Harnett v. Chislett

• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama
• Writing for the Court: JEFFREY U. BEAVERSTOCK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Citation: Harnett v. Chislett, 487 F.Supp.3d 1270 (S.D. Ala. 2020)
• Decision Date: 20 August 2020
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:19-00232-JB-MU
• Parties: Cathleen Chislett HARNETT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ESTATE OF John William CHISLETT, deceased, Defendant.

487 F.Supp.3d 1270

Cathleen Chislett HARNETT, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.ESTATE OF John William CHISLETT, deceased, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:19-00232-JB-MU

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division.

Signed August 20, 2020

Deena Renee Tyler, Joseph Michael Druhan, Jr., Druhan Tyler LLC, Megan Brooks Comer, MBC Law, LLC, Mobile, AL, for Plaintiffs.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JEFFREY U. BEAVERSTOCK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This Memorandum Opinion follows the Court's Order (Doc. 26) granting intervenor Defendant Sally M. Chislett's ("SMC") Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons stated herein, the Court concludes that it is without subject-matter jurisdiction based on the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction and on the separate ground that Plaintiffs lack standing.

I. BACKGROUND

This is an action pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. (Doc. 1 at 2). Plaintiffs ask the Court, inter alia , to declare divorce decrees invalid. Diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C § 1332, is the sole basis of federal jurisdiction. (Id. ).

A. The Underlying Probate Action

Plaintiffs bring this case in aid of a pending state court action. Specifically, this case "arises out of an underlying action filed in the Probate Court of Baldwin County, Alabama," styled Estate of John William Chislett, deceased , Baldwin County Probate Case Number 36164 ("Probate Action"). (See Complaint at ¶ 10 (Doc. 1)). SMC instituted the Probate Action and filed a Petition to Probate the "Last Will and Testament Annexed" of John William Chislett ("JW Chislett"). (Id. at 2 – 3). SMC alleges she was JW Chislett's third wife and is his surviving spouse. (Id. at 3 ). Plaintiffs in the instant action are children of JW Chislett and his first wife, Carol Ann Wagner ("Wagner"). They have appeared in the Probate Action and filed a petition contesting probate on grounds that SMC exercised undue influence. (Id. ). Plaintiffs also moved to dismiss the Probate Action on grounds that SMC lacks standing. (Id. ). The Baldwin County Probate Judge, however, is unwilling to proceed with the Probate Action until determinations are made concerning the validity of JW Chislett's "multiple marriages/divorces." (Id. ). The Probate Judge transferred the Probate Action to an administrative docket pending theses determinations. (Doc. 5 at 3).

The purported "multiple marriages/divorces" for which the Baldwin County Probate Judge requires determination include:

(i) JW Chislett's marriage to Wagner in New York in 1958, and a divorce decree entered in the Dominican Republic in 1974;

(ii) JW Chislett's marriage to his second wife, Jane Yang Chislett ("JYC") in New Hampshire in 1977, and their Agreement of Divorce signed in Taiwan in 1982; and

(iii) JW Chislett's marriage to SMC in 1986.

(Doc. 1).

B. The Instant Action

The "Estate of John William Chislett, deceased," i.e. the Probate Action, is the only defendant Plaintiffs name in this action. (Doc. 1, ¶3). Plaintiffs name SMC, Wagner, and JYC as "Relief Part[ies]." (Id. at 2). SMC intervened as a party-defendant. (Doc. 15). Plaintiffs seek only declaratory relief and invoke diversity jurisdiction exclusively. Their challenges of the subject divorces or marriages are not based on any federal right, statute or constitutional provision.

Plaintiffs ask this Court to declare whether the subject marriages and divorces are valid or invalid, so that the Baldwin County Probate Court will proceed with the underlying Probate Action. Plaintiffs argue their parents’ divorce (Wagner and JW Chislett) in 1974 is invalid, and therefore that their marriage is "still valid." (Id. at 7 - 9). SMC responds that her 1986 marriage to JW Chislett is valid, and they remained married until his death in 2018. (Doc. 5). SMC also alleges she and JW Chislett had two children, both of whom are beneficiaries under JW Chislett's Will awaiting administration in the Probate Action. (Id. ). Plaintiffs are not named in the Will. The Complaint includes a count for a "Declaration of Marriage" between JW Chislett and Wagner, and an alternative count for a "Declaration of Marriage" between JW Chislett and JYC. (Doc. 1 at 7 - 10). The Complaint also asks this Court to declare the marriage of JW Chislett and SMC invalid. (Id. at 10).

Plaintiffs contend they stand to inherit from JW Chislett's estate in the Probate Action if either of JW Chislett's divorces (from Wagner or JYC) is declared invalid, "because then [JW Chislett's] purported marriage to [SMC] will be invalid." (Doc. 18 at 2). Plaintiffs note the unwillingness of the Baldwin County Probate Judge to proceed, but they offer no legal reason or argument why these declarations are necessary to or would affect their pending challenge to the probate of JW Chislett's Will in the Probate Action.

