the sale of the property for the benefit of creditors. The property had been conveyed by Wm. H. Harlan, and wife, to the said Caroline W. Harrison, in fee simple, with the reservation to the said grantors, and their heirs and assigns, of the use at all times of 'Choice Street,' as designated on the plat mentioned in the deed. John L. G. Lee, as trustee, filed a bill of complaint against Wm. H. Harlan, in which he charged that Harlan was interfering with and obstructing the sale of the property by wrongfully claiming, without any foundation in law or fact, certain rights and interest in a part of the property which the said appellee had acquired by virtue of his trusteeship and that the appellant had notified certain prospective purchasers that he would not allow them to use the said 'Choice Street', and threatened litigation if they undertook to do so. That the action of the said Wm. H. Harlan, based on his illegal and wrongful claim of title, was causing irreparable damage and loss to the said trust estate by reason of his said wrongful claim. And the said trustee prayed that a decree be passed to the effect that Wm. H. Harlan had no rights in 'Choice Street' other than an easement to pass over it, it being a street of the Town of Bel Air; and that an injunction be granted prohibiting and restraining the said Harlan from making the claim that he had an exclusive easement in the street and so could prohibit any person from using or passing over it, and for other relief. The demurrer was filed to the whole bill of complaint and the Chancellor, having overruled this demurrer, the defendant appealed.

The appellant contends that under the facts, as stated in the bill, the appellee is not entitled to relief in equity, for on its face the bill discloses that the trustee was only appointed to sell the property and has no such title to the land referred to in the case, as gives him any standing in a Court of Equity, and finally that the proceedings disclose that an issue exists as to the title of the real property and this Court of Equity had no jurisdiction to entertain the bill, and the matter should be determined at law. The Chancellor took the contrary view and overruled the demurrer to the entire, or whole, bill. The first question presented by the pleadings, and urged in the arguments at bar, is that the appeal is not from a final order disposing of the material rights of the parties, and therefore should be dismissed; but this question seems to have been decided in the case of Chappell v. Funk, 57 Md. 465. Judge Miller, in delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that appeals were allowed "from any final decree, or order in the nature of a final decree,' and it is well settled, that an order of the latter character, to admit of an appeal, must be one which finally settles some disputed right or interest of the parties. Dillon v. Insurance Co., 44 Md. [386] 395.'

It was the opinion of the Court that an order, overruling the demurrer to the entire bill, does finally settle (so far as the Court passing it can do so) a disputed right of the parties, and the Court stated that, 'It is true that demurrers are no favorites of courts of equity, nor are they often resorted to, but it is the undoubted privilege of a defendant in an equity suit to demur to the bill. By so doing he challenges and denies, either the jurisdiction of the court, or that the bill, on its face, states any case which the defendant can be lawfully required to answer, or otherwise notice or defend. He...