Harmon v. Lehman

Decision Date18 December 1888
Citation5 So. 197,85 Ala. 379
PartiesHARMON v. LEHMAN ET AL.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Appeal from chancery court, Montgomery county; THOMAS COLEMAN Chancellor.

A bill was filed by John F. Harmon against Lehman, Durr & Co. partners in trade as warehousemen and commission merchants in the city of Montgomery, and sought to enjoin a sale of lands under a mortgage, which the complainant and his wife had executed to the defendants, and for an account, and for the redemption of the lands so conveyed, charging at the same time usury. The defendants answered, denying the charge of usury, and by a cross-bill, regularly filed, asked for the foreclosure of the mortgage. On final hearing on the pleading and proof, the following opinion was delivered by Chancellor THOMAS W. COLEMAN:

"The case made by the bill is that Harmon Bros. borrowed money from Lehman, Durr & Co., to be used in the purchase of cotton, and gave their father, John F. Harmon, as security who signed the note, and executed a mortgage upon certain lands belonging to him, which are described in the bill, with the understanding that the money was to be used in the purchase of cotton, which, when sold, was to be applied to the payment of the mortgage debt. The bill further alleges that the loan was usurious. The bill alleges the purchase of cotton with the money, and asserts that, if the proceeds had been applied according to the agreement, the mortgage debt would be paid; and it concludes with an offer to pay any balance that might remain unpaid. Respondents admit that Harmon Bros. desired to borrow money, and their refusal to loan without security; also the execution of the note and mortgage, and the loan of $5,000; but they deny that the loan was to Harmon Bros., and deny that it was a part of their original agreement that the money was to be used in the purchase of cotton alone, or that the proceeds of the cotton purchased with the money was to be applied to the payment of the debt secured by the mortgage. They also deny any usurious intention in connection with the loan, and ask a foreclosure of the mortgage. This short statement presents the main points for consideration.

"Taking detached portions of the complainant's testimony, it may be that his proof sustains the case made by the bill; but considering his evidence as a whole, it is far from satisfying the court that he is entitled to all the relief asked for in the bill. In complainant's deposition T. B Harmon uses the following language: 'We stated to him [meaning John F. Harmon, their father] that we wanted to make arrangements for him to borrow some money, and for him to be responsible, or bind his lands for that amount, and let us have some money to buy some cotton; and that when we sold the cotton we would take up the mortgage. Our father said, that was all right.' Is there any reason why other portions of complainant's testimony should have more weight than this simple statement, which is so consistent with the entire transaction and proceedings from that time on, and with John F. Harmon's own conduct? He evidently understood that the money was borrowed in his name, or else why give the check to Harmon Brothers? If he understood that he was simply a surety, and Harmon Brothers the principals, by what process of reasoning could he come to the conclusion that the money was placed to his credit-a mere surety-by Lehman, Durr & Co. instead of to the credit of the principals? It may be said that equity looks at the real transaction of the parties as it was, and not as it appears to be. That may be true; but equity cannot prescribe the terms and securities upon which a man may lend his money, provided those terms do not contravene some statute or public policy; nor will a court of equity change those terms. As between John F. Harmon and his sons, he doubtless borrowed the money for them. He was willing to trust them. But as between the complainant, Harmon Brothers, and Lehman, Durr & Co., the latter evidently has the right to prescribe the terms of the loan. The note and mortgage bear date January 26, 1886. T. B. Harmon testifies that it was not signed until several days after this date, but was signed before the money was drawn by them. Why do we find them on the 3d February using this money for other purposes than to buy cotton, if it was to be used only in the purchase of cotton? Considering the whole evidence of the complainant together, it fails to impress the court favorably. It must not be understood that the conversations between John F. Harmon and Harmon Brothers, in the absence of Lehman, Durr & Co., or some member or agent of the firm, are considered by the court as legal evidence, or as binding upon them, unless communicated, and so as to have entered into the making the contract for the loan. Without pressing upon the question whether Harmon Brothers were the agents of Lehman, Durr & Co. in making the trade with the complainant, as insisted by him, we simply state that one who deals with an agent does so at his peril; and the proof does not sustain the claim that Harmon Brothers were authorized by respondents to make said contract. When the complainant's evidence is considered in connection with respondents' testimony, we cannot perceive any reason why complainant should have the proceeds of the cotton bought and paid for with the borrowed money, applied to the mortgage debt. The statement by Harmon Brothers that the respondents were directed to sell the 77 bales of cotton, and so apply the proceeds, is not sustained by the evidence; and the application made by them, as shown by the stated account rendered, to which there was no dissent, must be conclusive against Harmon Brothers. We think the complainant utterly fails to sustain this branch of his case. If there was any money in the hands of respondents, belonging to Harmon Brothers; or if the evidence established the fact that Lehman, Durr & Co. were properly chargeable with cotton, or the proceeds of cotton, for which they have not accounted, after the payment of any balance that might be due them from Harmon Brothers, such money should be credited on the debt secured by the mortgage, of January 26, 1886.

