Harmon v. Louisiana

Decision Date10 October 2014
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 14-1403 SECTION "E"(2)
PartiesELDRIDGE J. HARMON v. STATE OF LOUISIANA ET AL.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Eldridge J. Harmon filed the captioned suit pro se and in forma pauperis against the Vermilion Parish Clerk of Records; two private corporations, which he identifies only as Precision Holding and St. Mary Energy; and the State of Louisiana Secretary of the State Archives. Harmon alleges that "agencies representing the State of Louisiana have acted in concert to deny and deprive plaintiff of protected constitutional statutory rights." Record Doc. No. 1 (Complaint at p. 1) (emphasis added).

Specifically, plaintiff's complaint asserts the following:

My great-grandfather whose name was Samuel N. Huntsberry was donated a land grant for agricultural purposes by President Theodore Roosevelt which was recorded in Vermilion Parish dated April 29, 1893 and recorded in the office of Department of the Interior dated December 18, 1907. That transaction was also deposited in the General Land Office according to an Act of Congress on the 25th day of May, 1908. In the Vermilion Parish court of records, at Abbeville, Louisiana, the Huntsberry family [name?] was changed 4 (four) times through fraud and schemes.
To the best of my recollection, sometimes (sic) in the early 1980's, I attempted to tour that land that I heard belonged to my ancestors and ran across a sign which read "Restricted Area" and an oil drilling rig was set in place and they were drilling - so I went in another way and viewed the land.
On the oil well identifies those that are trespassing on the Huntsberry land are: Precision Holding . . . ; and TACO . . . ; and St. Mary Energy . . . . At the presenttime, they are still pumping oil and gas that they have not gotten permission to drill in the first place.
Plaintiff demands the following relief:
[W]henever the defendants are ordered to compensate plaintiff, Eldridge J. Harmon and co-heirs, plaintiff asks the court to have such monies placed into an interest bearing account . . . with plaintiff being the only person to draw from that account. Such a deposit will protect plaintiff from further fraud and swindles as plaintiff's social security . . . have been exposed many times to the extent that plaintiff does not know who have (sic) access to that personal number. Plaintiff is trying to protect my identity, I demand that this court also permit plaintiff to create a nonprofit account in the name of plaintiff's founder and Dean of the Institute of Devine Metaphysical Research whose name is Henry C. Kinley and the name of the account should read: "The Henry C. Kinles (sic) Fortune Foundation" and only [plaintiff] is to be allowed to draw from that account. Such an account is to be tax-exempt and protected from fraud and swindlers.

Id. (Complaint at pp. 2-3).

Although plaintiff requested in his complaint that he be permitted to supplement his complaint "for purpose of serving TACO; and to incorporate others who have violated plaintiff's constitutional rights," his amended complaint filed in this matter on July 1, 2014, named no new defendants.

Harmon appears to seek both injunctive relief and compensatory damages. In his original complaint, he states that "whenever defendants are ordered to compensate plaintiff," he "will invest moneys [apparently sought to be obtained via this lawsuit] to our president to help with health care . . . and to create jobs for the deprived unemployed." Id. (Complaint at p. 3) (emphasis added). Plaintiff's amended complaint "demands that this court restrain the defendants from continuing to profit off the Huntsberry land without affording plaintiff and co-heirs . . . due compensation" andasserts that he will "present further proof as to who are (sic) operating on said land while other residents are also trespassing . . . ." Id. (Complaint at p. 4) (emphasis added); Record Doc. No. 7 (Amended Complaint).

About one month after filing, the case was referred to me by the presiding district judge for purposes of evaluating whether it should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Record Doc. No. 17.

ANALYSIS
I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A pro se complaint filed in forma pauperis shall be dismissed "at any time" if the court determines that it is frivolous, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint is frivolous "if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact." Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998); Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994). The law "'accords judges . . . the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.'" Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown), Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).

"'A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.'" Davis, 157 F.3d at 1005 (quoting McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997)). "When a complaint raises an arguable questionof law which the district court ultimately finds is correctly resolved against the plaintiff, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate . . . ." Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 269 (5th Cir. 1992). An in forma pauperis complaint which is legally frivolous, fails to state a claim or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief may be dismissed sua sponte at any time under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

In this case, construing plaintiff's submissions broadly,1 I find that he attempts to state the following four causes of action, two under federal law and two under state law: (1) a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his constitutional rights, apparently for deprivation of property rights without due process, Record Doc. No. 1 (Complaint at p. 4); (2) a federal civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), based upon defendants' allegedly fraudulent interstate commerce activities, Record Doc. No. 8 (Motion for TRO at p. 2); (3) a fraud claim under state law, id. at p. 3; and (4) a state law trespass claim, Record Doc. No. 7 (Amended Complaint at p. 1).

I find that plaintiff's federal claims must be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), either as legally frivolous because they lack an arguable basis in law, or under Rule 12(b)(6), or because they seek relief from defendants who are immune. The complaint, as amended, fails to state a cognizable federal claim under the broadest reading and seeksdamages from two defendants who are immune from such relief. In addition, no valid basis for federal jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims has been stated in the complaint, and the state law claims must therefore be dismissed without prejudice.

II. FEDERAL CLAIMS
(A) Two (2) Defendants Are Not State Actors

Harmon's federal Section 1983 claims against defendants Precision Holding and St. Mary Energy are based on his allegations that defendants are responsible for the deprivation of certain constitutional rights arising from their unauthorized and uncompensated use of his property for oil and gas production activities. No such liability conceivably exists under Section 1983 against these two defendants.

Specifically, Precision Holding and St. Mary Energy cannot be liable to Harmon under Section 1983 because under no circumstances can these private business entities and/or their general counsel be considered state actors as a matter of law for Section 1983 purposes in light of the allegations made by plaintiff in this complaint. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Small v. Dallas Cnty., 170 F. App'x 943, 2006 WL 925500, at *1 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 873 (5th Cir. 1996); Mills v. Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 3, 837 F.2d 677, 679 (5th Cir. 1988)).

"'Federal question jurisdiction under [28 U.S.C.] § 1331 extends to cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantialquestion of federal law.'" Williams v. EDCare Mgmt., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-278, 2008 WL 4755744, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2008) (quoting Frank v. Bear Stearns & Co., 128 F.3d 919, 922 (5th Cir. 1997)). Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). Because plaintiff fails to state a cognizable Section 1983 claim upon which federal question subject matter jurisdiction might be based, his federal claim must be dismissed.

Only state action in violation of an individual's constitutional rights may serve as the basis for a cognizable Section 1983 claim. Although Harmon has named the State of Louisiana Secretary of the State Archives as a defendant, the transactions upon which he bases his claims arise from purely private commercial activities. Plaintiff makes no allegations in this lawsuit against any individual state officials acting in any capacity.

"To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." James v. Tex. Collin Cnty., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added)....

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