Harling v. United States
Citation | 387 A.2d 1101 |
Decision Date | 21 June 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 11719.,11719. |
Parties | Jerome HARLING, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Columbia District |
David C. Niblack, Washington, D.C., appointed by this court, for appellant.
Charles Hall, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U.S. Atty., and John A. Terry, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before KELLY and GALLAGHER, Associate Judges, and PAIR, Associate Judge, Retired.
Appellant was tried by a jury and convicted of first-degree murder while armed (D.C.Code 1973, §§ 22-2401, -3202) and carrying a pistol without a license (D.C. Code 1973, § 22-3204). On appeal, he makes three claims of error: (1) His Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when the trial court removed his appointed attorney without just cause and over his objection; (2) the trial court erred in summarily denying his motion for discovery of the names of certain government witnesses; and (3) the trial court erroneously refused to give his requested self-defense instruction. We agree with appellant that the court unnecessarily interfered with his right to counsel and reverse.1
The facts of the underlying offense are not controlling as to the issues raised and may be summarized briefly. The government's principal witness at trial, Audrey Valentine, testified that on December 9, 1975, she, her husband and another woman accompanied appellant to a poolroom near 7th and Wiltberger Streets, N.W., in order to purchase narcotics. It was outside this poolroom that appellant is alleged to have fired at least two shots into the body of Dempsey Hinton, fatally wounding him.
On June 4, 1976, an original indictment was filed charging appellant with the murder of Hinton. On June 21, appellant was arraigned and an attorney was appointed to represent him. Trial was scheduled for October 4. In the interim, motions for discovery (seeking primarily the names of government witnesses) and for suppression of identification were filed. At a status hearing on September 13, the prosecutor noted the pending discovery motion and requested that the trial be rescheduled for sometime in November in order for the government to assess what information, if any, it would release to the defendant. Defense counsel acknowledged that postponement of the trial might consequently be helpful to the defense, but concomitantly asserted appellant's speedy trial rights on the belief that the government should have previously produced the requested information. The trial judge then remarked:
After an exchange with defense counsel, the court indicated it would deny the entire discovery motion without hearing argument from the government. In response, defense counsel stated:
Strike Mr. Borders, Mr. Bowers and have another attorney appointed. Set the case for November.
On September 24, the court received a communication from appellant requesting that Mr. Bowers be reinstated as his defense counsel. Appellant said that
[t]o appoint another Attorney at this stage of the case would definitely and seriously damage and/or hamper the Defense thereby denying the Defendant the fairest trial possible.
Attorney Shellie F. Bowers has done extensive and in depth research and investigating into this case that would be seriously interrupted if another Attorney was about [sic] to the case at this time.
Moreover, there appears to be no "just" justification for the order withdrawing Attorney Bowers from the case, and as the records will indicate the only justification for the Court's actions is Counsel's determination to effectively represent the Defendant. Furthermore the Court was tragically and shamefully disrespectful to Counsel and his efforts to represent the Defendant.
On the face of this document the following notation appears: "Denied — The Court is paying for counsel, not the deft." We think the record speaks for itself. Appellant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by the court's unwarranted interference with the relationship established between appellant and his attorney.
When an accused has the means to employ counsel, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel embraces not only the assistance of counsel but also the reasonable opportunity to secure counsel of one's own choice. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932). Once counsel has been retained, the court may not unreasonably interfere with the accused's choice of counsel. Lee v. United States, 98 U.S.App. D.C. 272, 235 F.2d 219 (1956), aff'd after remand, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 204, 251 F.2d 915 (1958). The only limitation that may be placed on the right to retained counsel of choice is that the client's selection not impede or disrupt the orderly administration of justice. See, e.g., McKoy v. United States, D.C.App., 263 A.2d 645 (1970) ( ); United States v. Dinitz, 538 F.2d 1214, rehearing denied, 542 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104, 97 S.Ct. 1133, 51 L.Ed.2d 556 (1977) ( ). We are called upon to decide in this case whether a trial judge may discharge court-appointed counsel, over the objections of the attorney and the defendant and under circumstances where the removal of retained counsel would not be justified.
It has been generally recognized that while an indigent's preference for a particular attorney may be considered by the court, he does not have an unqualified right to appointed counsel of his own choosing. United States v. Hampton, 457 F.2d 299 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 856, 93 S.Ct. 136, 34 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); Tibbett v. Aliand, 294 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1961). Furthermore, once counsel has been selected for an indigent defendant, substitution of that counsel upon request of either the defendant or the attorney rests in the sound discretion of the court. Thornton v. United States, D.C.App., 357 A.2d 429, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024, 97 S.Ct. 644, 50 L.Ed.2d 626 (1976). We conclude, however, that once an attorney is serving under a valid appointment by the court and an attorney-client relationship has been established, the court may not arbitrarily remove the attorney, over the objections of both the defendant and his counsel. "[O]nce counsel has been chosen, whether by the court or the accused, the accused is entitled to the assistance of that counsel at trial." English v. State, 8 Md.App. 330, 259 A.2d 822, 826 (1969) (emphasis in original). Accord, McKinnon v. State, 526 P.2d 18 (Alaska 1974); Smith v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 68 Cal.2d 547, 68 Cal.Rptr. 1, 440 P.2d 65 (1968) (en banc). The right to assistance of chosen counsel is not absolute, however. A trial judge may "in the interest of justice" substitute one counsel for another. D.C.Code 1977 Supp., § 11-2603. Gross incompetence or physical incapacity of counsel, or contumacious conduct that cannot be cured by a citation for contempt may justify the court's removal of an attorney, even over the defendant's objection. See, eg., United States v. Dinitz, supra.
The record fails to disclose any justifiable basis for the court's removal of this appointed attorney as appellant's trial counsel. After the defense motion for discovery was summarily denied, counsel stated, essentially, that he could not be an effective advocate without access to the names of eyewitnesses. The court charged counsel with trying to make a record of ineffectiveness of counsel for appeal. Counsel was abruptly cut off by the court in his efforts to assure the court that this was not his intent, but, rather, he desired only that the motion be granted "in the interests of justice." The motion for discovery was not frivolous. Like United States v. Holmes, D.C.App., 343 A.2d 272, rehearing denied, 346 A.2d 517 (1975), this was a first-degree murder...
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