"Let us now consider the question of usury. If, upon consideration of all the circumstances, it should appear that the language used or the stipulations made 'were a mere devise to evade the statute against usury, to conceal the real intent the mere form will not relieve the contract from the consequences of usury.' Swilley v. Lyon, 18 Ala. 552, per DARGAN, C.J. 'The intent is the test. Was it intended to compensate for risk, trouble, or expense incurred at the request of the debtor? or was it intended to give the creditor additional profit for the loan of money?' Was it reasonably expected that the 500 bales of cotton could be delivered by the Harmons? If not, Lehman, Durr & Co. could as easily have contracted for the payment of so much money as interest, as for the storage and commissions. Uhlfelder v. Carter's Adm'r, 64 Ala. 532. Did the respondents make the heavy outlay of $25,000 or $30,000, annually, in running their business as warehousemen, and in order to meet this expense, and to promote their interest as commission merchants, loan money and require a shipment of so much as ten bales on the $100 loaned? The witness Roman states and repeats that this expense is estimated and provided for after the money is loaned. He says: 'We regulate the fall business by the advances made in the spring. We engage such force as we think necessary from the amount of money advanced in the spring. The arrangements are made by May the 1st, for we can tell by that time how much cotton we can handle.' We do not think that a contract made in the spring, which is at the time usurious, can be purged of the taint of usury, because respondents incur large expense to enable them to carry out their part of the usurious contract. They contract to loan a man $100, for which he is to pay them eight per cent. interest, and, in addition thereto, make him agree to ship them bales of coton worth $400, or, in default thereof, pay as liquidated damages an amount equal to fifty cents per bale storage, and one and a half per cent. commissions; amounting to eleven per cent. additional to the legal rate; total interest, nineteen per cent. A shipment of three bales would pay the interest on the $100, yet the borrower is required to ship seven more bales; storage on the extra seven bales, $3.50; commissions, $4.20; total extra payments, $7.70,-or nearly double legal interest. This is usury, unless it be held that the expense incurred to serve the business of warehousemen and commissions merchants frees the contract from usury. Can this be done, when the facts are as stated by Mr. Roman? 'We regulate the expense after the money is loaned.' But, under the facts of this case, could Lehman, Durr & Co. have reasonably expected the shipment of 500 bales of cotton from the Harmons, including the cotton to be made by John F. Harmon? They did business with John F. Harmon & Son in 1884, and with all of them in 1885. They had very accurate information as to the means of these persons. In January, 1886, Harmon Brothers were not able to meet their past liabilities, and Lehman, Durr & Co. refused to lend them money, or to do business longer without security. Respondents were reasonably advised that from thirty to fifty bales was the extent of John F. Harmon's ability to ship. From what source was the 500 bales to come, which, at forty dollars per bale, required an outlay of $20,000? Respondents say that Harmon Brothers were to buy out some merchant or business at Union Springs. But how were they to buy out this large business? They were not then able to pay their indebtedness to Lehman, Durr &...

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  • Cohen v. District of Columbia National Bank, Civ. A. No. 2110-69.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • March 27, 1974
    ...and Usury, § 170. 62 See, e. g., Walker v. The Transportation Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 150, 18 L.Ed. 172 (1865). 63 Harmon v. Lehman, 85 Ala. 379, 5 So. 197 (1888). 64 45 Am.Jur.2d, Interest and Usury, § 170 (footnotes omitted). See also 25 C.J.S. Customs and Usages § 19(b). As to the 360-day......
  • Patillo v. Allen-West Commission Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • April 11, 1901
    ... ... all the facts and circumstances, whether the contract was not ... usurious. Cockle v. Flack, 93 U.S. 344, 23 L.Ed ... 949; Harmon v. Lehman, 85 Ala. 384, 5 So. 197, 2 ... L.R.A. 589; McKenzie v. Garnett, 78 Ga. 257; ... Shattuck v. Clark (Tex. Civ. App.) 34 S.W. 404; ... ...
  • First National Bank of Hailey v. Glenn
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    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • June 22, 1904
    ... ... P. 779; Fidelity Sav. Assn. v. Shea, 6 Idaho 405, 55 ... P. 1022. And for other authorities along the same line see ... Harmon v. Lehman, 85 Ala. 379, 5 So. 379, 2 L. R. A ... 589; 27 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1st ed., 1009 (bonus added ... to interest), 1017 (rents), and ... ...
  • Gage v. J.F. Smyth Mercantile Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • February 17, 1908
    ... ... other. To the same effect are the cases of Patillo v ... Allen-West Commission Co., 108 F. 723, 47 C.C.A. 637; ... Harman v. Lehman, 85 Ala. 384, 5 So. 197, 2 L.R.A ... 589; McKenzie v. Garnett, 78 Ga. 257; Shattuck ... v. Clark (Tex. Civ. App.) 34 S.W. 404; Uhlfelder v ... ...
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