Harned v. Evanston Mun. Officers Electoral Bd.
| Decision Date | 11 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-20-0314,1-20-0314 |
| Citation | 178 N.E.3d 1138,449 Ill.Dec. 287,2020 IL App (1st) 200314 |
| Parties | Allison HARNED, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EVANSTON MUNICIPAL OFFICERS ELECTORAL BOARD; Its Members, in Their Official Capacities, Steve Hagerty, Devon Reid, and Ann Rainey; and Objectors Jane Grover, Kent Swanson, and Betty Hayford, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Pat Quinn and John W. Mauck, both of Chicago, for appellant.
Keri-Lyn J. Krafthefer and Daniel J. Bolin, of Ancel Glink, P.C., of Chicago, for appellees Evanston Municipal Officers Electoral Board, Steve Hagerty, Devon Reid, and Ann Rainey.
Peter M. Friedman, Hart M. Passman, and Jeffrey N. Monteleone, of Elrod Friedman LLP, of Chicago, for other appellees.
¶ 1 In this appeal, petitioner Allison Harned asks us to reverse the decision of the Evanston Electoral Board (the board), striking a proposed referendum from the March 17, 2020, ballot. The board, in a 2-to-1 decision, denied petitioner's motion to dismiss an objection petition filed by three objectors who sought to remove the referendum from the ballot. Then, in another 2-to-1 decision, the board sustained the two objections that had been raised against that proposed referendum appearing on the ballot. We affirm the board as to both rulings.
¶ 4 On December 16, 2019, petitioner and supporters filed with the office of the Evanston City Clerk a petition to place the "Evanston Voter's Initiative" (EVI) on the ballot for the upcoming March 17, 2020, election. The EVI states that it is brought pursuant to article I, section 5, and article VII, sections 6(a), 6(f), 6(i), 6(m), and 11 of the Illinois Constitution ( ; , and article 28 of the Election Code ( 10 ILCS 5/28-1 et seq. (West 2018)).
¶ 5 The EVI provides as follows:
¶ 6 On December 23, 2019, three objectors filed a petition raising two specific objections to the EVI: "1) it present[ed] a binding referendum question in violation of State law, and 2) the question presented in the Petition (the Referendum Question) w[ould] confuse voters."
¶ 8 Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the objectors' petition, on the basis that the objectors failed to state their interests as required by state law. After briefing, on January 15, 2020, the board voted 2-to-1 to deny the motion to dismiss. The board then considered the objections and, in another 2-to-1 decision, voted to sustain both objections and remove the EVI from the ballot. The circuit court affirmed the decision of the board, and following expedited briefing, this appeal is now before this court for review.
¶ 10 The circuit court issued an order on February 13, 2020, denying the petition for judicial review, affirming the decision of the board, and dismissing petitioner's action for mandamus with prejudice. Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal on February 18, 2020. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rules 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and 303 (eff. July 1, 2017), governing appeals from final judgments entered by the circuit court in civil cases.
¶ 12 We review the decision of the electoral board in this case, not that of the circuit court. Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board , 228 Ill. 2d 200, 209, 319 Ill.Dec. 887, 886 N.E.2d 1011 (2008). There are generally three types of questions we encounter on administrative review, each subject to a different level of deference to the board's decision. Id. at 210, 319 Ill.Dec. 887, 886 N.E.2d 1011. The board's findings and conclusions on questions of fact are deemed prima facie true and correct, and as a reviewing court, we will overturn these only where they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. In contrast, the board's decisions on questions of law are not binding, and this court's review is "independent and not deferential." Id. at 210-11, 319 Ill.Dec. 887, 886 N.E.2d 1011. Finally, on mixed questions of fact and law, where "the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard,’’ we ask whether the board's conclusion was ‘‘clearly erroneous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 211, 319 Ill.Dec. 887, 886 N.E.2d 1011. With these standards in mind, we now consider the board's decisions.
¶ 14 Before addressing the merits of the board's decision to remove the EVI from the ballot, petitioner raises two preliminary issues. First, petitioner argues that the board should have granted her motion to dismiss the objection petition and refused to consider the petition because the objectors did not properly state their interests, as required by state law. Second, petitioner argues that in sustaining these objections, the board improperly considered constitutional and legal issues that it had no authority or jurisdiction to decide.
¶ 15 As to the first issue, petitioner relies on section 10-8 of the Election Code, which provides as follows:
¶ 16 The objectors acknowledge that there is no language in their objection expressly stating their "interest" as objectors. Rather, they rely on the fact that their objection specifically states that they are "Evanston residents and registered voters" and that they object to the fact that the EVI violates state law and would confuse voters. According to the objectors, by stating their status as voters and residents and their concerns as to the legality and clarity of the proposed referendum, they have sufficiently stated their "interest" under section 10-8 of the Election Code. The board agreed and denied petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition on this basis.
¶ 17 Petitioner argues that the board made a legal error because the pleading requirements of section 10-8 are mandatory and are to be strictly construed. Petitioner cites this court's decisions in Pochie v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board , 289 Ill. App 3d 585, 588, 224 Ill.Dec. 697, 682 N.E.2d 258 (1997) —where we held that the "residence address requirement" for filing an objection under section 10-8 of the election code is mandatory—and Daniel v Daly , 2015 IL App (1st) 150544, ¶ 29, 391 Ill.Dec. 703, 31 N.E.3d 379 —where we sustained an electoral board decision requiring an objector to appear and make a "credible showing that there [was] a good-faith basis for the filed objection." Petitioner also relies on our supreme court's recent opinion in Jackson-Hicks v. East St. Louis Board of Election Commissioners , 2015 IL 118929, ¶ 32, 390 Ill.Dec. 1, 28 N.E.3d 170. In that case, our supreme court reversed an electoral board's decision recognizing that a mayoral candidate had an insufficient number of valid signatures on his nominating petition but, because the board found that there had been "substantial compliance," ordering the candidate's...
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