Harnischfeger Corp. v. Labor and Industry Review Com'n, Nos. 93-0947
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin |
| Writing for the Court | STEINMETZ |
| Citation | 539 N.W.2d 98,196 Wis.2d 650 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 93-0947 |
| Decision Date | 24 October 1995 |
| Parties | HARNISCHFEGER CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Petitioner, v. LABOR AND INDUSTRY REVIEW COMMISSION, Defendant-Co-Appellant-Petitioner, Guenther Gieske, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. HARNISCHFEGER CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Petitioner, v. LABOR AND INDUSTRY REVIEW COMMISSION, Defendant-Co-Appellant-Petitioner, Edward Bohn, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. HARNISCHFEGER CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Petitioner, v. LABOR AND INDUSTRY REVIEW COMMISSION, Defendant-Co-Appellant-Petitioner, Emmerich Drawitsch, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. to 93-0949. |
Page 98
v.
LABOR AND INDUSTRY REVIEW COMMISSION,
Defendant-Co-Appellant-Petitioner,
Guenther Gieske, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.
HARNISCHFEGER CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Petitioner,
v.
LABOR AND INDUSTRY REVIEW COMMISSION,
Defendant-Co-Appellant-Petitioner,
Edward Bohn, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.
HARNISCHFEGER CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Petitioner,
v.
LABOR AND INDUSTRY REVIEW COMMISSION,
Defendant-Co-Appellant-Petitioner,
Emmerich Drawitsch, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.
Decided Oct. 24, 1995.
Page 100
[196 Wis.2d 655] For the defendants-appellants-petitioners there were briefs by David L. Weir and Zubrensky, Padden, Horwitz & Weir, Milwaukee, and oral argument by David L. Weir.
For the defendant-co-appellant-petitioner the cause was argued by Richard Briles Moriarty, Assistant Attorney General, with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, Attorney General.
For the plaintiff-respondent-cross petitioner there were briefs by Thomas M. Rohe and Otjen, Van Ert, Stangle, Lieb & Weir, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Thomas M. Rohe.
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Michael H. Gillick and Murphy, Gillick, Wicht, & Prachthauser, Milwaukee, for Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers.
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Philip Lehner and Capwell & Berthelsen, Brookfield, for Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce.
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Joseph R. Long, II and Relles, Meeker & Borns and Betsy J. Abramson and Elder Law Center, all of Madison, for Elder Law Center of the Coalition of Wisconsin Aging Groups.
STEINMETZ, Justice.
This is a review of a decision of the court of appeals affirming an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee county, Richard G. Harvey, Jr., Reserve Judge, which concluded that the Labor and Industry Relations Commission's (LIRC) interpretation of Wis.Stat. § 102.555(8) (1993-94) 1 directly contravenes [196 Wis.2d 656] the plain language of the statute and was therefore not to be granted deference. We conclude that LIRC's interpretation does not contravene the plain language of the statute because § 102.555(8) is ambiguous. Since LIRC's interpretation is otherwise reasonable, it should have been accorded the appropriate deference. As such, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
Guenther Gieske, Edward Bohn and Emmerich Drawitsch all suffered hearing loss during the course of their employment with Harnischfeger Corporation. It is undisputed, however, that each had prior, though less severe, hearing loss before they began their employment with Harnischfeger.
LIRC determines compensation awards for hearing loss by looking to the various subsections of Wis.Stat. § 102.555. Specifically germane to this case is subsection (8) which discusses the treatment of hearing loss occurring prior to employment. It reads:
102.555 Occupational deafness; definitions.
....
(8) An employer is liable for the entire occupational deafness to which his or her employment has contributed; but if previous deafness is established by a hearing test or other competent evidence, whether or not the employe was exposed to noise within the 2 months preceding such test, the employer is not liable for previous loss so established nor is the employer liable for any loss for which compensation has previously been paid or awarded.
