Harnischfeger Corp. v. Labor and Industry Review Com'n
| Decision Date | 24 October 1995 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 93-0947,s. 93-0947 |
| Citation | 539 N.W.2d 98,196 Wis.2d 650 |
| Parties | HARNISCHFEGER CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Petitioner, v. LABOR AND INDUSTRY REVIEW COMMISSION, Defendant-Co-Appellant-Petitioner, Guenther Gieske, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. HARNISCHFEGER CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Petitioner, v. LABOR AND INDUSTRY REVIEW COMMISSION, Defendant-Co-Appellant-Petitioner, Edward Bohn, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. HARNISCHFEGER CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Petitioner, v. LABOR AND INDUSTRY REVIEW COMMISSION, Defendant-Co-Appellant-Petitioner, Emmerich Drawitsch, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. to 93-0949. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners there were briefs by David L. Weir and Zubrensky, Padden, Horwitz & Weir, Milwaukee, and oral argument by David L. Weir.
For the defendant-co-appellant-petitioner the cause was argued by Richard Briles Moriarty, Assistant Attorney General, with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, Attorney General.
For the plaintiff-respondent-cross petitioner there were briefs by Thomas M. Rohe and Otjen, Van Ert, Stangle, Lieb & Weir, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Thomas M. Rohe.
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Michael H. Gillick and Murphy, Gillick, Wicht, & Prachthauser, Milwaukee, for Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers.
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Philip Lehner and Capwell & Berthelsen, Brookfield, for Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce.
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Joseph R. Long, II and Relles, Meeker & Borns and Betsy J. Abramson and Elder Law Center, all of Madison, for Elder Law Center of the Coalition of Wisconsin Aging Groups.
This is a review of a decision of the court of appeals affirming an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee county, Richard G. Harvey, Jr., Reserve Judge, which concluded that the Labor and Industry Relations Commission's (LIRC) interpretation of Wis.Stat. § 102.555(8) (1993-94) 1 directly contravenes the plain language of the statute and was therefore not to be granted deference. We conclude that LIRC's interpretation does not contravene the plain language of the statute because § 102.555(8) is ambiguous. Since LIRC's interpretation is otherwise reasonable, it should have been accorded the appropriate deference. As such, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
Guenther Gieske, Edward Bohn and Emmerich Drawitsch all suffered hearing loss during the course of their employment with Harnischfeger Corporation. It is undisputed, however, that each had prior, though less severe, hearing loss before they began their employment with Harnischfeger.
LIRC determines compensation awards for hearing loss by looking to the various subsections of Wis.Stat. § 102.555. Specifically germane to this case is subsection (8) which discusses the treatment of hearing loss occurring prior to employment. It reads:
102.555 Occupational deafness; definitions.
....
(8) An employer is liable for the entire occupational deafness to which his or her employment has contributed; but if previous deafness is established by a hearing test or other competent evidence, whether or not the employe was exposed to noise within the 2 months preceding such test, the employer is not liable for previous loss so established nor is the employer liable for any loss for which compensation has previously been paid or awarded.
LIRC has historically taken the position that the same definition which is applied to the phrase "occupational deafness" in this subsection should also be applied to the phrase "previous deafness." Wisconsin Statutes § 102.555(1), the applicable definitional subsection, defines "occupational deafness" as "loss of hearing," but does not specifically define "previous deafness." For further guidance, LIRC appropriately looked to the administrative code for an interpretation of "loss of hearing." The Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations (DILHR), through proper administrative rule-making procedures, determined 40 years ago that loss of hearing is not compensable under Wisconsin's Worker's Compensation Act until a person has suffered a loss exceeding 30 decibels. 2 See Wis.Admin.Code § Ind 80.25.
LIRC applied this definition to both "occupational deafness" and "previous deafness" in determining the compensation awards of Gieske, Bohn and Drawitsch. Harnischfeger petitioned, under Wis.Stat. § 102.555, for judicial review of LIRC's decisions. The circuit court found that LIRC's methodology held employers responsible for all hearing loss between 0 and 30 decibels even if such loss was not caused by employment. Although the trial court recognized that deference to LIRC was otherwise appropriate, it held that LIRC's interpretation contravened the clear meaning of the statute. As such, it did not accept LIRC's interpretation, but instead applied Harnischfeger's proposed formula in determining the awards. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's holding that LIRC's formula was invalid since it directly contravened the words of the statute, but disagreed with its methodology. See Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 184 Wis.2d 227, 230, 517 N.W.2d 193, 195 (Ct.App.1994). It went on to determine the employees' awards under an entirely different formula. See id.
