Harness v. Steele

• Decision Date: 10 October 1902
• Citation: 159 Ind. 286,64 N.E. 875
• Parties: HARNESS v. STEELE.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

159 Ind. 286

64 N.E. 875

HARNESS

v.STEELE.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Oct. 10, 1902.

Appeal from superior court, Howard county; Hiram Brownlee, Judge.

Action by Arthur Steele against Lewis W. Harness. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appealed to the appellate court. Transferred to supreme court under Act March 13, 1901. Affirmed.Harness & Vorhis and Bell & Perdum, for appellant. Blacklidge, Shirley & Wolf, for appellee.

JORDAN, J.

Appellee, a minor, by his next friend, sued appellant, the sheriff of Howard county, together with one Strubbs, to recover damages for false imprisonment. A trial before a jury resulted in a verdict against appellant for $400, and a finding in favor of the defendant Strubbs. Over appellant's motion for a new trial, wherein he assigns various reasons, the court rendered judgment on the verdict, from which appellant appealed to the appellate court. The appeal was transferred to this court under the act of March 13, 1901.

The first error argued by counsel for appellant is the overruling of the demurrer to the first paragraph of the amended complaint. This complaint consists of two paragraphs. The first, omitting the caption, is as follows: “Plaintiff, for his amended complaint, complains of the defendant, and says that on the 15th day of May, 1900, the defendant unlawfully imprisoned the plaintiff and deprived him of his liberty for the space of one hour, to his damage in the sum of $2,000, for which he demands judgment.” It is contended that this paragraph contains no facts to show that appellee was falsely imprisoned and deprived of his liberty, but consists merely of conclusions. While the paragraph is somewhat terse, it is an exact copy of the form given in 3 Works, Prac. p. 152. It may also be said that it substantially follows the averments in a form given in 1 Estes, Pl. & Forms, p. 561, with the exception that the latter form does not contain the word “unlawfully,” and states that the imprisonment was “without probable cause,” and also gives the place at which the plaintiff was imprisoned. The charge that “the defendants *** imprisoned the plaintiff and deprived him of his liberty for the space of one hour” is certainly not a mere conclusion of the pleader, but is a composite statement of an ultimate fact, the imprisonment of the plaintiff. The word “unlawful” is not essential, and may be omitted from the pleading, for the rule is settled in this state that a complaint for false imprisonment is sufficient without alleging that the act complained of was illegal, or wrongful, or that the arrest or imprisonment was without competent authority, or malicious, or without probable cause. Colter v. Lower, 35 Ind. 285, 9 Am. Rep. 735;Gallimore v. Ammerman, 39 Ind. 323;Boaz v. Tate, 43 Ind. 60. The paragraph in controversy is at least sufficient on demurrer. It might possibly have been open to the objection, upon a motion to make it more specific, that it did not state the venue where the alleged wrong was perpetrated by the defendants; but in respect to this question we do not decide.

The appellant answered in three paragraphs, the first being a general denial. A demurrer was sustained to the second, and of this ruling appellant complains. The paragraph was not one in confession and avoidance. It professed, in part, at least, to recite the circumstances surrounding the alleged arrest and imprisonment, but expressly averred that the defendant at no time or place arrested the plaintiff, and at no time deprived him of his liberty. If the paragraph, under its recitals and averments, can, on any view, be sustained as an answer, it must be upon the ground that it serves as a special denial. All of the facts, however, therein averred, so far as competent to constitute in any manner a defense to the action, were admissible under the general denial, which remained as a part of the answer; consequently it was not necessary to affirmatively plead them, and the ruling in sustaining the demurrer to the paragraph, under the circumstances, was harmless. Water Supply Co. v. Ritter, 146 Ind. 521, 45 N. E. 697.