LIRC has historically taken the position that the same definition which is applied to the
Page 101
phrase "occupational deafness" in this subsection should also be applied to the phrase "previous deafness." Wisconsin Statutes § 102.555(1), the applicable definitional subsection, defines "occupational deafness" as "loss of hearing," but [196 Wis.2d 657] does not specifically define "previous deafness." For further guidance, LIRC appropriately looked to the administrative code for an interpretation of "loss of hearing." The Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations (DILHR), through proper administrative rule-making procedures, determined 40 years ago that loss of hearing is not compensable under Wisconsin's Worker's Compensation Act until a person has suffered a loss exceeding 30 decibels. 2 See Wis.Admin.Code § Ind 80.25.LIRC applied this definition to both "occupational deafness" and "previous deafness" in determining the compensation awards of Gieske, Bohn and Drawitsch. Harnischfeger petitioned, under Wis.Stat. § 102.555, for judicial review of LIRC's decisions. The circuit court found that LIRC's methodology held employers responsible for all hearing loss between 0 and 30 decibels even if such loss was not caused by employment. Although the trial court recognized that deference to LIRC was otherwise appropriate, it held that LIRC's interpretation contravened the clear meaning of the statute. As such, it did not accept LIRC's interpretation, but instead applied Harnischfeger's proposed formula in determining the awards. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's holding that LIRC's formula was invalid since it directly contravened the words of the [196 Wis.2d 658] statute, but disagreed with its methodology. See Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 184 Wis.2d 227, 230, 517 N.W.2d 193, 195 (Ct.App.1994). It went on to determine the employees' awards under an entirely different formula. See id.
In order to understand why this seemingly straightforward exercise of agency discretion so concerned the courts below, it is necessary to briefly discuss how LIRC's methodology works in practice. According to LIRC, an employee is not compensated for the first 30 decibels of loss of hearing. For every decibel loss above 30, however, an employee is considered to have 1.6 percent occupational deafness. 3 The percentages increase at a rate of 1.6 percent per decibel up to a maximum of a 93 decibel loss. At this point the person is considered to have reached 100 percent occupational deafness. See Wis.Admin.Code § Ind 80.25. For example, an employee who starts work with a 25 decibel loss and leaves work with a 40 decibel loss is compensated for the entire loss over 30 by his employer, 10 decibels, which equates to 16 percent occupational deafness. This is regardless of whether the...
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Masri v. State, No. 2012AP1047.
...and consistency in the application of the statute.UFE Inc., 201 Wis.2d at 284, 548 N.W.2d 57 (quoting Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis.2d 650, 660, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995)). Under great weight deference, the reviewing court will not overturn an agency's reasonable interpretation that does ......
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Clean Wisconsin v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMM'N, No. 2004AP3179.
...Id., s 32 (quoting UFE, Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 284, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996) (in turn quoting Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 660, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995))). s 40. However, the appropriate test for great weight deference is not whether the agency has "decided a case pres......
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Bank v. Guar. Financial, No. 2010AP729.
...and made based on the agency's expertise in the interests[334 Wis.2d 208] of uniformity and consistency. See Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis.2d 650, 660–62, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995). ¶ 62 We see no reason that we should be less deferential in the preemption context, because as a general ma......
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Hilton v. Department of Natural Resources, No. 2003AP3353.
...the statute. See majority op., ¶ 15; UFE, Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis.2d 274, 284, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996) (quoting Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis.2d 650, 660, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995)); Sea View Estates Beach Club, Inc. v. DNR, 223 Wis.2d 138, 148-49, 588 N.W.2d 667 (Ct.App.1998). "If the fo......
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Masri v. State, No. 2012AP1047.
...and consistency in the application of the statute.UFE Inc., 201 Wis.2d at 284, 548 N.W.2d 57 (quoting Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis.2d 650, 660, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995)). Under great weight deference, the reviewing court will not overturn an agency's reasonable interpretation that does ......
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Clean Wisconsin v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMM'N, No. 2004AP3179.
...Id., s 32 (quoting UFE, Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 284, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996) (in turn quoting Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 660, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995))). s 40. However, the appropriate test for great weight deference is not whether the agency has "decided a case presentin......
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Bank v. Guar. Financial, No. 2010AP729.
...and made based on the agency's expertise in the interests[334 Wis.2d 208] of uniformity and consistency. See Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis.2d 650, 660–62, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995). ¶ 62 We see no reason that we should be less deferential in the preemption context, because as a general ma......
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Hilton v. Department of Natural Resources, No. 2003AP3353.
...the statute. See majority op., ¶ 15; UFE, Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis.2d 274, 284, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996) (quoting Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis.2d 650, 660, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995)); Sea View Estates Beach Club, Inc. v. DNR, 223 Wis.2d 138, 148-49, 588 N.W.2d 667 (Ct.App.1998). "If the foregoi......
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JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO MUNICIPAL INTERPRETATION.
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