Harley v. State
Decision Date | 01 September 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 160,160 |
Parties | Peter Donald HARLEY v. STATE of Maryland. , |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
John L. Kopolow, Assistant Public Defender, (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, both on brief), Baltimore, for appellant.
Gary E. Bair, Assistant Attorney General, (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, both on brief), Baltimore, for appellee.
Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, KARWACKI, BELL and RAKER, JJ.
The issue in this criminal case concerns the trial court's application of the principles set forth in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1716, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 79 (1986), in the context of a defendant's allegation that the prosecution's peremptory strikes were racially motivated.
Peter Donald Harley, an African-American male, was charged with murder and related offenses based upon the killing of Timothy Kidd when a potential drug buy went awry. After a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Harley was found guilty of first-degree felony murder, second-degree murder, robbery with a deadly weapon, attempted robbery with a deadly weapon, and use of a handgun in commission of a felony. Harley was sentenced to life imprisonment without a possibility of parole for felony murder and to a concurrent term of twenty-five years imprisonment on the handgun conviction. No sentence was imposed on the other convictions because of merger.
The only question raised by Harley in this appeal concerns the State's peremptory challenges during jury selection. The State's first four peremptory challenges were all against African-Americans. After the fourth prospective juror was challenged by the State, defense counsel raised a Batson objection. Regarding two of these prospective jurors struck by the State, Harley's attorney stated that he could "understand why" the prosecutor "might" have challenged them, as one "had two cousins involved in serious criminal offenses" and the other "had been a victim of a stolen car" and "was a lawyer." With respect to the other two potential jurors, namely Ms. Marcia Shaw and Mr. Keith Brooks, defense counsel pointed out that neither prospective juror had answered any questions during voir dire. Defense counsel suggested that "the State [was] inappropriately challenging these two black jurors without any basis for doing so other than the racial basis." The following then ensued:
Jury selection continued, and when there was only one more juror to be selected, the prosecuting attorney struck Ms. Mary Hardison, a fifty-six year-old, widowed, African-American female. Defense counsel raised a Batson challenge to this strike as well, noting that Ms. Hardison had not responded to anything during the voir dire questioning. The prosecutor explained her reason as follows:
Subsequently, the state exercised a peremptory strike against Ms. Millicent Barnes, a twenty-four year old single African-American female. The defendant again made a Batson challenge, and the following colloquy occurred:
Ultimately, twelve jurors and two alternates were selected. Nine of the regular jurors selected, and both alternates, were African-Americans. Before the jury was sworn, defense counsel placed on the record his explicit refusal to waive his Batson challenges.
After his conviction, Harley appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. There he argued, inter alia, that the State's peremptory strikes against the above discussed jurors violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals took the position "that a prima facie case [of discrimination] was impliedly found by the court to have been made by appellant...." The intermediate appellate court went on to hold that the trial judge gave an inadequate explanation of " 'whether the established prima facie case of purposeful discrimination [had] been overcome by the State' " and that it "is insufficient for the trial judge to ... simply say that it is satisfied with the State's reasons for exercising the strikes." The appellate court remanded the case to the Circuit Court for Prince George's for "the trial judge to fulfill his fact-finding obligation." The State did not file in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Court of Special Appeals' decision. 1 The defendant Harley filed a pro se petition for a writ of certiorari which we denied, Harley v. State, 331 Md. 87, 626 A.2d 370 (1993).
On remand, the trial judge again considered the peremptory challenges in question and found that, in each instance, the State had successfully rebutted the defendant's...
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