Harnden v. Croswell-Lexington Cmty. Sch.
| Decision Date | 11 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:15-cv-12738 |
| Parties | ROBERT LANCE HARNDEN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CROSWELL-LEXINGTON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
I. RECOMMENDATION: The Court should grant Crosswell-Lexington Community Schools, Dr. Kevin Miller, and superintendent Julie Western's (collectively, the "School Defendants") motion to dismiss. This action should be dismissed with prejudice as to the adult Plaintiffs and without prejudice as to the minor Plaintiff, Sara Marie Harnden.
II. REPORT
The caption of the complaint identifies the Plaintiffs as Robert Lance Harnden and Pamela Suzanne Harnden, "individually and on behalf of their then- minor children" (Robert Lance Harnden II, Darren Jonathan Harnden, Nathan David Harnden, and Sara Marie Harnden). It was ostensibly filed by both Lance and Pamela Harnden on August 5, 2015, bringing claims of kidnapping, civil rights violations, and gross negligence. (DE 1.) They are proceeding without the assistance of counsel. In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the School Defendants inappropriately complied with Child Protective Service ("CPS") workers by restricting their children's movement, and thereby kidnapping the children. Plaintiffs assert that the investigation led to the eight children living with the Harndens being removed from their Michigan home without following the proper procedures. Four of the eight children (the named Plaintiffs in this action) were later returned to the Harnden's home.
Plaintiffs ask the Court to award damages of $2,500,000 for the parents and $1,500,000 for each of the four children returned to their home. (DE 1 at 13.) Throughout the complaint, first person plural pronouns are used, (e.g., "we" and "our"); however the sole signatory on the cover page, at the end of the pleading, and on the Civil Cover Sheet is Pamela Harnden. (DE 1 at 1, 14, and 15.)1
The School Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on September 9, 2015. (DE 11.) Theyassert that Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for three reasons. First, they contend that Plaintiff's action is barred by the applicable three year statutes of limitations for actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for gross negligence actions in the State of Michigan. Second, they argue that since they could not have violated Plaintiffs' rights by complying with a CPS investigation in accordance with Michigan law, Plaintiffs have therefore failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Finally, the School Defendants assert that they are entitled to immunity for their alleged actions in this case.
Plaintiffs oppose the motion. (DE 14 and 16.)2 In their responses, they argue that their claims are not barred by any statute of limitations because the crime of kidnapping has no limitations period. Further, they argue that the School Defendants were not required to comply with the CPS investigation. Finally, Plaintiffs assert that the School Defendants were grossly negligent, and therefore are not entitled to immunity.
The School Defendants filed a reply on September 30, 2015. (DE 18.) They assert that the kidnapping statute upon which Plaintiff relies is a criminal statute, and is thus irrelevant to the applicable statute of limitations in this civil matter.
Plaintiffs filed an unsolicited sur-reply on October 7, 2015, in which they reiterate that there is no statute of limitations for kidnapping. (DE 19.) The brief was filed in violation of Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(d)(1)(A), as well as my practice guidelines, which state that Motion Practice Guideline, available at https://www.mied.uscourts.gov/index.cfm?pageFunction=chambers&judgeid=51. Accordingly, by separate order, Plaintiffs' sur-reply brief has been stricken from the record and was not considered for the purposes of deciding this motion. (DE 25.)
The only non-School Defendant, police officer Ken Western, filed a motion to dismiss on September 2, 2015. (DE 8.) On March 14, 2016, I entered a report and recommendation that Defendant Ken Western's motion to dismiss be granted in part and denied in part. (DE 22.) Specifically, I concluded that the adult Plaintiffs' claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, while the minor Plaintiff's claims could be saved by Michigan's infancy saving statute. Areview of Plaintiffs' complaint revealed the following approximate ages of the Harnden children: Nicole S. Harnden is approximately 20, Sara Marie Harnden is approximately 14, Robert Lance Harnden is approximately 22, and Darren Jonathan Harnden is approximately 20. Accordingly, the only remaining minor in this action is Sara Marie Harnden. As to Sara Marie Harnden's claims, I concluded that she be given additional time in which to obtain counsel or to dismiss her claims voluntarily to bring them at an appropriate time in the future.
In the instant report, in light of new briefing which focused the Court's attention on the Michigan infancy saving statute, I instead conclude that while all of the adult parties' claims still should be dismissed with prejudice, Sara Harnden's claims should simply be dismissed at this time without prejudice to refiling between her 18th and 19th birthdays. In other words, I no longer conclude that she should be given additional time to obtain counsel at present, as she is not eligible to refile until she reaches her 18th birthday.
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must "construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff and accept all allegations as true." Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2012). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausibleon its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation omitted); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (). Facial plausibility is established "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant's conduct." 16630 Southfield Ltd., P'Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).
Furthermore, the Court holds pro se complaints to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, even in pleadings drafted by pro se parties, '"courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted."' Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App'x 975, 976-77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)). Furthermore, Rogers v. Detroit Police Dept., 595 F.Supp.2d 757, 766 (E.D. Mich. 2009) ().3
As addressed above, the School Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed because it is time-barred, because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and because Defendants are protected by various immunities. Because I conclude that this action can be disposed of on the basis of the statute of limitations alone, I will not address Defendants' additional arguments.
As best as the Court can discern, Plaintiff brings constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as a state-law claim for gross negligence. As addressed in my report and recommendation dated March 14, 2016, Plaintiff does not specify in her complaint that this action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE 22.) However, the causes of action raised in the complaint involve the deprivation of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution andlaws, and such an action is properly brought pursuant to § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For example, Plaintiff notes that it is her belief "that the very nature of the act of kidnapping violates [her] rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution." (DE 1 at 6.) In addition, she notes that the actions of Defendants violate the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights of her son. (Id. at 4.) Accordingly, the Court will construe this action as one brought pursuant to § 1983.
Plaintiffs' argument that the Court should use the criminal statute of limitations in this civil case is unavailing. Neither 18 U.S.C. § 1201 nor Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.349 confer an express or implied private right of action. Brown v. Walsh, No. 12-10535, 2013 WL 173025, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 16, 2013) (); see also, generally, Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986) (). As such, Plaintiffs have no standing to bring a civil case under these...
To continue reading
Request your trial