Harling v. Board of Com'rs of Police Insurance and Annuity Fund

• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MR. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE TAYLOR delivered the unanimous Opinion of the Court:
• Citation: Harling v. Board of Com'rs of Police Insurance and Annuity Fund, 31 S.E.2d 913, 205 S.C. 319 (S.C. 1944)
• Decision Date: 03 November 1944
• Docket Number: 15687.
• Parties: HARLING v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF POLICE INSURANCE AND ANNUITY FUND.

31 S.E.2d 913

205 S.C. 319

HARLING v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF POLICE INSURANCE AND ANNUITY FUND.

No. 15687.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

November 3, 1944

Heyward Brockinton and John W. Crews, both of Columbia, for appellant.

B E. Nicholson, of Edgefield, for respondent.

TAYLOR Justice.

This appeal comes by way of the Court of Common Pleas from Edgefield County where the plaintiff brought action based upon the defendant's refusal to pay plaintiff's claim for certain disability benefits under an Act approved March 17, 1937, 40 St. at Large, page 295, and known as "An Act to Create a Board of Police Commissioners to Provide Revenue or a Source of Revenue for the Purpose of Paying Insurance and Annuity Benefits to the Peace Officers of the State of South Carolina."

The appellant refused to pay such claimed benefits for the reason that the plaintiff was still discharging the duties of the office of sheriff of Edgefield County and drawing salary and compensation for his said services. The cause came on to be tried at the March, 1944, term of Court of Common Pleas of Edgefield County before Honorable M. M Mann, Presiding Judge, and a jury, upon the Summons and Complaint and Answer filed in the cause.

At the close of the plaintiff's testimony in the case, the defendant made a motion for a nonsuit, which was refused by the Presiding Judge. At the close of the plaintiff's and defendant's testimony in the case motions were made on behalf of the plaintiff and defendant for a directed verdict. His Honor, Judge Mann, refused defendant's motion for a directed verdict, but directed a verdict for the plaintiff and the defendant now appeals to this Court upon the following exceptions:

"1. That his Honor erred in granting plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict and in refusing to grant defendant's for a directed verdict; the error being that his Honor should have held that the undisputed physical fact of plaintiff continuing to hold the office of sheriff of Edgefield County and receiving emoluments therefrom refuted the claim and allegations of total and permanent disability.

2. That his Honor erred in granting plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict and refusing defendant's motion for a directed verdict; the error being that his Honor should have ruled that the plaintiff had failed to prove total and permanent disability within the meaning of the words as use in the Police Insurance and Annuity Act.

3. That his Honor erred in granting plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict and refusing defendant's motion for a directed verdict and in applying to the instant case the rules of law relating to private insurance contracts and so interpreting the statute in question; the error being that his Honor should have held and so interpreted the statute that the benefits sought thereunder are in the nature of a pension and the maturity of such benefits are dependent and contingent upon resignation of plaintiff as sheriff of Edgefield County.

4. That his Honor erred in interpreting the statute in question and holding that the Legislature intended to compensate Peace Officers and pay to them total and permanent disability benefits in addition to their regular compensation received from their position as such Peace Officers; the error being that his Honor should have held and so interpreted the statute to the effect that it was not the intention of the Legislature to pay total and permanent disability to Peace Officers in addition to their regular salaries.

5. That his Honor erred in directing a verdict for plaintiff and in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant; the error being that his Honor should have held that more than one inference could have reasonably been drawn from the testimony on the issue of permanent and total disability and should have submitted the case to the jury for its determination of the evidence and the question of the extent of plaintiff's injury.

6. That his Honor erred by ruling and holding that as a matter of law the nature and extent of plaintiff's injury constituted permanent and total disability; the error being that his Honor should have held whether or not plaintiff's injury constituted permanent and total disability was a question of fact and should have submitted the said question to the jury for its determination."

While the appellant appeals upon six exceptions, these exceptions raise only two questions:

1. Did the respondent prove by the greater weight or preponderance of the evidence that he is totally and permanently disabled under the terms of the Act?

2. Did the Legislature intend to allow a peace officer to continue to work and receive his salary and at the same time receive the benefits granted under the Statute?

A study of the record leaves no doubt that the claimant is totally and permanently disabled. This the appellants themselves admit by awarding to respondent total and permanent benefits under the Act, but they go further and provide that before any of such funds shall be paid to the respondent he must resign his office as sheriff.

The testimony offered to prove the fact of respondent's total and permanent disability was uncontradicted and as a whole tended to establish the truth of such allegation. This made the question one of law, and the trial Judge not only was entirely within his rights, but it was his duty under the circumstances to direct a verdict for the plaintiff unless the Board of Commissioners were within their rights when they placed in the award the requirement that respondent resign his office before receiving payments for such disability. Slaughter Co. v. King Lumber Co., 79 S.C. 338, 60 S.E. 705.

This then, brings before us the consideration of question number two which is the construction of that portion of the Act listed as Sec. 3812-2 of 1942 Code of Laws of South Carolina, the...