There is a sharp conflict in the evidence in regard to some material points; nevertheless there is evidence to establish the following summary of facts: On May 14, 1900, E. H. Strubbs, appellant's codefendant below, was carrying on a harness shop in the city of Kokomo, Howard county, Ind. On that day a watch was stolen from his shop, and thereupon he made complaint to appellant, who was the sheriff of said county, and informed him that appellee frequently visited his harness shop, and stated to appellant that he thought appellee had taken the watch, as he had been at his place of business on the morning of the 14th, and that appellee knew that he (Strubbs) had the watch, because he had often looked at it when at the harness shop. Appellee was a boy about 14 years of age, an orphan residing in the family of one McBeth, in the city of Kokomo. He was a musician, and his standing in the community was good, and he was just beginning to rely for his support in teaching music. Appellant, on receiving the information mentioned, and after talking the matter over with Strubbs, proceeded, on the forenoon of May 15th, to hunt for appellee. After inquiring at several places for him, he finally found him at the home of one Stewart, in said city, and called him out of the house, and then and there informed him that he was the sheriff of the county, and had come to arrest him. Appellee inquired for what he was to be arrested, and was informed by appellant that he (appellee) knew what he had taken. Appellee denied that he had taken anything, and thereupon appellant informed him that a watch had been taken from Strubbs' harness shop, and that he (appellee) knew he had taken it. Appellee replied that he knew nothing about the watch being taken; that he had no need for the watch, as he had one of his own, which he took out and exhibited to appellant. Thereupon the latter took the watch away from him, and put it in his pocket, and stated to appellee to get his hat, and come with him. Upon being ordered to get his hat and go with appellant, appellee became excited and frightened, but did as he was bidden, and went along with appellant; the latter informing him that he wanted him to go with him to Strubbs' shop. They went together north along Main street, in the city of Kokomo, until they came opposite the county jail, and then appellant took appellee across the street to the jail building. Appellant then again said to him, “You don't know nothing about the watch?” and he replied that he did not. Thereupon appellant said to him: “If I have to lock you up, you will be in here for six weeks. I don't like to do a young man like this. If you don't own up, I will have to turn the keys. If I once turn the keys on you, you will be in here for six weeks.” Appellant denied this conversation, but admitted that he took appellee across the street to the jail, but gave as an excuse for so doing that he wanted to ascertain if his dinner was ready, it being then 11 o'clock. After leaving the jail building, appellee was taken by appellant to Strubbs' harness shop. In going to the shop they went along Main street past the offices of two justices of the peace, and also passed along near the vicinity of the mayor's office, but no offer or attempt was made to take him before either of the magistrates or the mayor. On the way to Strubbs' shop they went along and through the principal parts of the city, and passed and repassed a great many persons, and finally arrived at the harness shop. Appellee testified that when they reached the shop both Strubbs and appellant accused him of having taken the watch; Strubbs saying to him: “You know you took the watch, and you ought to tell where it is. I hate to have a boy up this way;” and further accused him of having taken a match safe,-all of which he denied. Appellee testified that when at the shop Strubbs and appellant told him that a prominent man passed the window of the shop at the time the watch was taken, and saw appellee take it. Appellant and Strubbs, at the latter's shop, had a conversation in a whisper with each other, after which appellant directed appellee to come along with him. They went together down along Washington, Main, and Walnut streets until they again reached the county jail, appellant continuing to say to appellee that if he did not tell where the watch was he would have to put him in jail, and, if he once put him in jail, he would be there for six weeks; and further said to him, “I don't like to turn the key on a boy.” Appellee continued to deny that he had taken the watch, or that he knew where it was, and thereupon appellant told him he was “lying.” After they had reached the jail the second time, appellant took appellee into the jail office, and then directed a young man who was present there to get him the key to the door opening into the cell rooms of the jail. He then unlocked and opened the iron door leading to the cells, and then said to appellee: “Now, what have you got to say? Back there is your cell.” Upon hearing appellant make this statement, appellee became frightened, and began to cry, but continued to assert his innocence. Appellant was informed at the jail that some friend of appellee had been there to see him. After he received this information, he told appellee he might go back to Stewart's house,-that being the place where he was when appellant found him,-saying to him: “You stay there until this evening, and I will come after you. Don't you go away at all.” After appellant let appellee go, he continued crying until he reached the home of Mr. Stewart. He informed Mr. Stewart of his arrest, and the latter went to the jail, and saw appellant in regard to the trouble. Stewart testified on the trial that appellant told him that appellee had been accused of stealing a watch, and that he had arrested him, and taken him to the...