Harlow v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 23 May 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. EDCV 17-2091 JGB (SPx)
• Citation: 379 F.Supp.3d 1046
• Parties: Jennett HARLOW v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

379 F.Supp.3d 1046

Jennett HARLOW

v.METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.

Case No. EDCV 17-2091 JGB (SPx)

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Filed May 23, 2019

MAYNOR GALVEZ, Deputy Clerk, Attorney(s) Present for Plaintiff(s): None Present

Not Reported, Court Reporter, Attorney(s) Present for Defendant(s): None Present

Proceedings: Order (1) GRANTING-IN-PART Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees (Dkt. No. 64); (3) DENYING the Application to File Under Seal as MOOT (Dkt. No. 68); and (2) VACATING the June 3, 2019 Hearing (IN CHAMBERS)

The Honorable JESUS G. BERNAL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Plaintiff Jennett Harlow's motion for attorneys' fees against Defendants Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ("MetLife") and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. Long Term Disability ("Kaiser"). ("Motion," Dkt. No. 64.) The Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 ; L.R. 7-15. After considering all papers filed in support of and in opposition to the Motion, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART Plaintiff's Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 12, 2017, Plaintiff initiated this action under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), challenging MetLife's determination that Plaintiff was not "totally disabled" during the 24-month period and subsequent termination of her long-term disability ("LTD") benefits payments. ("Complaint," Dkt. No. 1.) The Court scheduled a bench trial for January 23, 2019 (dkt. no. 55) and later vacated the hearing (dkt. no. 59). On March 11, 2019, the Court entered its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. ("March Order," Dkt. No. 60.) The Court reversed MetLife's decision to terminate Plaintiff's LTD benefits during the 24-month period. (Id. at 18.) Judgment was entered in Plaintiff's favor. ("Judgment," Dkt. No. 61.)

On April 26, 2019, Plaintiff moved for attorneys' fees. (Mot.) In support of her Motion, Plaintiff attached the following documents:

• Declaration of Michael Horrow ("Horrow Declaration," Dkt. No. 64-1);

• Orders Approving Attorneys' Fees ("Ex. A, "Ex. B," "Ex. C," "Ex. D")

• Horrow Time Billed ("Horrow Time")

• Horrow Costs Incurred ("Horrow Costs")

• Declaration of Nichole D. Podgurski ("Podgurski Declaration," Dkt. No. 64-2);

• Podgurski Time Billed ("Podgurski Time")

• Declaration of Scott E. Calvert ("Calvert Declaration," Dkt. No. 64-3);

• Calvert Time Billed ("Calvert Time")

• Orders Approving Attorneys' Fees ("Ex. J," "Ex. K," "Ex. L," "Ex. M," "Ex. N")

• Declaration of Glenn R. Kantor ("Kantor Declaration")

• Declaration of Robert McKennon ("McKennon Declaration")

• Declaration of Russell G. Petti ("Petti Declaration," Dkt. No. 64-4); and

• Petti Time Billed ("Petti Time")

• Declaration of Ronald Dean ("Dean Declaration")

• Declaration of David C. Scheper ("Scheper Declaration")

• Declaration of George B. Newhouse, Jr. ("Newhouse Declaration")

• Proposed Order (Dkt. No. 64-5).

MetLife opposed the Motion on May 13, 2019. ("Opposition," Dkt. No. 65.) In support of its Opposition, MetLife submitted the following documents:

• Declaration of Misty Murray ("Murray Declaration," Dkt. No. 65-1);

• Exhibit 1: Time Murray Believes is Excessive ("Ex. 1," Dkt. No. 65-2);

• Exhibit 2: Subpoenas ("Ex. 2," Dkt. No. 65-2);

• Exhibit 3: April 12, 2019 Email from Murray to Horrow ("Ex. 3," Dkt. No. 65-2);

• Exhibit 4: Horrow Declarations from Other Actions ("Ex. 4," Dkt. No. 65-2);

• Exhibit 5: Petti Declarations from Other Actions ("Ex. 5," Dkt. No. 65-2);

• Exhibit 6: Calvert Declarations from Other Actions ("Ex. 6," Dkt. No. 65-2);

• Exhibit 7: Podgurski Declarations from Other Actions ("Ex. 7," Dkt. No. 62-2).

Plaintiff replied on May 20, 2019. ("Reply," Dkt. No. 66.) In support of her Reply, Plaintiff filed a second declaration from Scott E. Calvert. ("Calvert 2d Declaration," Dkt. No. 66-1.) She also submitted a time log for the hours billed preparing the Reply. ("Reply Time," Dkt. No. 66-1.)