In order to understand why this seemingly straightforward exercise of agency discretion so concerned the courts below, it is necessary to briefly discuss how LIRC's methodology works in practice. According to LIRC, an employee is not compensated for the first 30 decibels of loss of hearing. For every decibel loss above 30, however, an employee is considered to have 1.6 percent occupational deafness. 3 The percentages increase at a rate of 1.6 percent per decibel up to a maximum of a 93 decibel loss. At this point the person is considered to have reached 100 percent occupational deafness. See Wis.Admin.Code § Ind 80.25. For example, an employee who starts work with a 25 decibel loss and leaves work with a 40 decibel loss is compensated for the entire loss over 30 by his employer, 10 decibels, which equates to 16 percent occupational deafness. This is regardless of whether the employee's original 25 decibel loss was caused by prior employment, other causes or a natural defect.
Under LIRC's scheme, however, employers do receive a credit if an employee begins work with hearing loss greater than 30 decibels. Therefore, if the employee started with a loss of 35 decibels, the employer would receive a five decibel credit. Thus, the employee's compensable hearing loss percentage would be 16 percent for the 40 decibel loss minus eight percent for the prior 35 decibel loss for a sum of eight percent or a five decibel loss.
The circuit court, the court of appeals and Harnischfeger contend that this interpretation makes an employer liable for all of an employee's deafness and not just the "occupational deafness" to which it has contributed. They assert that the employer in the last example (35 beginning decibel loss, 40 ending decibel loss) is actually being held liable for the entire 40 decibels of loss, even though only a five decibel loss was caused by employment. However, this is clearly incorrect. If the employer was actually responsible for the entire loss, a 40 decibel loss should translate into occupational deafness of 31 percent (40/130) representing the percentage of hearing lost by the individual on a scale of 0-130, the theoretical range of human hearing. The employer under LIRC's method, however, is actually liable for much less--1.6 X 5 decibels which equates to only eight percent occupational deafness.
Whether or not a court agrees or disagrees with LIRC's methodology, however, is not the issue in this case. Instead, the central question is what standard of review the courts of this state should apply when called upon to evaluate an agency's interpretation of a statute. The guiding principle is that statutory interpretation is a question of law which courts decide de novo. See Kania v. Airborne Freight Corp., 99 Wis.2d 746, 758, 300 N.W.2d 63, 68 (1981). Furthermore, a court is not bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute. See State ex rel. Parker v. Sullivan, 184 Wis.2d 668, 699, 517 N.W.2d 449, 460 (1994). As important, however, is the principle that courts should defer to an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute in certain situations. This court has applied three distinct levels of deference to agency interpretations: great weight, due weight and de novo review. 4 See Jicha v. DILHR, 169 Wis.2d 284, 290, 485 N.W.2d 256, 258-59 (1992). Great weight deference is appropriate once a court has concluded that: (1) the agency was charged by the legislature with the duty of administering the statute; (2) that the interpretation of the agency is one of long-standing; (3) that the agency employed its expertise or specialized knowledge in forming the interpretation; and (4) that the agency's interpretation will provide uniformity and consistency in the application of the statute. See Lisney v. LIRC, 171 Wis.2d 499, 505, 493 N.W.2d 14, 16 (1992).
To the extent the circuit court and the court of appeals found that some level of deference was applicable to LIRC's interpretations, they were correct. Although neither lower court so stated, it is clear under the standards set forth in Lisney that LIRC's interpretation was entitled to great weight deference. LIRC and its predecessors have long been charged with the duty of administering Chapter 102 and have exercised their expertise in analyzing and interpreting its various sections for over 80 years. See, e.g., Pendzich v. Industrial Comm., 11 Wis.2d 531, 532-33, 105 N.W.2d 781, 782-83 (1960); Discher v. Industrial Comm., 10 Wis.2d 637, 640, 103 N.W.2d 519, 520-21 (1960); Janiszewski v. Industrial Comm., 9 Wis.2d 171, 176-77, 100 N.W.2d 347, 348-49 (1960); General Castings Corp. v....
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