In her Motion to Dismiss the instant action, SMC argues that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge JW Chislett's previous divorces because Plaintiffs are not parties to the divorces and had no legally protected interest at the time of the divorces. (Doc. 5). Plaintiffs respond that JW Chislett's divorces are facially invalid, and their potential inheritance and rights in the Probate Action constitute "protected interests." (Doc. 18 at 2). Plaintiffs represent that if non-parties to a divorce have rights that would be affected if a divorce is declared invalid, courts "routinely" find those non-parties to "have a personal right and, thus, standing to collaterally attack the decree." (Id. ).

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Domestic Relation Exception

"Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 is subject to a judicially created exemption for domestic relations and probate cases." Rash v. Rash , 173 F.3d 1376, 1380 (11th Cir. 1999). See also, Alliant Tax Credit 31 v. Murphy , 924 F.3d 1134, 1138 (11th Cir. 2019) ("The federal judiciary has traditionally abstained from deciding cases concerning domestic relations.")

(quoting Ingram v. Hayes , 866 F.2d 368, 369 (11th Cir. 1988) ).

The Court recognizes that the "domestic relations exception" is not an "absolute rule," and is to be "narrowly confined." Rash , 173 F.3d at 1380. Courts should abstain from exercising jurisdiction "only when hearing the claim would require the court to delve into the parties’ domestic affairs." Id. (citing Ingram , 866 F.2d at 370 ). The United States Supreme Court, in reaffirming the domestic relations exception in Ankenbrandt v. Richards , explained that the domestic relations exception does not apply to "cases arising from the domestic relations of persons unless they seek the granting or modification of a divorce or alimony decree. " 504 U.S. 689, 698, 112 S.Ct. 2206, 119 L.Ed.2d 468 (1992) (emphasis added). After Ankenbrandt , the Supreme Court "clarified that only ‘divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees’ remain outside federal jurisdictional bounds." Marshall v. Marshall , 547 U.S. 293, 308, 126 S.Ct. 1735, 164 L.Ed.2d 480 (2006) (quoting Ankenbrandt , 504 U.S. at 703–04, 112 S.Ct. 2206 ).

In analyzing the application of the domestic relations exception, courts should "sift through the claims of the complaint to determine the true character of the dispute to be adjudicated," while keeping the policies favoring abstention "in mind." Kirby v. Mellenger , 830 F.2d 176, 178 (11th Cir. 1987). The Eleventh Circuit has made clear that a claim requiring the review or modification of a divorce decree is subject to the domestic relations exception, "even when the plaintiff couches the claim in other terms." McCavey v. Barnett , 629 F.App'x 865, 867 (11th Cir. 2015). See also, Campbell v. Friend of the Court , 2016 WL 750215, at *2, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23039, at *5 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2016) ("Where the relief that is sought is simply to consider the propriety of an element of the state court's divorce decree, federal courts must abstain." (citing Ingram , 866 F.2d at 370 )).

The true character of Plaintiffs’ claims is clear. Plaintiffs ask the Court to declare JW Chislett's divorce from Wagner, and alternatively his divorce from JYC, invalid. These declarations are in turn necessary to Plaintiffs’ claims for a declaration that the marriage between JW Chislett and SMC is invalid. Plaintiffs’ claims fit squarely within the letter of domestic relations exception. See Ankenbrandt , 504 U.S. at 698, 112 S.Ct. 2206.

This case is materially distinguishable from cases finding the domestic relations exception inapplicable when the true character of the subject claims was in tort or contract. For example, in Stone v. Wall , the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found the domestic relations exception inapplicable to claims for "damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees" incurred in connection with recovering a minor child. 135 F.3d 1438, 1440 (11th Cir. 1998). The defendants in Stone were "a grandmother, aunt, and their lawyer" who abducted plaintiff's child. Id. at 1441. There was no decree awarding custody to defendants. Id. The Court concluded that the case was "just a tort suit for money damages." Id.

The Court applied a similar analysis in Alliant Tax Credit 31 , in which plaintiffs claimed that a divorce settlement and related asset transfers "were ruses to evade" a debt owed to plaintiffs. 924 F.3d at 1138. The action in Alliant Tax Credit was brought under a state fraudulent transfer act to void the asset transfers made pursuant to the divorce settlement. Id. The Court affirmed the district court's refusal to apply the domestic relations exception, because plaintiffs’ claims "did nothing more than ‘charge[ ] Defendants with a tort.’ " Id. at 1146. See also Ankenbrandt , 504 U.S. at 704, 112 S.Ct. 2206 (finding the domestic relations exception inapplicable because the "lawsuit in no way [sought a divorce, alimony or child custody] decree; rather, it allege[d] that [defendants] committed torts.").

The Court further recognizes the domestic relations exception "does not - at least, ordinarily - include third ...