On May 22, 2019, MetLife filed a supplemental declaration of Misty Murray. ("Murray 2d Declaration," Dkt. No. 67.) Portions of the Murray 2d Declaration do not propose facts, but instead contain legal argument. (See id. ¶ 6.) MetLife neither requested nor received leave to file a surreply. MetLife also filed an Application to File Under Seal. ("Application," Dkt. No. 68.) The Application seeks to file under seal documents related to negotiations concerning attorneys' fees. (Id. )¹

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Entitlement to Attorneys' Fees

ERISA authorizes a court to award attorneys' fees. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) ("the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to either party"). The award of attorney's fees under ERISA is left to the Court's discretion. Id. A court must first decide whether the litigant has "achieved some degree of success on the merits." Simonia v. Glendale Nissan/Infiniti Disability Plan, 608 F.3d 1118, 1119 (9th Cir. 2010). This is not satisfied by achieving "trivial success on the merits" or a "purely procedural victor[y]..." Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 255, 130 S.Ct. 2149, 176 L.Ed.2d 998 (2010). But a litigant achieves "some degree of success on the merits" if the court "can fairly call the outcome of the litigation some success ... without conduct a ‘lengthy inquir[y] into the question whether a particular party's success was substantial or occurred on a central issue.’ " Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 688 n.9, 103 S.Ct. 3274, 77 L.Ed.2d 938 (1983) ).

If the litigant has achieved some success, the court then considers five factors: (1) the degree of the opposing parties' culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability of the opposing parties to satisfy an award of fees; (3) whether an award of fees against the opposing parties would deter others from acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether the parties requesting fees sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA; and (5) the relative merits of the parties' positions. Hummell v. S. E. Rykoff & Co, 634 F.2d 446, 452 (9th Cir. 1980). "[N]o single Hummell factor is necessarily decisive[.]" Simonia, 608 F.3d at 1122. In the Ninth Circuit, courts "ordinarily grant a prevailing beneficiary in an ERISA action reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, absent special circumstances cautioning against it." Boston Mut. Ins. v. Murphree, 242 F.3d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 2001).

B. Amount of a Fee Award

Reasonable attorneys' fees under ERISA are calculated using a hybrid lodestar/multiplier approach. McElwaine v. US West, Inc., 176 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing D'Emanuele v. Montgomery Ward Co., 904 F.2d 1379, 1383 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992) ). A court determines the lodestar amount by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by each attorney's reasonable hourly rate. Id. The party seeking the award of attorneys' fees must submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed. Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) ). The court excludes from the lodestar amount hours that are " ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’ " Id. The lodestar amount is presumptively reasonable. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Entitlement to Attorneys' Fees

The Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees. As a preliminary matter, MetLife does not dispute that Plaintiff achieved success on the merits of her action. The Court reversed MetLife's determination that Plaintiff was not totally disabled within the meaning of the LTD plan for the 24-month period for which Plaintiff sought review. (See March Order.) Accordingly, the Court can easily determine that Plaintiff's success was both substantial and occurred on a central issue.

See Hardt, 560 U.S. at 255, 130 S.Ct. 2149.

MetLife points to no "special circumstances" to justify denying Plaintiff's fee request despite her success in this litigation. See Boston Mut., 242 F.3d at 904. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has held where the fact that the plaintiff prevailed " ‘is evident from the order of the district court, it is unnecessary for the court to engage in a discussion of the factors enumerated in Hummell.’ " Grosz-Salomon v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Nelson v. EG & G Energy Measurements Grp., Inc., 37 F.3d 1384, 1392 (9th Cir. 1994) ). Accordingly, because MetLife points to no special circumstances justifying denying attorneys' fees and because is it evident from the March Order that Plaintiff prevailed on the merits of her claim, the Court need not analyze the Hummell factors. Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys' fees.

Even if examination of the Hummell factors was required, the Court would still find Plaintiff established she is entitled to relief. The first factor, bad faith or culpability, is neutral, as the Court did not find that MetLife acted in bad faith. (See March Order.) As to the second factor, MetLife admits it can satisfy an award of attorneys' fees. (Opp'n at 9.) This favors granting an award. The Court finds the third factor also favors an award, as ERISA plans should be discouraged from relying solely on the determination of their retained consultant when the record contains conflicting medical evidence. If a plan discounts the conflicting medical evidence, it should at least explain why. The fourth factor slightly favors an award. Although Plaintiff did not act on behalf of others, her case may clarify an insurer's obligations in the future. Finally, the fifth factor also weighs in Plaintiff's favor, as the Court adopted her position on the merits. Thus, even considering the Hummell factors, attorneys' fees are appropriate.

B. Amount of Plaintiff's Fee Award

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