Harmon v. American Elec. Power Service Corp.
| Decision Date | 03 June 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A. 3:04-1230.,CIV.A. 3:04-1230. |
| Citation | 371 F.Supp.2d 804 |
| Parties | Connie HARMON, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Richard Keith Harmon, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION, d/b/a American Electric Power Company Phillip Sporn Plant, and United Mine Workers of America International; United Mine Workers of America, District 17; and United Mine Workers of America, Local No. 5396, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
James D. McQueen, Jr., M. Kathlene Harmon McQueen, McQueen Harmon & Murphy, Charleston, WV, for Plaintiff.
Bryan R. Cokeley, Faisal B. Siddiqui, Steptoe & Johnson, James M. Haviland, Crandall Pyles Haviland Turner & Smith, Charles F. Donnelly, Donnelly & Carbone, Charleston, WV, Judith Rivlin, UMWA
Headquarters, Fairfax, VA, Pamela W. Yu, Richmond, VA, for Defendants.
Pending are the motions of the defendants to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment; the motion of the defendant United Mine Workers International, joined by the other defendants, to dismiss or for summary judgment on the amended complaint; the renewed motion to dismiss of the defendants United Mine Workers, District 17 and Local No. 5396; the motion of the plaintiff for leave to file a supplemental memorandum of law in opposition to the defendants' motions; and the motion of the defendant American Electric Power Company to strike the plaintiff's supplemental memorandum.
Because the parties have submitted matters outside the pleadings, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), the Court will treat the defendants' primary motions as motions for summary judgment under Rule 56. The plaintiff's supplemental memorandum of law largely reiterates her earlier filings and includes an affidavit in support of her position. Having reviewed the memorandum, the Court finds that allowing this submission would not unduly prejudice the defendants. Therefore, in an abundance of caution to ensure that her claims are thoroughly considered, the Court GRANTS the plaintiff's motion to file a supplemental memorandum of law (Doc No. 33) and DENIES the defendant's motion to strike the memorandum (Doc. No. 35). For the following reasons, the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the amended complaint (Doc. Nos. 22 and 28) are GRANTED IN PART and the prior motions (Doc. No. 5) are DENIED as moot.
The plaintiff, Connie Harmon, brought this action in her individual capacity and as administratrix of the estate of Richard Keith Harmon. Mr. Harmon was an employee of the defendant American Electric Power Service Corporation, doing business as American Electric Power Company Philip Sporn Plant ("AEP") from March 1977 until his termination on June 20, 2002. During his employment, Mr. Harmon was represented by the defendant unions, United Mine Workers of America International, District 17 and Local No. 5396 (collectively, "the union"). This lawsuit arises from the circumstances surrounding Mr. Harmon's termination.
On January 11, 2002, AEP issued a "last chance agreement" to Mr. Harmon, citing excessive absenteeism. This agreement indicated that Mr. Harmon would be terminated if he violated its conditions or other standards of conduct. On June 19, 2002, Mr. Harmon left work early, stating that he was ill. Representatives of AEP went to Mr. Harmon's home later that day and took him to a clinic to take an alcohol breath test. The test was not completed, a situation the plaintiff attributes to Mr. Harmon's physical condition. The following day, AEP discharged Mr. Harmon, indicating that he had "refused to cooperate in the administration of a reasonable cause alcohol test."
Mr. Harmon and the union initiated a grievance, which proceeded through the third step of the procedure outlined in the collective bargaining agreement.1 The third step, which is the final step before a grievance is referred to arbitration, was a meeting on July 15, 2002, attended by Mr. Harmon and representatives of the union and AEP. After the meeting, Mr. Harmon submitted a letter indicating his understanding that in exchange for his voluntary resignation, the company would not contest his claim for unemployment benefits. The union took no further action on this matter, and, before his death on January 14, 2003, Mr. Harmon did not initiate any internal union charges regarding the end of his employment or the union's processing of his grievance against AEP.
On June 18, 2004, the plaintiff, Mr. Harmon's widow, commenced this lawsuit, a hybrid action brought under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185. The plaintiff has since filed an amended complaint, adding state-law claims of wrongful termination, conspiracy and discrimination. The defendants move for dismissal or for summary judgment, challenging the plaintiff's standing and failure to exhaust internal union remedies and asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to the Section 301 claims.
To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court will not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Instead, the Court will draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
Although the Court will view all underlying facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party nonetheless must offer some "concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party has the burden of proof on an essential element of his or her case and does not make, after adequate time for discovery, a showing sufficient to establish that element. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The nonmoving party must satisfy this burden of proof by offering more than a mere "scintilla of evidence" in support of his or her position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
The parties disagree on many details, but there is no dispute as to any fact material to the dispositive issues in this case. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate. The plaintiff asserts claims involving state and federal law and the defendants raise multiple defenses they believe warrant judgment in their favor. In an effort to address the complex and overlapping issues in the clearest manner, the Court will first address the issue of whether the state-law claims are preempted by federal labor law. Then, the Court will consider the defendants' arguments regarding standing, the statute of limitations and exhaustion of union remedies.
The defendants contend that the plaintiff's state-law claims necessarily require interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement and are consequently preempted by federal labor law.
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act establishes federal jurisdiction over employment disputes covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985). Under the "well-pleaded complaint rule," federal courts have jurisdiction based on the existence of a federal question evident on the face of the plaintiff's complaint, not on the basis of any defense. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). The doctrine of complete preemption is an exception to this rule. See id. In complete preemption cases, "the pre-emptive force of a statute is so `extraordinary' that it `converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.'" Id. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987)). Thus, state "claims founded directly on rights created by the collective-bargaining agreement, and also claims `substantially dependent on analysis of a collective bargaining agreement'" are preempted by § 301 under the doctrine of complete preemption. Id. at 394, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (citing Electrical Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 859 n. 3, 107 S.Ct. 2161, 95 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987)). In that circumstance, "federal labor law principles ... must be employed to resolve the dispute." Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399, 406, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) (footnote omitted).
To determine whether the state-law claims should be preempted by § 301 under the complete preemption doctrine, the Court must analyze the elements of the individual causes of action. See id. at 406, 108 S.Ct. 1877; see also Salmons v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 F.Supp.2d 620, 624 (S.D.W.Va.1999)(citing McCormick v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 934 F.2d 531, 535 (4th Cir.1991)). The plaintiff has asserted three state-law claims, for wrongful termination, conspiracy and discrimination. If resolution of these claims requires interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, then the claims are preempted by § 301. See Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 211-212, 105 S.Ct. 1904.
The plaintiff's first state-law claim is for wrongful discharge. West Virginia follows the employment-at-will doctrine, meaning the relationship may be terminated at the will of the employer or employee for any reason, or for no reason. Wright v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co.,...
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